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Abstract 
 
The tax compliance behaviour of large businesses is one of the crucial challenges to 
nation-building in a developing country. However, studies in this area and knowledge of 
how the respective tax authorities manage the issue are somewhat limited. Hence, this 
study addresses a gap identified in the body of knowledge and answers research 
questions pertaining to the factors that influence large business compliance, how they 
affect it, and how the relevant authority manages compliance risks.   
Employing four fundamental research concepts to determine research design, this 
qualitative study used semi-structured, in-depth interviews to collect data. A total of 48 
key informants participated in this study. They were grouped according to their specific 
tax functions: tax officials, tax managers and tax advisors. The collected interview data 
was encoded and analysed using thematic analysis. Subsequently, data triangulation, 
member checking, and disconfirming evidence techniques were used to check the 
validity and reliability.  
Four main findings were derived from the study. First, it was found that four major factors 
simultaneously affect large business tax compliance in Indonesia. These are: (i) 
economic (cost-benefit driven decisions, compensation of manager, probability of 
detection and penalty, risk appetite and uncertainty), (ii) socio-psychological (personal 
and social norms, fairness and trust), (iii) corporate characteristics (tax risk 
management, ownership structure and business size, business profitability and the use 
of tax advisors) and (iv) regulation (complexity, ambiguity, unfairness and regulatory 
overlap). Secondly, in principle, the Indonesian tax authority (DGT) manages non-
compliance by means of two sequential steps: persuasion and enforcement. Thirdly, it 
was found that the issues of inadequate human resources, poor data management and 
lack of coordination have impeded the DGT’s capacity to respond effectively to 
compliance risks. Finally, the introduction of the responsive regulatory approach might 
have benefits for both the tax authority and taxpayers.     
Keywords: tax compliance behaviour, large businesses, influencing factors, managing 
tax risks, developing country, Indonesia. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This study aimed to address a knowledge gap that relates to tax compliance behaviour 
of large businesses. This study sought to obtain a better understanding of the factors 
that influence tax compliance behaviour of large businesses in Indonesia and how the 
respective authority is dealing with the associated risks. Despite the abundance of 
research into corporate taxpayer compliance in recent years, little attention has been 
paid to the study of large businesses’ tax compliance behaviour in developing 
countries. The literature is still unclear about the factors that affect this behaviour in a 
developing country and how the respective tax authorities manages the situation. 
Hence, this study attempted to contribute to the body of knowledge by addressing the 
gap concerning large firms’ compliance behaviour.  
This study investigated the factors that influence large businesses’ tax compliance 
from the perspective of tax officials, tax advisors and tax managers, and also explored 
how the DGT, the Indonesian tax authority, manages the non-compliance issues of 
large companies.  
The research design was constructed on the paradigm of interpretivism as the 
epistemological framework. As this study was intended to acquire an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon of large business’ tax compliance behaviour based 
on the participants’ perspectives, an emphasis on the quality of entities, processes and 
meanings was paramount as the expected information is the knowledge that comes 
from participants’ rich experiences and their contextual understanding. For these 
reasons, this study adopted a qualitative approach for the research by employing in-
depth, semi-structured interviews to collect data and using thematic analysis as the 
analytical tools. Previous studies have paid a little attention to large businesses’ tax 
compliance, especially in developing countries. Hence, this study offers an 
understanding of the large business compliance behaviour in a developing country, 
namely Indonesia, and the experiences of the respective tax authority in dealing with 
the issues, thereby addressing the gap in the literature.  
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1.1 Background 
The importance of tax for a nation is unquestionable. Tax revenue enables a country to 
provide basic needs, security, welfare and support to its citizens, all of which 
constitute a legitimate government (McKerchar & Evans, 2009). Hence, the tax 
authority has a responsibility to promote ongoing economic development, and in the 
meantime, the stakeholders expect the tax authority to have an effective compliance 
strategy and deliver an efficient service.  Although the tax systems of countries may 
vary substantially, their tax authorities have a common goal: to collect taxes while 
simultaneously ensuring the taxpayers' compliance (OECD, 2004).  
Unfortunately, the tax authorities in developing countries face greater challenges 
compared to their counterparts in developed countries. A limited organisational 
capacity, a rampant corruption issue, a mounting cash economy problem and an 
outdated information technology are amongst the main issues that have been 
recognised as hindering the effectiveness of tax collection (Torgler, 2011). Some studies 
have identified that there is much room for improvement in the tax administration of 
developing countries (See for example; Tanzi & Zee, 2000; Baurer, 2005; Brautigram, 
Fjeldstad, & Moore, 2008; Bird, 2008; McKerchar & Evans, 2009; Gordon & Li, 2009). 
Baurer (2005) details several internal shortcomings such as the inability to perform an 
adequate audits; lack of interest in establishing a self-assessment method; an 
inefficient voluntary compliance system; lack of specialisation among tax personnel; 
limited written operational procedures; inadequate training of  tax officials; and poor 
use of information technology including the lack of a centralised system to identify all 
taxpayers.  
Baurer (2005) also indicates other weaknesses, including inadequate internal controls 
to prevent corruption; poor communication that relies heavily on a top-down 
management approach, and inadequate efforts to improve the overall image of the tax 
administration. Regarding services for the taxpayer, limited tax-related education is 
offered to taxpayers, and the taxpayer may face an uncoordinated audit from multiple 
sectors of the tax administration office. Moreover, the tax authority has a shortage of 
staff and staff skills (Baer & Silvani, 1997; Trasberg, 2004; Tanzi & Zee, 2000; Bird, 
2008). Also, the tax audit focuses mainly on delinquent tax liabilities which are not 
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being aggressively enforced because of external intervention such as political 
interference. Another worrisome characteristic of tax administration in developing 
countries is their limited focus on large taxpayers despite the higher revenues that 
potentially could be collected from this group (Gordon & Li, 2009). 
In recent years, the issue of large business’ tax compliance behaviour has become a 
global concern (Braithwaite, 2005). As tax avoidance and evasion are becoming 
universal problems, the public must be aware that the revenue loss may cause severe 
damage as it threatens the financing of essential services for society as a whole 
(Franzoni, 1999; Eisenhauer, 2008). Nowadays, tax authorities are facing greater 
challenges in collecting taxes as businesses are operating more globally and therefore 
have more complex structures, for example, tax disputes on high-profile cases that 
involving well-known corporations such as Google, Apple and Amazon (Tomkins, 
Packman, Russel & Colville, 2001). It has been estimated that the amount of corporate 
tax avoidance is about a quarter of the total corporate profits in developed countries 
and the proportion is more substantial for the developing countries as they are more 
susceptible to tax avoidance activities (Dharmapala, 2014). According to Gordon and Li 
(2009), many tax authorities in developing countries depend on corporate income 
taxes as their main source of revenue estimated to be 19.3 percent on average 
compared to their counterparts in developed countries at only 9,7 percent.  
Indonesia is no exception; the Indonesian tax system has a history of heavy reliance on 
corporate taxes. The dependence concerns not only the amount paid by the corporate 
taxpayers but also the significant role played by these taxpayers. For example, Arnold 
(2012) stated that the natural resources industry is the backbone of Indonesian’s tax as 
it contributes up to 20 percent of the total corporate tax revenue. Regarding the 
importance of large businesses’ role in Indonesia, Le Borgne et al., (2008) identified 
that although there were only about 300 large taxpayers, they accounted for up to 27 
percent of the nation’s total revenue and the internal data from the DGT showed that 
the taxpayers registered with the Large Taxpayers Regional Office (LTRO) contributed 
around 40 percent to Indonesia’s annual tax revenue (DGT, 2016). Hence, any 
disruption to tax revenue from the large corporations would result in less government 
expenditure on infrastructure and public welfare. 
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As a developing country, Indonesia faces several problems with regard to large 
businesses’ compliance. Besides the issue of low tax collection productivity compared 
to its neighbouring countries like Malaysia or Thailand as pointed out by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2017),1 the tax compliance of large businesses 
poses a greater challenge requiring better management. Rahayu (2014) stated that 70 
percent of the foreign direct investment (FDI) companies had not paid their taxes as 
they were continuously reporting losses or, as stated by the Indonesian Minister of 
Finance in 2015, around 4,000 foreign companies had not filed an income tax return 
since their establishment in Indonesia (Gandhi, 2015). Moreover, the Panama Papers 
case indicated that at least 4,300 Indonesian companies or their affiliations have 
offshore accounts in tax haven countries (ICIJ, 2017). Meanwhile, the estimated losses 
of this non-compliance in terms of uncollected tax payable is IDR two trillion each 
year from only the FDI companies (Lestari, 2008) and the losses caused by the alleged 
tax evasion by 2,000 foreign firms has been around USD 37.53 billion over the past ten 
years as reported by the Jakarta Post (2016). Hence, this issue raises questions 
regarding the actual behaviours of large businesses in Indonesia in terms of taxation, 
and the factors that motivate taxpayers to comply, both of which were addressed in 
this study.     
Apart from depending on corporate tax revenues, the Indonesian tax administration 
appears to rely on the command and control approach conducted mainly through tax 
audits (Arnold, 2012) and penalties to enforce compliance or deter non-compliance 
(Rizal, 2011). Given the fact that a tax administration has limited resources for 
conducting extensive tax audits, arguably, an alternative approach to improve 
compliance is reasonable. Therefore, McKerchar and Evans (2009) suggested that 
developing countries should call for a synchronised and coordinated plan, 
accompanied by multiple comprehensive policy instruments and supported by a 
robust regulation policy in order to improve the compliance record.  
Despite the limitations that constrain a developing country, the respective tax 
administrations ideally should seek and apply the best available approach to meet 
their objectives of collecting taxes effectively and improving compliance optimally. 
                                                          
1
 See section 2.3 regarding tax compliance issues in Indonesia for more details. 
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The OECD (2001) suggested that a systematic model incorporating risk management 
as a tool could be used to enhance taxpayers’ compliance. In this vein, Braithwaite and 
Braithwaite (2000) argued that relying solely on the deterrence approach to improve 
the overall compliance is inadequate.  
Hence, in 2009, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) published a practical guide for tax administrations which incorporated 
compliance risk management (CRM) in the compliance strategy (OECD, 2009). From 
eight OECD members’ experiences, the incorporation of CRM system brought positive 
results, such as an improvement of corporate governance practices within the 
organisation. Realising the potential, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) (2010) 
released a policy that emphasised the importance of good corporate governance 
practices, sound tax risk management (TRM) and better relationship with large 
businesses in order to maintain compliance. The ATO’s new approach adopted for 
large corporations was followed by other tax administrations which suggested that 
large businesses should have a systematic method in place to ensure that they are 
complying with the tax laws (Brondolo, 2009). 
However, given Indonesia’s low tax productivity, taxpayers’ chronic non-compliance 
activities, and the sub-optimal capacity of the tax authority, it would be interesting to 
discover the actual practices of large businesses in the country and their attitudes 
toward taxes, tax administration and the government in particular. Moreover, it would 
be valuable to investigate how the tax administration manages those issues. Observing 
the shortcomings and exploring the possibility of introducing a better approach to 
improve taxpayers’ compliance are avenues worthy of further investigation.  
1.2 Motivation 
As a developing economy, Indonesia faces many challenges in its attempts to improve 
taxpayer compliance. As stated by McKerchar and Evans (2009), a lack of appropriate 
policy may hamper the effort to improve compliance. In this case, Indonesia was an 
appropriate context for this study given the researcher’s background and knowledge 
and his belief that it would be useful to explore the current practices in Indonesia. By 
bridging the gap between the current practices and the available knowledge, the 
researcher argues that the findings would be valuable not only for Indonesia but also 
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for tax administrations in other developing countries in similar situations regarding 
tax compliance.   
Although the majority of countries in the world are developing countries, there are 
few tax compliance studies in developing countries. Most of the previous studies have 
focused on developed countries and have tended to concentrate on individual rather 
than corporate taxation (McKerchar, 2001). Hence, the researcher was motivated to 
investigate the issue of large businesses’ tax compliance behaviour in Indonesia in 
order to address the gap in the literature concerning tax research on developing 
countries.  
Another motivation for this research is the fact that corporate compliance behaviour is 
a relatively new area of research and any findings related to the corporate decision 
either to comply or to not comply may advance the understanding of the respective 
issues (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Unlike the individual taxpayer, a corporation as a 
separate entity has some particular characteristics before the law such as its legal 
status, its obligation to shareholders and its distinct business profile; hence, in order 
to acquire a better understanding of corporate behaviour, a different research 
approach should be taken (Slemrod, 2004; Armstrong et al., 2012; Hanlon & Heitzman, 
2010; Lanis & Richardson, 2012).  Moreover, the nature of large business with its more 
sophisticated transactions places additional pressure on the tax authority to anticipate 
riskier complexities. Braithwaite (2005) argued that a progressive global tax planning 
strategy and a harmful corporate tax competition among countries made it difficult for 
authorities to implement a series of appropriate policy strategies. In fact, Ernst and 
Young (2009) pointed out that although the government has made preparation to 
tackle the problems, the anticipation itself still causing complexity, uncertainty and 
controversy. Hence, the interesting nature of a corporation itself aroused the 
researcher’s curiosity and was another motivation for carrying out this research.  
Finally, as a tax official from a developing country who has had the opportunity to 
conduct further academic research, it is encouraging to have the chance to explore the 
best available solutions to tackle the problem of non-compliance. Further, the 
researcher could determine whether the system or the model implemented in a 
developed country would be appropriate for the Indonesian setting. As previously 
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stated by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), the conventional approach that depends on 
command and control to enhance taxpayers’ compliance as currently applied by the 
Indonesian tax authority is regarded as inadequate and inefficient. In terms of large 
business compliance, it is essential to consider the impact of their overall behaviour as 
well (Lavermicocca & McKerchar, 2013). Moreover, an understanding of large business 
behaviour would be necessary, and to handle compliance problems, some flexibility 
that is aligned with the level of the taxpayer’s compliance risks is needed (Braithwaite 
& Wirth, 2001). In this sense, the researcher realises that corporate tax compliance 
behaviour is a relatively new area of research and most of the information has been 
derived from the experiences of developed countries. The researcher is aware that as a 
high context phenomenon, a single tax research and its findings cannot be a panacea 
for all tax compliance problems and no single generic approach is appropriate for 
every country without prior reviews and analysis. Therefore, the researcher believes 
that this study, conducted in the context of a developing country, contributes to an 
understanding of the factors that influence large firms’ tax compliance and how the 
tax authority is managing the situation.        
1.3 Research objectives and research questions 
The objective of this study was to investigate the factors that influence large business 
tax compliance in Indonesia and how the tax authority manages this situation. It was 
anticipated that several parties would influence the compliance of large corporate 
taxpayers. It was also expected that the decision about whether or not to comply 
would depend on external factors as well as the internal dynamics of a large business. 
Hence, it was assumed that it would be significant for the study to include the 
opinions and perspectives of relevant parties who contribute to large businesses 
compliance. Accordingly, to gain a better understanding of the abovementioned 
issues, this study obtained opinions from three inter-related parties: tax officials, tax 
managers and tax advisors who were representing the tax function in practice as 
regulator, taxpayer and intermediary as these three groups were regarded as having 
experiences and knowledge. Therefore, the following actions were established to 
address the aims of this study: 
a. To conduct a review of the relevant literature in order to identify: (i) 
Definitions of the concepts of tax compliance, tax avoidance and tax risk; (ii) 
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The determinants and the conceptual understanding regarding factors that are 
influencing corporate compliance behaviour; (iii) The appropriate frameworks 
as the basis of analysis in the study, and; (iv) The knowledge gap in the existing 
literature. 
b. To undertake necessary fieldwork as the means of collecting data from the 
participants after the research design and the methodology of the study had 
been determined. 
c. To analyse and examine the collected data with thematic analysis and 
corroborate it with point (a) above in order to validate the results of the 
analysis. 
d. To apply the findings to the context of tax administration in Indonesia for its 
policy implications. 
Therefore, to achieve the research objectives, this study was guided by the following 
research questions: 
1. What are the factors that influence large businesses’ tax compliance risks from 
the perspectives of the tax officials, the tax managers, and the independent tax 
advisors? 
2. How does the tax authority manage large business taxpayers’ compliance risks 
according to the factors identified by addressing the previous research 
question? 
In order to answer those research questions satisfactorily, the following goals were 
established:  
i. To acquire insights on large business compliance behaviour and examine 
any existing non-compliance issues;  
ii. To determine the main factors affecting large companies’ tax non-
compliance and to understand the emerging perspectives on this matter; 
iii. To obtain an understanding of the tax compliance process in large 
businesses and analyse their interaction with their external tax advisors 
and vice versa;  
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iv. To gain insights on the relationship between the tax authority and large 
corporate taxpayers and analyse the effectiveness of this relationship.  
v. To evaluate the significance of the non-compliance risks and examine how 
the DGT counters the risks. 
1.4 Significance of the study 
This study systematically investigated the factors that influence large businesses’ tax 
compliance and how the tax authority is managing the issues. The findings of the 
study will explain the factors that contributed to the tax compliance behaviour of large 
businesses in Indonesia and the measures taken by the tax authority to tackle large 
corporate taxpayers’ non-compliance problems. Hence, it is envisaged that this study 
will make at least three significant contributions.  
First, it adds to the literature in the area of tax research, particularly the study of 
corporate tax compliance in a developing country. Although the tax compliance of 
large businesses has become a major issue in tax research because of its economic 
importance, the factors that influence their compliance in a developing country have, 
unfortunately, attracted little research, since most studies have focused on the 
experiences of developed countries. Moreover, this study is the first to use the 
qualitative method to analyse the issue of large businesses tax compliance in Indonesia 
as most of the previous empirical researches were conducted using a quantitative 
approach2. 
Secondly, this study obtained perspectives of large business compliance from three 
inter-related groups that represent the tax function. In particular it is worth noting 
that the point of view of tax officials is rarely available in the literature although the 
officials play an important role in shaping taxpayers’ compliance. The researcher has 
                                                          
2
 For example, previous studies on Indonesian large businesses have discussed tax compliance cost 
(Susila & Pope, 2012; Pope & Susila, 2014); tax aggressiveness that relates to the changes in corporate 
income tax rates (Hartadinata & Shauki, 2013); tax avoidance practices by the FDI companies 
(Rahayu, 2014); transfer pricing issues (Mulyani, 2010). See the details of previous studies in Section 
3.7. 
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found previous relevant studies that incorporate tax officials’ perspectives, although 
these are rare in qualitative studies.3   
Finally, this study enriches the research literature on tax administration by elaborating 
on the strategy used by the tax authority and the challenges it faces when tackling the 
issue of large business non-compliance in a developing country. Moreover, regarding 
practical application, the study contributes to the Indonesian tax policy improvement 
by making relevant policy recommendations for the competent authority based on the 
findings of this study.4 
1.5 Scope of the study 
Given the time constraint and the importance of making the study manageable, it was 
important to specify the scope of this study. First, this study was specifically 
conducted to investigate the factors that influence large businesses’ compliance and 
how the tax authority is managing the issues. In the Indonesian context, and for the 
purposes of this thesis, a large business is defined as a business with an annual 
turnover in excess of IDR 50 billion or USD 3.85 million5. Hence, this study did not 
include a discussion of other types of taxpayers such as the individual taxpayer or the 
small business taxpayer.  
Secondly, this study was conducted using the qualitative approach whereby the data 
was collected from semi-structured interviews and from public archival records to 
support the interview data. Documents such as the Indonesian tax laws and related 
regulations were used as references. Other sources such as the Indonesian budget 
statement from 2010 to 2016, the international organisations report from the World 
Bank, the IMF and the OECD were also examined. Information was also acquired from 
relevant formal sources such as the DGT’s website. Therefore, the study did not intend 
                                                          
3
 For example, these are some studies that incorporated tax official’s point of view: Job & Honaker 
(2003); Murphy (2004a); Morris, Lonsdale & Revenue (2004); Boll (2011); Mahmood (2012). 
4
 The details of the policy recommendations offered are presented in Section 8.4. 
5
 Article 6 of The Law Number 20 Year 2008 of Micro, Small and Medium Businesses defines the 
business size by its turnover. As an illustration, Figure 2-5 at page 18 indicates tax revenue 
contributions collected from large businesses that registered in the Large Taxpayer Offices who 
manages fewer than 1,000 corporate taxpayers, however, they contribute for over 32 percent of the 
DGT total tax revenue every year. 
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to generalise the findings as representations of the participants’ community that had 
been involved in the study, namely, tax officials, tax managers and tax advisors, but 
rather sought to gain insights regarding the phenomenon of large business tax 
compliance behaviour and the tax administration situation in Indonesia.  
Thirdly, it needs to be acknowledged that the study has several limitations discussed 
in more detail in Section 8.5. Finally, although this study intersects with other tax 
research areas such as tax accounting, transfer pricing, or tax evasion, it should be 
noted that this thesis is concerned with income tax compliance or non-compliance 
only and it is important to emphasise that a discussion of those areas is beyond the 
scope of this study.  
1.6 Overview of research design 
This study was conducted using a qualitative methodology approach in order to obtain 
comprehensive and detailed information about large business behaviour and practices 
in Indonesia. Accordingly, in-depth semi-structured interviews were used to collect 
data from 48 participants who were categorised into three groups: tax officials, tax 
managers and tax advisors. To enrich and substantiate the collected data, secondary 
data was acquired from other relevant sources such as the published and unpublished 
material from the DGT, reports from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) of Indonesia, 
reports from the international donors and organisations and the official websites of 
several institutions in Indonesia.  The collected data was then coded and analysed by 
means of thematic analysis. NVivo software was used to sort, group and compile the 
data for the purpose of further analysis. The findings obtained were compared with 
and corroborated by the findings from previous studies to achieve the research 
objectives and to answer the research questions. Accordingly, the methodology and 
research method selection and its justification are discussed further in Chapter 4.  
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters including this introductory chapter. Chapter 2, 
Background of the Indonesian Tax Administration, explains the contextual background 
by giving an overview of the Indonesian tax system and its compliance issues. 
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Chapter 3, Literature Review, reviews the relevant literature, beginning with a 
discussion of relevant concepts such as tax compliance, tax avoidance and tax risk. The 
chapter then briefly examines the factors influencing corporate compliance behaviour 
under three major categories: economic factors, socio-psychological factors and 
corporate characteristics. This is followed by a discussion of responsive regulation and 
corporate risk management. The chapter concludes with a review of previous 
compliance studies in the Indonesian context and identification of the knowledge gap 
that this study addressed. 
Chapter 4, Research Design and Methodology, outlines the research design and the 
adopted methodology. It provides details of the methodology, theory, domain and 
research method adopted for the study. The chapter also discusses the process of data 
collection and its analysis. Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion of the reliability and 
validity of the research instrument and subsequent findings. 
Chapter 5, Factors That Influence Large Business Compliance, presents the findings 
related to the first research question of the study. It outlines the corporate factors and 
the regulation factors as the major findings.  
Chapter 6, The Tax Authority’s Responses to Large Business Compliance Risks, presents 
the findings pertaining to the second research question. The chapter discusses the 
DGT’s current capacity and how it manages the issue of non-compliance. Chapter 6 
concludes with the participants’ opinions regarding responsive regulation.  
Chapter 7, Discussion, summarises the findings discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6 
in relation to the existing literature, and discusses their implications. The chapter also 
revisits the research questions which guided this study.  
Finally, Chapter 8, Conclusions and Policy Recommendations, concludes this thesis and 
provides a summary of the study, its contributions, policy recommendations, 
limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.         
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CHAPTER 2  
THE BACKGROUND OF INDONESIAN TAX ADMINISTRATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the research background that underpins this 
study. It includes a description of the Indonesian tax system in Section 2.2 comprising 
a discussion of the revenue and tax structure, income tax and corporate income tax, 
and tax administration. Section 2.3 discusses four indicators of compliance issues in 
Indonesia that pertain to corporate taxpayers. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter.  
2.2 Overview of the Indonesian tax system 
Under the Indonesian constitution, there are two main administrators responsible for 
collecting taxes in Indonesia. The first is the central government which includes the 
DGT that is responsible for administering the tax system, as well as levying and 
collecting central government taxes such as income tax and value-added tax (VAT)6. 
The second is the level of government that is responsible for collecting local 
government taxes such as the vehicle tax and the hotel and restaurant tax. This 
authority has two levels of administrators: the provincial government and the 
municipal or city government (Parlaungan, 2017).   
Central government taxes are stipulated in the Taxation Laws that are issued jointly by 
the parliament and the central government.7 Currently, there are five laws related to 
the central taxes under the DGT’s administration (Rosid, 2017); these are: The Law of 
General Provision and Taxation Procedures (Law Number 6 of 1983); The Law of 
Income Tax (Law Number 7 of 1983); The Law of Value Added Taxes and Luxury Sales 
                                                          
6
 Two agencies administer the central government taxes - the Directorate General of Taxes (DGT) and 
the Directorate General of Customs and Excise. These two agencies are under the MoF. 
7
 Local government taxes are stipulated by local regulations which are issued by the respective local 
government after it has approval from the local parliament for the respective draft of local tax laws. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the local taxes cannot overlap with the central government taxes 
and the regulations must be in accordance with the Laws of Local Tax and Retribution. 
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Tax (Law Number 8 of 1983); The Law of Land and Building Tax (Law Number 12 of 
1985); and The Law of Stamp and Duty (Law Number 13 of 1985).8 
2.2.1 Revenue and tax structure in Indonesia 
Indonesia relies heavily on taxes to sustain its finances. The contribution of taxes to 
the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN) was about 76 percent on average 
from 2010 to 2016, and the national budget revenue is derived mostly from domestic 
taxes rather than from non-tax sources. The dominant role of tax revenue in financing 
the budget is shown in Table 2-1 below. As Table 2-1 shows, the composition of the 
state budget was dominated by domestic revenues from 2010 to 2016, with domestic 
taxes on average contributing around 76 percent to the budget whereas the rest is 
contributed by non-tax revenues derived from natural resources, profit transfers from 
state-owned enterprises, public service institutions, and other non-tax sources of 
revenue. 
TABLE 2-1 STATE BUDGET REVENUES 2010-2016 (IN BILLIONS USD)
9
 
 
Source: Republic of Indonesia (2016; 2017) 
                                                          
8
 It is worth noting that the Laws (Undang-undang) act as the highest order of regulation under the 
Constitution which is generally established by the parliament (the People’s Representative Council). 
Meanwhile, the executive or the President can propose a bill to the parliament. Concurrently, at the 
level of central government, Undang-Undang (the law) is the highest order in the hierarchical system 
and, based on this order, then the lower ranks of regulation can be derived, for example, the 
Governmental Regulation, the Presidential Regulation and Regional Regulation (Article 7 of the Law 
Number 10 of 2004 concerning the Formulation of Laws and Regulation). Meanwhile, the ministerial 
decrees and the decrees of the Director General of the DGT are two types of regulation that are issued 
if specific laws such as the tax laws have mandated to do so. See Appendix A for more detail. 
9
 The number of the Indonesian budget is converted to US Dollar (USD) from the Indonesian Rupiah 
(IDR) based on the year end exchange rate that provided by the Indonesian central bank. Data was 
retrieved from http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952  
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
I.    Domestic Revenues 110.4 132.9 137.8 117.5 131.3 108.4 115.1 99.55
1  Tax Revenues 80.4 96.4 101.4 88.4 100.2 89.9 95.6 76.29
a.  Domestic Tax 77.2 90.4 96.3 84.5 95.6 87.4 93.0 73.09
b.  International Tax 3.2 6.0 5.1 3.9 4.5 2.5 2.6 3.20
2  Non Tax Revenue 29.9 36.6 36.4 29.1 31.1 18.5 19.5 23.26
a.  Natural Resources 18.8 23.6 23.4 18.6 19.4 7.3 4.8 13.26
b.  Profit Transfers  From 
State-Owned Enterprise 
(SOE)
3.3 3.1 3.2 2.8 3.2 2.7 2.8
2.48
c.  Other Non Tax Revenues 6.6 7.6 7.6 5.7 6.8 5.9 8.8 5.75
d.  Revenue from Public 
Service Agency (PSA)
1.2 2.2 2.2 2.0 1.7 2.6 3.1 1.77
II.  Grants 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.9 0.7 0.45
Total 110.7 133.5 138.4 118.0 131.5 109.3 115.8 100.00
Composition
Financial Year % 
Average
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Figure 2-1 below shows the trend of domestic tax increasing steadily from 70 percent 
contribution in 2010 to 80 percent in 2016. Conversely, the non-tax revenue decreased 
gradually from 27 percent in 2010 to 17 percent in 2016, with the natural resource 
revenue having the greatest decline from 17 percent in 2010 to four percent in 2016.     
 
FIGURE 2-1 TREND OF REVENUE IN THE STATE BUDGET 2010-2016 
Source: Republic of Indonesia (2016; 2017) 
In general, domestic taxes are mainly comprised of income tax, VAT, and excise duties. 
Figure 2-2 shows that in the past seven years from 2010 to 2016, the largest proportion 
of domestic tax revenue has been collected from income tax, VAT and excise duties 
with the average share of 50.37 percent, 35.49 percent and 10.65 percent respectively as 
shown in the pie diagram below. 
 
FIGURE 2-2 PROPORTION OF DOMESTIC TAXES (2010-2016) 
Source: Republic of Indonesia (2016; 2017) 
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The DGT administers five central government taxes: Income Tax, VAT, Sales Tax on 
Luxury Goods, Land and Building Tax for Mining and Estate and stamp duty. From 
2010 to 2016, the contribution of income tax increased from IDR 334.8 trillion to IDR 
666.2 trillion or almost double the revenue collected in 2010. The contribution of the 
VAT peaked in 2015 with IDR 423.7 trillion and slightly declined in 2016 to IDR 412.2 
trillion as shown by the trend depicted in Figure 2-3.10  
 
FIGURE 2-3 TAX COLLECTED BY THE DGT 2010-2016 (IN TRILLIONS IDR) 
Source: Republic of Indonesia (2016; 2017) 
Regarding the tax revenue that is generated from corporate taxpayers, the Indonesian 
tax system has a history of heavy reliance on the corporate taxpayer to generate, 
withhold and pay the taxes. The system mandates the corporate taxpayer to act as the 
tax withholder which means that the taxes on employee salaries and wages are 
withheld by their employer that is most likely to be the corporate taxpayer who 
transfers the tax money to the Government’s account. The system classifies this tax 
revenue as ‘tax revenue generated from corporation’ rather than under the 
classification of ‘tax revenue generated from individual’.11 As stated by Francis (2012), 
                                                          
10
 For information, the exchange rate of USD 1 to IDR from 2010 to 2016 is 8,991, 9,068, 9,670, 
12,189, 12,440, 13,795 and 13,436 respectively. (The exchange rate is retrieved from 
http://www.bps.go.id/LinkTableDinamis/view/id/952 ) 
11
 The DGT classifies tax revenue differentiation is not by the tax source but by the actor who pays the 
tax money into the Government’s account. For example, tax on salary or wages is withheld by their 
employers- i.e. corporations or government agencies, although, in fact, this type of tax is personal 
income tax but it is categorised under the classification of ‘income tax revenue generated from 
corporation’ as the corporation is the actor who pay the respective tax to Government’s account.  
17 
 
there is no direct split-up between personal income tax and corporate income tax in 
Indonesia. The IMF (2011) confirmed this by stating that the official statistics do not 
differentiate income tax from individual and corporate taxpayers and later the IMF 
(2011) estimated that 80 percent of income tax revenue is derived from the corporate 
taxpayer. Figure 2-4 demonstrates the crucial role of the corporate taxpayer in 
generating revenue under the Indonesian tax system. Under the DGT’s classification, 
corporate taxpayers have contributed more than 90 percent of total revenue from 2005 
to 2016, while the individual taxpayers and treasurer taxpayers have less than 10 
percent of contributions during the respective period.12 
 
FIGURE 2-4 TAX REVENUE CONTRIBUTIONS PER CATEGORY OF TAXPAYER 2005-2016 (AS 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REVENUE) 
Source: DGT (2012; 2017) 
In the corporate taxpayer category, the group of large taxpayers plays a vital role in 
generating tax revenue. Susila (2014) argued that despite its small number of 
registered taxpayers, the group contributed significantly to the total tax revenue. 
Figure 2-5 below indicates tax revenue contributions collected by the Regional Large 
Taxpayer Office (LTRO) that manages fewer than 1,000 registered corporate taxpayers 
compared to the other 30 regional offices in the DGT. This figure shows the 
contribution of the LTRO compared with the combination of all other regional tax 
                                                          
12
 Under Indonesian tax law, three types of income taxpayers are recognised, namely, corporate 
taxpayer, individual taxpayer and treasurer taxpayer. A treasurer taxpayer is a government’s official in 
a government agency that has been appointed and mandated by the law to withhold the relevant tax 
payable in accordance with government payments to the external parties where the source of the 
payment is from the State budget.      
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offices in the DGT. Despite showing a decline in the revenue contribution, the LTRO 
accounted for over 32 percent of the DGT total tax revenue every year. 
 
FIGURE 2-5 THE REGIONAL LTO SHARES OF CONTRIBUTION 2006-2016 
Source: DGT (2012; 2017) 
2.2.2 Income tax in Indonesia 
Income tax in Indonesia is stipulated by Law Number 7 of 1983 concerning Income 
Tax. The law itself has been amended four times with amendments in 1991, 1994, 2000 
and the latest one was in 2008. The main purpose of these amendments was to 
improve fairness, to enhance service quality, to promote certainty and to encourage 
voluntary compliance of taxpayers, as well as to improve professionalism, 
transparency, law enforcement, and update information technology from the side of 
tax administration (Rosid, 2017). 
Liability to income tax in Indonesia in general, based on residency status; Indonesian 
residents are taxed on their income derived from worldwide sources, while the non-
residents are taxed on income derived from Indonesian sources.13 Indonesia imposes a 
range of taxes on corporate and individual taxpayers which includes: (1) corporate 
income tax; (2) individual income tax; (3) withholding tax on employees’ 
remuneration, and various payments to third parties.  
                                                          
13
 As stipulated on Article 4 (1) of Law Number 7 of 1983 concerning Income Tax.  
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A self-assessment system was introduced to the income tax system in 1983 (Gillis, 
1985). This system requires the taxpayers to self-calculate and self-report their tax 
obligations on a regular basis. Along with self-assessment, the income tax system in 
Indonesia also includes the withholding taxes whereby the government obliges 
particular taxpayers to withhold or deduct a certain amount of taxes from other 
taxpayer payments and then remit the said taxes to the government (Mulyani, 2010). 
Indonesia has five types of withholding tax in their income tax system: withholding tax 
on employees’ salaries, withholding tax on payments to foreigners, withholding tax on 
income from asset utilisation (e.g. rent, interest and dividend), withholding tax on 
income from service provision, and withholding tax imposed on particular industries 
(e.g. steel, paper, and automotive). 
2.2.3 Corporate income tax in Indonesia 
Currently, the statutory tax rate for corporations in Indonesia is a flat rate of 25 
percent for the fiscal year 2010 onward.14 However, if public companies have satisfied a 
minimum listing requirement of 40 percent of their paid-up shares that are listed for 
trading on the Indonesian Stock Exchange and have met other predetermined 
conditions, they are entitled to have a tax cut of five percent of the standard rate.15 
Also, to support small businesses, the government offers an incentive of a further 50 
percent cut on the standard corporate tax rate that applies to small businesses that 
have met certain conditions. 
In principle, the resident companies are taxed based on their worldwide income. 
However, the non-resident corporations are taxed only on their Indonesia-source 
income, including income related to their permanent establishment in Indonesia. 
                                                          
14
 According to Article 17 of Law Number 7 of 1983 concerning Income Tax as lastly amended by 
Law Number 36 of 2008. 
15
 A five percent corporate tax rate cut can be granted to a public company that satisfies the following 
conditions:  
- At least 40 percent of their paid-in shares are listed for trading in the Indonesian Stock Exchange 
and these shares are placed in the collective custody of a custodian and the respective settlement 
institution 
- The term ‘public’ means it consists of at least 300 individuals who own the shares and each 
individual holds less than five percent of the paid-in shares. 
This applied condition must be maintained for at least 183 days in a tax year to obtain the five 
percent tax cut. 
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According to the Indonesian income tax law, the taxable objects are broadly defined as 
“income”, which is defined in Article 4(1) of the Law Number 7 of 1983 as any increase 
in economic capacity received by or accrued by a taxpayer from within or outside 
Indonesia which may be utilized for consumption or to increase the taxpayer's wealth, 
in whatever name and form.  
Consequently, there is no difference in the treatment of a foreign-owned subsidiary 
and a locally-owned entity. Hence, a company is treated as an Indonesian resident for 
tax purposes if its business, incorporation or domicile is within the Indonesia border. 
Foreign firms that carry out their business activities in Indonesia through a permanent 
establishment (PEs) have obligations similar to those of the resident taxpayer. 
Therefore, both the resident taxpayers and the PEs of foreign companies are required 
to settle their tax liabilities either by direct payments, third-party withholdings or a 
combination of both. Those foreign firms without PEs must settle their tax liabilities 
for their Indonesian-sourced income through a withholding mechanism via the 
Indonesian party that is responsible for paying their income.16 
Standard accounting principles calculate taxable business profits, and at some point, 
the profits can be modified by the acceptable tax adjustments17. Principally, deductions 
are allowed for all expenditures incurred as long as the expenditures have been 
disbursed in order to earn, to collect and to secure the business profits.18 In practice, 
book-timing differences may occur if some costs have been recorded as expenses in 
the accounting post which cannot be claimed immediately as deductions for tax 
purposes.19 
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 According to Article 26 of the Indonesian income tax law number 36 year 2008. 
17
 The acceptable tax adjustment means a range of items that have been acceptable for being adjusted 
in taxable income calculation. Typically, the adjustment is made in the taxpayer’s reconciliation 
statement by indicating the differences between profit or loss that calculated for the purpose of 
accounting and the taxable income calculation.  
18
 According to Article 6 of the Indonesian income tax law number 36 year 2008. 
19
 Frequently, some permanent differences and or timing differences may occur regarding expenditures 
in order to calculate the final profit. Therefore, the profit reconciliation is always needed between the 
accounting division and the taxation division.   
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However, for some specialised industries and activities, different provisions may apply 
regarding the calculation of corporate income tax. These include specific contractual-
based concessions such as Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) and Contract of 
Works (CoWs)20. Companies that are engaged in upstream oil and gas and geothermal 
industries should calculate corporate income tax in accordance with their PSCs. A 
particular company engaged in metal, mineral and coal mining is governed by CoW 
when calculating its tax liabilities. However, CoWs are no longer available to new 
mining projects since the enactment of the Law Number 4 of 2009 concerning Mineral 
and Coal Mining which stipulates that general prevailing tax laws and regulations 
apply to the mining projects (PwC, 2017). 
In the case of transfer pricing, the DGT requires that related party transactions or 
dealings with the affiliated companies, which includes profit-sharing by multinational 
corporations, should be carried out on an arm’s length basis and in a “commercially 
justifiable way”. 21  Moreover, the government requires specific transfer pricing 
documentation22 to prove that the most appropriate transfer pricing method has been 
utilised, and the transactions made were consistent with the arm’s length principle.23 
However, the domestic-related party transactions, in general, are outside the scope of 
the transfer pricing rules unless the taxpayer is subject to different tax rates, as in the 
cases where the transactions have been conducted with contractors in the oil and gas 
industry. If a company has failed to follow this requirement, the DGT is authorised to 
                                                          
20
 The Contract of Works or Kontrak Karya (KK) is a mining concession between the government of 
the Republic of Indonesia with a company to carry out mining activities excluding oil and gas in a 
specific period. KK was previously stipulated in the Law Number 11 year 1967 on Principal Terms of 
Mining before it was replaced with the new law in 2009.  
21
 In general, the Indonesian income tax law describes related parties as: 
a. Companies who have ownership in term of capital participation at least 25 percent either 
directly or indirectly upon other companies;  
b. Companies who control another company or two or more companies are under the similar 
control, either directly or indirectly; or, 
c. There is family relationship which is indicated either by blood relationship or by marriage. 
22
 As promulgated by the Regulation of Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia No. 
213/PMK.03/2016. 
23
 As promulgated by the DGT Regulation No. PER-32/PJ/2011 and the DGT Regulation No. 
43/PJ/2010 concerning the application of arm’s length principle in related party transactions.  
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recalculate the taxable income or the deductable costs by applying the arm’s length 
principle24. 
Any company that has transfer pricing disputes with the DGT may file an objection or 
an appeal with the Tax Court. Alternatively, this taxpayer can request a double tax 
relief under the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) article if the transactions with 
the related party were conducted with one of Indonesia’s tax treaty partners. Further, 
the Government Regulation Number 74 of 2011 provides flexibility for the taxpayer to 
apply for a MAP and to continue domestic resolution at the same time. However, there 
is a restriction: a MAP application cannot be lodged if the Tax Court has declared an 
end to the court hearing process. Another mechanism used to settle the related party 
transactions dispute is the Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) which is regulated by 
the Regulation of Ministry of Finance Number 07/PMK.03/2015. Once the APA has 
been established, it is valid for a maximum of three fiscal years for unilateral 
agreements and four fiscal years for bilateral agreements after the effective date.  
To tackle tax avoidance, despite the non-existence of general anti-avoidance rules in 
Indonesia, Indonesia does have several specific measures. For example, to anticipate 
tax treaty misconduct by the taxpayer, the DGT requires taxpayers to confirm that 
their transactions have economic substance and are not designed solely to take 
advantage of a tax treaty’s benefit. Another anti-avoidance rule is applied by the 
provision of the Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC)25. A CFC is defined as an 
unlisted foreign company in which the Indonesian resident either individually or as a 
group holds at least 50 percent or more of the total paid in capital to that offshore 
company.26 All the overseas investment by the Indonesian taxpayer will be subject to 
this rule except for the foreign investments that have been made to the publicly listed 
companies because Indonesia has not had either a ‘white list’ or ‘black list’ of countries 
since 2009. A Debt-to-Equity Ratio (DER) mechanism is also applied to tackle the 
avoidance whereby the amount of tax deducted from the cost of borrowing that arises 
                                                          
24
 The arm’s length principle is based on Article 9 of the OECD model tax convention which identified 
as a situation when the parties transact with each other, the condition or the fact of those parties are 
independent or the transaction is determined by purely market forces (OECD, 2017).  
25
 Stipulated in the Article 18 (2) of the Indonesian income tax law. 
26
 Stated in the Article 18 of the Indonesian income tax law and further regulated by the Minister of 
Finance Regulation No. 256/PMK.03/2008. 
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from debt, in general, is restricted to a maximum threshold of DER of 4:1; alternatively, 
the excess of the borrowing cost cannot be deductible for tax calculation purposes.   
2.2.4 Tax administration in Indonesia 
The DGT is an echelon 1 unit under the MoF, and is headed by the Director General of 
Taxes. In general, the DGT’s primary tasks are formulating, implementing various 
technical policies and establishing taxation standards at the national level. In 
undertaking those tasks, the DGT performs several functions such as preparing and 
implementing taxation policies; preparing norms, standards, procedures and criteria of 
taxation; providing technical guidance and supervision; performing monitoring, 
evaluation and reporting in taxation; performing tax administration; and performing 
other functions assigned by the Minister of Finance (DGT, 2015). The DGT has a head 
office and operational offices. The head office is located in Jakarta and comprises one 
secretariat, 14 directorates and four senior advisors. The details regarding the 
operational offices that are dispersed across Indonesia are shown in Table 2-2 below.  
TABLE 2-2 TYPE AND NUMBER OF DGT OFFICES 
Type of office Number of offices 
Regional Tax Office (RTO) 33 
Large Taxpayers Office (LTO) 4 
Medium Taxpayers Office (MTO) 28 
Small Taxpayers Office (STO) 309 
Tax Services Dissemination and 
Consultation Office (TSDCO) 
207 
Technical Implementing Unit (TIU) 5 
Source: DGT (2015) 
As of 2015, the DGT had 37,987 employees, 70.54 percent of whom were men. Figure  
2-6 below shows that around 64 percent of the DGT’s employees work on Java Island 
since Java is the most populous area in Indonesia and most of the economic activities 
take place on this island. Figure 2-7 below shows the composition of the DGT’s 
workforce according to their function namely, echelon official, administration, tax 
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auditor, appraiser and computer administrator.27 The figure indicate an imbalance 
proportion between the personnel that appointed for administrative and the non-
administrative. As evident, 74 percent of employees have an administrative function, 
while tax auditors constitute only 12 percent of the total employees. As argued by 
Korte (2013), this is not an ideal situation for a tax administration and has negative 
consequences in terms of tax compliance. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2-6 THE DGT EMPLOYEES' DISTRIBUTION BY LOCATION 
Source: DGT (2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2-7 THE DGT EMPLOYEES' COMPOSITION BY FUNCTION 
Source: DGT (2015) 
                                                          
27
 Echelon official is a higher level official who was appointed to head a section, division, tax office or 
regional office in the DGT’s organizational structure. The Echelon rank is divided into four level: 
Echelon 1 (the director general), Echelon 2 (directors, senior advisors, head of regional office and head 
of TIU), echelon 3 (deputy directors, head of division and head of tax office) and echelon 4 (head of 
section, head of sub-division and head of TSDCO). Appraiser is an official who appointed as real 
estate appraiser. The main task of appraiser is to value land and building in order to determine its 
market value for taxation purposes. See Appendix B for the DGT organizational structure information. 
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2.3 Compliance issues in Indonesia 
Ikhsan et al. (2005) and Arnold (2012) argue that tax compliance is a significant issue 
in Indonesia and is still unresolved, despite the tax reform that came into force in 1983 
(Heij & Griffiths, 2007). The DGT as the tax administrator in Indonesia has recognised 
that compliance issues constitute major challenges that need to be rectified (DGT, 
2017). Considering the importance of corporate roles as discussed in Section 2.2.2, it is 
conceivable that the compliance issue in the corporate sector will have a huge impact 
on State revenue. Therefore, this section discusses four indicators related to the 
problem of corporate tax compliance in Indonesia. 
 
FIGURE 2-8 GENERAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE  
Source: IMF (2017) 
First, despite its significant contribution to the state budget, (76 percent on average 
for the last seven years) the Indonesian tax system experiences low tax revenue 
collection. Arnold (2012) claimed that Indonesia’s tax ratio is lower than those of its 
G20 peers and even lower than those of their neighbouring countries like Malaysia or 
Thailand. 28  IMF (2017) supported the claim, pointing out that, in general, the 
Indonesian government revenue has trailed behind its peers in mobilising revenue and 
the gap was widening after the global financial crisis in 2008 as shown in Figure 2-8 
                                                          
28
 Tax ratio is defined as tax to GDP ratio which means the comparison between tax revenue and the 
Gross Domestic Product. This ratio is frequently used as a measure of the amount of taxes paid across 
the years (IMF, 2011). 
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above. Figure 2-9 below indicates a comparison of tax ratio between Indonesia and 
other countries in Asia, again demonstrating that Indonesia has lagged behind its 
neighbours in terms of its tax collection effectiveness, consequently, the availability of 
infrastructure, social welfare and other public interests will suffer for its financing.   
 
FIGURE 2-9 TAX TO GDP RATIO, 2015 
Source: IMF (2017) 
Another issue is the low tax productivity.29 Figure 2-10 shows, that compared to their 
neighbour countries, the productivity in collecting corporate income tax in Indonesia 
was considered low which means the collection rate is below its potential (Ikhsan et al. 
2005). The IMF (2017) argues that such low productivity could be caused by weakness 
in tax administration or inappropriate exemptions. The study of Bayraktar, Le and 
Moreno-Dodson (2012) using data from 110 countries from 1994 to 2009 also pointed 
out that Indonesia is categorised as a country with a low collection rate and low tax 
efforts, indicating that Indonesia is still struggling to collect tax revenue and the 
collection is below its capacity.  
                                                          
29
 The corporate income tax (CIT) productivity is defined as the ratio of CIT revenue in percent to the 
top bracket of CIT rate (IMF, 2017) or it can be interpreted as the CIT ratio adjusted for the CIT 
statutory rate. In this case as indicated in Figure 2-10, the Indonesia tax productivity efficiency is about 
0.17 which means the authorities only collect 17 percent CIT revenue compared to its tax rate 
benchmark at 25 percent, or Indonesia’s CIT productivity in 2015 was about four percent of its GDP.   
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FIGURE 2-10 CORPORATE INCOME TAX PRODUCTIVITY 
Source: IMF (2017) 
Regarding corporate tax compliance, Figure 2-11 demonstrates the level of compliance 
of annual filing ratio for corporate income tax was only around 50 percent on average 
from 2012 to 2015, which is low since the respective legislation requires a timely 
lodgement of tax returns by corporate taxpayers. It is worth noting here that Figure   
2-11 shows the level of compliance in terms of the timeliness of reporting only, 
irrespective of the accuracy of the declared income in the tax returns; even so, the 
ratio is only about 50 percent on average.  However, while filing compliance remains 
low, it is increasing over time, thus in terms of filing ratio the future is encouraging. 
 
 
FIGURE 2-11 RATIO OF FILED CORPORATE INCOME TAX RETURNS, 2012-2015 
Source: Adapted from DGT (2016) 
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Finally, the last issue is related to the sign of non-compliance of corporate taxpayers. 
In 2015, Dr Bambang Brodjonegoro, the Indonesian Minister of Finance, stated that 
4,000 foreign companies had never paid their income tax since their establishment in 
Indonesia, which meant that several of those companies had not paid income tax for 
25 years, although they were operational (Gandhi, 2015). These foreign companies 
were suspected of using non-compliance schemes to avoid taxes such as transfer 
pricing or tax avoidance arrangements. A report from the OECD (2013) stated that the 
escalation of tax avoidance by multinational companies had become a global trend, 
with the Economist (2014) claiming that the developing countries suffered more as a 
result of this avoidance. Currently, the conduct of large corporations has come under 
scrutiny by tax authorities in various countries since the Panama Papers case was 
exposed. ICIJ (2017), the organisation responsible for leaking the Panama Papers, 
reported that there are at least 4,300 Indonesian companies or their affiliations with 
offshore accounts in tax haven countries thanks to the assistance of a single law firm, 
Mossack Fonseca. Hence, as stated by Tomkins et al. (2001), these tax avoidance issues 
posed more challenges to the tax authority in collecting taxes as businesses are now 
operating more globally and have more complex structures. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the issues that provide a contextual research background for 
the study. It reviewed the Indonesian tax system particularly in regard to revenue and 
the tax structure in Indonesia, emphasising the importance of taxes as the source of 
sustainable financing and the dominance of the income tax as the main contributor of 
tax revenue in Indonesia. Regarding income tax and corporate income tax in 
Indonesia, the chapter described the major features of the law such as income 
recognition, withholding tax system, the tax rate, dispute settlement, and anti-
avoidance measures. Under the topic of tax administration in Indonesia, the chapter 
described the main job of the DGT, the type of offices and the composition of the DGT 
workforce. This chapter also reviewed the issue of tax compliance in Indonesia by 
exploring four aspects that posed more challenges to the tax authority in its attempts 
to improve compliance.   
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CHAPTER 3  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the relevant concepts that are reviewed in this study. In Section 
3.2, tax compliance, tax avoidance and tax risk are explained in detail. Section 3.3 
reviews the factors influencing corporate compliance behaviour. This section consists 
of three subsections in which economic factors, non-economic factors and corporate 
characteristics are discussed. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 describe the responsive regulation 
approach and compliance risk management. Section 3.6 discusses the situation of tax 
administration in developing countries while Section 3.7 explores previous corporate 
tax compliance studies and the knowledge gap in the literature. Section 3.8 concludes 
the chapter. 
3.2 Developments of relevant concepts in tax compliance literature  
An understanding of relevant concepts related to tax compliance behaviour is 
necessary as the stance taken by taxpayers - whether to comply or not comply - is 
likely to be affected by their attitude toward the law and the government. 
Consequently, the level of compliance might result from the taxpayers’ rationale 
regarding the acceptable risks they are willing to take. Hence, both taxpayers and the 
authority should manage the tax risks properly to prevent any potential threat to 
themselves with respect to their own standpoint.  Accordingly, a discussion of the 
issues of tax compliance, tax avoidance and tax risk is vital in attaining a better 
understanding of the nature of corporate compliance behaviour. As McKerchar (2003) 
noted, the clarity of definitions is essential in a tax compliance study. 
3.2.1 Tax compliance  
Tax compliance could be seen as a continuum of definitions ranging from a narrow 
perspective of law enforcement approach to the wide version of the taxpayer decisions 
to comply with tax laws (Brown & Mazur, 2003). Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) 
argue that tax compliance is a fluid concept that could be approached from multiple 
perspectives. For example, in the public finance area, tax compliance is related to 
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equity, efficiency and incidence issues; in terms of labour market behaviour, 
occupational choices or labour supply might be affected by the degree of non-
compliance activities. In organisational theories, tax compliance is related to the 
principal-agent issue where the challenge is to design an effective institution to 
enforce tax laws although they have limited capacity to enforce the laws.  
Several scholars have offered their own definitions of tax compliance (see for example 
Cialdini, 1989; Roth & Scholz, 1989; Alm. 1991; James & Alley, 2002; Brown & Mazur, 
2003; McKerchar, 2003). Long and Swingen (1991) view tax compliance as the result of 
the process of interaction between the authority and taxpayers. The social 
psychologist views tax compliance as powerfully influenced by six major compliance 
principles as part of social motivations-commitment; these principles are: consistency, 
reciprocity, social validation, authority, scarcity and friendship or liking (Cialdini, 
1989).  
Another definition of tax compliance was proposed by Alm (1991, p.577): "reporting all 
income and paying all taxes in accordance with the applicable law, regulations, and 
court decisions." While Kirchler (2007, p.21) offers his definition of tax compliance as 
"the most neutral term to describe taxpayers' willingness to pay their taxes." James and 
Alley (2002, p.32) defined tax compliance as "the willingness of individuals and other 
taxable entities to act in accordance within the spirit as well as the letter of tax law and 
administration without the application of enforcement activity"; this compliance has 
two perspectives which are voluntary or compulsory behaviour as required by the law. 
Meanwhile, Weber, Fooken and Herrmann (2014, p.5) suggest a simple definition of 
tax compliance: “the absence of tax evasion”. 
Consequently, defining taxpayer compliance is not a simple task. However on a more 
general note, tax compliance was defined by Roth and Scholz (1989, p.2) as “the timely 
filing of accurate tax return” and in a broader sense, James and Alley (2002, p.29) 
added “the degree to which taxpayer comply with tax laws”. Brown and Mazur (2003) 
divided tax compliance into three components of compliance which are the filing, the 
reporting and the payment. They point out that these three components are mutually 
exclusive and collectively shaped by taxpayer compliance. For this reason, a panel that 
was established for taxpayer compliance research purposes in the United States 
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adopted the following definition of compliance with the underlying assumption that 
the taxpayers’ motivation is ceteris paribus as follows (Roth, Scholz, & Witte, 1989, 
p.2): 
“Compliance with reporting requirements means that the taxpayer 
files all required tax returns at the proper time and that the returns 
accurately report tax liability in accordance with the Internal 
Revenue Code, regulations and court decisions applicable at the 
time the return is filed.” 
Unfortunately, this definition does not mention the obligation of taxpayers to pay 
their taxes on time and to keep appropriate records. Accordingly, McKerchar (2003, 
p.225) argued that a broader definition for research purposes is one that includes the 
timing of tax payments and proper record keeping, and should be as follows: 
“Taxpayer files all required income tax returns accurately and at the 
proper time, pays any outstanding taxes as they fall due and 
maintains all required records. The accuracy of the return and the 
records required are determined in accordance with the prevailing 
legislation (both tax and otherwise), rulings, return instructions and 
court decisions.” 
Moreover, it can be reasoned that the taxpayers can be said to be complying when 
they are appropriately declaring their income, properly paying their taxes and 
thoroughly abiding by tax laws. Ohms, Olesen and Khin-Carter (2015, p.428) identified 
tax compliance as “the actions of a taxpayer in engaging in the set of statutory 
obligations cast upon them in respect of their annual total tax liability to register, 
record and report, return and enable assessment, pay and participate in any post-
assessment adjustment process”. 
Hence, based on the definitions above, tax compliance could be categorised according 
to: (1) the conceptual definition (for example: Cialdini, 1989; Long & Swingen, 1991; 
James & Alley, 2002; Weber et al., 2014) and, (2) the practical definition (for example: 
Roth & Scholz, 1989; Alm, 1991;  Brown & Mazur, 2003; McKerchar, 2003; Ohms et al., 
2015).  In short, the conceptual definition emphasises the willingness of taxpayer to 
comply voluntarily while the practical one focuses on the administrative fulfilment of 
taxpayer obligations. Meanwhile, tax compliance in Indonesia, in general, follows the 
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OECD (2014, 60) definition of tax compliance which is: "(i) to register for tax purposes; 
(ii) to file tax returns on time; (iii) to correctly report tax liabilities; and (iv) to pay 
taxes on time”. However, the Indonesian version categorises tax compliance into two 
major groups: (i) ‘formal compliance’ that refers to criteria registration and filling and, 
(ii) ‘material compliance’ or substantive compliance that refers to reporting and 
payment criteria (Harinurdin, 2009). Therefore, as it is one of the focal points of this 
study, a tax compliance definition should be established for the relevant context of 
this research and with respect to the body of literature.  
In terms of complying with the tax law, because of decisions or actions taken by the 
taxpayer, non-compliance might occur either intentionally or unintentionally (Roth & 
Scholz, 1989). Further, Weisbach (2003) argued that the complexity and ambiguity of 
tax laws may have escalated the incidence of non-compliance behaviour. 
Consequently, a taxpayer may be non-compliant despite the intention to comply or 
vice versa.  
The issue of non-compliance has become a central problem that prevents the tax 
authority from achieving its goals because not all taxpayers are willing to declare their 
income and pay their taxes accordingly. Kirchler, Macjejovsky and Schneider (2003) 
argued that some taxpayers do not see that compliance with the tax law is one of their 
obligations as good citizens. Hence, Leviner (2009, 425) argued that “tax 
noncompliance is a serious and complex problem, subject to a full range of causes and 
influences” and many scholars agree that tax noncompliance is a universal concern 
encountered by most revenue administrations (for example, Allingham & Sandmo, 
1972; Andreoni et al., 1998; Franzoni, 1999; James & Alley, 2002; Kirchler et al., 2003; 
Eisenhauer, 2008). At this point, the tax authority also needs to identify the factors 
that motivate taxpayers to either comply or not comply. Moreover, Walpole & Evans 
(2001) argued that the effort to discourage non-compliance is not the responsibility of 
the government only; it is also a social responsibility because, arguably, the 
community’s welfare depends mainly on adequate tax revenue.  
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3.2.2 Tax avoidance 
In a broad sense, Braithwaite (2005, p.236) defined tax avoidance as a “plan or 
arrangement established for the sole or dominant purpose of avoiding tax". Strategies 
for reducing the payment of certain taxes may range from small-scale tax planning at 
one end to very aggressive tax planning at the other end (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). 
In accounting terms, this means the decrease of specific tax liabilities through cash 
flow transactions or pre-tax income arrangements (Dyreng, Hanlon & Maydew, 2008; 
Ki, 2012; Kang & Ko, 2014). 
However, on the sensitive issue of the definition, Hanlon & Heitzman (2010, p.152) 
argued that the term “tax avoidance” lacks a general definition as it might mean a 
“different thing to different people”. The OECD admitted the difficulty of defining tax 
avoidance by stating that it is "a term that is difficult to define but which is generally 
used to describe the arrangement of a taxpayer's affairs that is intended to reduce his 
tax liability and that although the arrangement could be strictly legal it is usually in 
contradiction with the intent of the law it purports to follow."30 This indicates the 
widespread concern and interest in the “magnitude, determinants and consequences” 
of tax avoidance. Further, Hanlon & Heitzman (2010) argued that the adoption of a 
broad definition is to circumvent any intricacies associated with a narrow definition 
and to cover the broad tax avoidance spectrum. Therefore, the concept of tax 
avoidance could also encompass all conduct that reduces the tax burden irrespective 
of the legality factor (Dyreng et al., 2008). Thus, due to the significance of the notion, 
Hanlon & Heitzman (2010) asserted that more research is required in this particular 
area in order to establish a universally accepted and comprehensive definition.  
In the literature, the term ‘tax avoidance’ is sometimes used interchangeably with tax 
aggressiveness, tax planning, tax management and tax sheltering (See for instance: 
Chen, Chen, Cheng & Shevlin, 2010; Lanis & Richardson, 2011; Minnick & Noga, 2010; 
Tang & Firth, 2011). However, some prefer a separate and more precise description of 
each term although they are all under the umbrella of ‘tax avoidance’. Some scholars 
believe that tax avoidance is legal and morally acceptable because it is a planned 
                                                          
30
 Referring to the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration's Glossary of Tax Terms. See 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm#A. Retrieved at 11 January 2018. 
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course of action to save taxes in a way that does not contravene the respective law (for 
example, Franzoni, 1999; James & Alley, 2002; Kirchler et al., 2003; Sandmo, 2005). For 
example, John and Alley (2002) argued that tax avoidance should not be associated 
with taxpayer compliance as the taxpayer is following “the spirit and the letter” of tax 
law. Although Weber et al. (2014) recognised the difference between tax avoidance and 
tax evasion, nevertheless to some extent they suggest that avoidance is associated with 
taxpayer compliance. Hence, tax avoidance implies that taxpayers are taking 
advantage of loopholes in the tax law to decrease their tax liabilities, which is 
considered as legal behaviour.  
On the other side of the tax avoidance spectrum, Lisowsky (2010) defined corporate 
tax sheltering as a transaction without economic substance, the purpose of which is to 
avoid taxes or to set up a particular transaction by exploiting loopholes in the tax law 
to evade taxes. In the similar vein, Bankman (2004) describes tax sheltering as a 
transaction which is unrelated to the purpose of a normal business operation, and the 
objective of this action is to avoid tax liabilities contrary to the intent of tax laws. 
Therefore, tax sheltering could be regarded as an aggressive form of tax avoidance 
viewed by some as an illegal activity. Given the circumstances of tax sheltering and tax 
avoidance itself, moral judgement can be exercised to evaluate the opposing views 
even though moral judgment itself is problematic given its subjective nature (Mears & 
Webley, 2010). 
At one end of the tax avoidance spectrum, tax evasion is often associated with tax 
fraud and many scholars perceive tax evasion as an immoral and illegal attempt to 
cheat taxes (Franzoni, 1998; James & Alley, 2002; Kirchler et al., 2003; Sandmo, 2005). 
The OECD defines tax evasion as the activity that "is generally used to mean illegal 
arrangements where liability to tax is hidden or ignored, i.e. the taxpayer pays less tax 
than he is legally obligated to pay by hiding income or information from the tax 
authorities."31 This evasion refers to cases where the business takes deliberate action to 
evade taxes with or without assistance from external parties. The steps to cheat may 
include but are not limited to non-filing of tax returns or, filing tax returns with 
understated income or overstated expenses or filing a tax return with underpayment 
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 According to the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration's Glossary of Tax Terms. See 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm#E . Retrieved at 11 January 2018. 
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of taxes (Murphy, 2004b). A remarkable example of a tax evasion case is that of the 
Enron Corporation which employed sophisticated accounting schemes and tax havens 
to support their illegal activities (Slemrod, 2004).  
In particular, although the aim of tax avoidance is to reduce the financial burden in 
consideration of company profitability, there are potential high costs of this action 
that arise from various parties such as the agency conflict with the taxation authority 
and the consequences of penalties (Boussaidi & Mounira, 2015).  In this light, Desai 
and Dharmapala (2006) argued that tax avoidance is typically characterised by 
complicated and obfuscated transactions that are difficult to detect. Accordingly, 
transactions that are related to tax avoidance activities run parallel with the future tax 
risk. Here, the term ‘tax risk’ is associated not only with the possibility of penalties but 
also the likelihood of losing profitable opportunity. Hence, tax avoidance may escalate 
tax risks because of the companies’ exposure to the unpredictable business outcome.  
The tax avoidance phenomenon has become a significant global issue (Braithwaite, 
2005). As tax avoidance and the tax evasion are pervasive problems, the public need to 
be alarmed by the fact that non-compliance may result in less revenue than expected 
in the government budget (Eisenhauer, 2008). This revenue loss, according to 
Franzoni (1999) may cause severe damage to the public sector by threatening its 
capacity to finance operational activities. A recent report from the OECD (2014) 
mentions that base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) has become a global trend to 
avoid taxes for multinational companies that harm developed and developing 
countries. It has been estimated that the amount of corporate tax avoidance is about a 
quarter of the total corporate profits in developed countries, and the number is more 
substantial for the developing ones (Economist, 2014). 
3.2.3 Tax risk 
Wunder (2009, p.16) cited Arlinghaus (1998) who admitted that there is no widely 
accepted general definition of tax risk; nevertheless, he offers the following 
understanding of tax risk:  
 
36 
 
“the likelihood that tax outcome differs from what is expected, due 
to a variety of reasons, for example, the judicial process, changes in 
the law, changes in business assumptions, an increased intensity of 
audits, and uncertainty in the interpretation of the law; and any 
action emanating from the tax function that subjects the company 
to adverse publicity”  
Goodman (2004) argued that business views tax risk as part of the internal control 
objective.  The goals of  a company’s internal control as stated in the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations’ (COSO) Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated 
Framework (COSO Framework) include effectiveness and efficiency of operations, the 
reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations. The latter 
depends considerably on the company’s tax risk management strategy.  
Arlinghaus (1998) emphasised that the main determinant of tax risk occurrence is the 
external factor. However, the internal control factor, for example, may cause tax risk to 
emerge as well, so both factors have equal significance (Goodman, 2004). Therefore, 
tax risk may result in the unpredictability of the corporate outcomes regardless of the 
tax risk sources (Miller, 1992). The PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (2004) treatise on the 
approach to tax risk management includes the identification of specific risk areas and 
generic risk areas32. Neubig and Sangha (2004, 114) offered a broader definition of tax 
risk as the accumulation of “all sources of risk that may create an unexpected outcome 
from a tax position.” Hence, a firm’s success in handling tax risk depends on the 
management’s ability to sustain its tax position over time and can be measured by the 
standard deviation of the effective tax rates cost (Guenther, Matsunaga & Williams. 
2013). 
However, inadequate tax risk management in a company could pose governance 
problems along with the potential tax penalties imposed by the authority (Chen et al., 
                                                          
32
 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004, 4) identifies four specific risk areas which are: (1) Transactional risk 
(e.g., acquisitions, mergers), (2) Operational risk (e.g., new business ventures, new operating models, 
new operating structure), (3) Compliance risk (e.g., weak records and controls, data integrity issues, 
legislative changes) and, (4) Financial accounting risk (e.g., changes in systems and policies) and three 
generic risk areas which are: (1) Portfolio risk (e.g., combination of any of the risks), (2) Management 
risk (e.g., changes in personnel, new/inexperienced resources) and, (3) Reputational risk (e.g., revenue 
authority investigation, press comment, legal actions).  
Retrieved 18 January 2018 from https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/pwc-tax-risk-management-
guide.pdf . 
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2010; Lanis & Richardson, 2011; Armstrong et al., 2012). In this light, Desai and 
Dharmapala (2008) pointed out that a higher tax risk imposes additional agency costs 
on the shareholders. Hence, managers take the opportunity to arrange more complex 
tax planning to avoid detection and for their own interests at the cost of shareholder 
interests. In a different scenario, the managers should balance the interests of their 
various stakeholders such as the shareholders, government and society with the 
company’s goal of maximising profits. Nevertheless, all this pressure might force 
managers to escalate the level of tax risk either intentionally or otherwise (Erle, 2008).   
However, on the government side, the tax authority has a distinct attitude towards the 
term ‘tax risk’, for example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRSAC33 (2008, 
p.2) defined tax risk as:  
“any event, action, or inaction in tax strategy, operations, oversight 
reporting, or compliance that either adversely affects LMSB10’s34 
collection or business objectives, or results in an unanticipated or 
unacceptable level of oversight reprimands, lost appeals, diminished 
collections, harm to reputation, lost opportunities or reporting 
exposure.”  
The UK authorities (HRMC, 2007, P.5) defined the term ‘tax risk’ for large corporations 
as ‘‘a risk that a customer will not pay the right amount of tax or duty at the right 
time’’ and further:  
“A tax compliance risk may be an identified tax issue, where HMRC 
and the customer may not agree about a particular tax analysis set 
out in a return or declaration. Or it may be a less specific 
uncertainty about whether tax returns and declarations are correct 
which may lead to an issue being identified.” 
Along with the IRS and the HRMC, other tax authorities such as Australia’s and those 
of several countries in Europe have established effective definition in order to manage 
susceptibility to tax risk in their jurisdictions. The authority might encounter several 
substantial risk threats such as large-scale evasion, transaction complexity, massive 
                                                          
33
 The IRSAC is the Internal Revenue Service Advisory Council. 
34
 The LMSB is a division under the IRS organizational structure that in charge for Large and Mid-
Size Business. 
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aggressive tax planning, and a pervasive globalisation effect that require fast response 
and thoughtful consideration (Hasseldine, 2007). Since the tax risks effect is more 
likely to have  impacts on the aims of collecting revenue, the tax authorities in several 
countries have issued their guidelines for tax risk management. For instance, the ATO 
issued the Large Business and Tax Compliance Guidelines (ATO, 2006), the European 
Union published Risk Management Guide for Tax Administration (EC, 2006), the 
HMRC issued Tax Compliance risk management: guidance for Large Business Service 
(LBS) customers and staff (HRMC, 2007), and the IRS established Large Mid-size 
Business Subgroups (IRSAC, 2008).  
Therefore, the corporate taxpayer and the tax authority as regulator see task risk 
differently although the underlying tenet here is that tax risk needs to be managed 
appropriately by both parties in order to pursue their objectives.  
3.3. Factors influencing corporate compliance behaviour 
The body of literature indicates that past studies have mainly focused on individual 
rather than corporate tax compliance, although the latter has been gaining traction in 
recent years. The case of Enron, Panama Papers and the efforts undertaken by the 
OECD and many tax authorities to manage globalised aggressive tax planning have 
given greater significance to the study of corporate tax compliance. Nevertheless, it 
could be argued that, to some extent, corporate and individual compliance have many 
characteristics in common since a corporation is a fictitious entity formed by people 
and the managers, in fact, do determine the level of compliance of their corporation 
(Joulfaian, 2000). The managers apply their own values, attitudes and norms that may 
influence their corporations’ compliance (Koester, Shevlin & Wangerin, 2013). One 
notable difference is that corporate decisions are made by a group of individuals with 
varying degrees of influence which results in an action that is more logical than that of 
an individual (Ariel, 2011). 
Therefore, in this study, the researcher also refers to the body of literature that relates 
to those individual compliance determinants that are considered relevant since, in 
terms of norms or trust, for instance, the findings are similar for both the corporation 
and the individual. Moreover, since tax compliance behaviour is not only complicated 
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but also highly context-dependent as well, there is still no agreement among tax 
researchers regarding the determinant that has the most impact (McKerchar & Evans, 
2009). The nature of tax as a social phenomenon has resulted in tax compliance 
behaviour that is affected by different knowledge of different domains ranging from 
law, economics, accounting to politics and social policy (Lamb, 2005).    
It is acknowledged that the factors influencing corporate tax compliance that are 
discussed in this chapter are derived from the study conducted by van der Hel-van 
Dijk and Siglé, (2015). They are: (i) economic factors, (ii) socio-psychological factors 
and, (iii) corporate characteristics as shown in Table 3-1 below. However, it should be 
noted that this is not a rigid categorisation since the boundaries between factors are 
somewhat blurred; for example, the factor of profitability could be placed into the 
category of economic factors instead of corporate characteristics.  
TABLE 3-1 FACTORS INFLUENCING CORPORATE TAX COMPLIANCE 
Economic factors Socio-Psychological factors Corporate characteristics 
Penalties Personal norms Board of directors’ 
composition 
Detection probability Social norms Tax risk management 
Tax rate Fairness Ownership 
Manager compensation Trust The use of tax advisors 
Risk appetite  Profitability 
Complexity of the law   
Uncertainty   
Source: Modified from van der Hel-van Dijk and Siglé, (2015) 
3.3.1 Economics factors  
The economic factors originated from the work of Becker (1967) who proposed the 
economics-of-crime model as an approach to explaining the decision not to comply 
according to the economic framework.  It is based on the rationality that tax 
compliance is affected by the economic cost-benefit decision (Kinsey, 1992). The 
economic factors sometimes also associated with deterrence theory. Accordingly, in 
the context of corporate compliance, several factors from the corporation’s point of 
view are involved as determinants; they include tax rate, penalties, book-tax 
conformity, detection probability, manager compensation, and risk appetite. Hence, in 
general, taxpayers decide to comply with the law if it makes them financially better off 
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based on their rational cost-benefit calculation (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 
1974). 
However, Chen and Chu (2005) argued that the non-compliance decision of a 
corporation is more complicated, unlike the individual whose decision to evade 
depends on personal assessment. Conversely, the corporation’s decision relates to 
principal-agent model as it depends on the agency framework or the relationship 
between manager and business owner. They further argued that a corporation might 
engage in evasion if the risk of being detected is only small. Consequently, there may 
be less evasion in those corporations which have more hierarchies and have 
established firm internal control. 
Penalties  
Becker (1967) argued that the threat of punishment or penalties is significant in 
reducing illegal behaviour, valid for any violations and encompassing many 
misdemeanours and crimes ranging from traffic violations, robbery and murder to tax 
evasion. In the context of taxation, the threat of punishment is seen as a coercive 
approach that forces compliance by imposing penalties.  Becker’s basic idea was 
modified by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) who added the tenet that a taxpayer is a 
rational actor who sought to maximise their utility so that penalties can be used to 
force them to comply. They used variables such as tax rate, the probability of detection 
and penalty as the proxies of the threat of punishment with the expected outcome that 
the decision made by the rational taxpayer depends on the perception of the 
likelihood of being audited. Hence, the study of Allingham and Sandmo that focused 
on the deterrence effect and placed more emphasis on the issue of tax evasion or non-
compliance, was used as the basis for later similar work on using deterrence to 
determine compliance (See for example: Kolm, 1973; Christiansen, 1980; Spicer & 
Thomas, 1982; Scotchmer & Slemrod, 1989; Alm, Jackson & McKee, 1992; Torgler, 2007; 
Li, 2010). 
In the context of penalties, there are variations in the use of penalties as a deterrent. 
Yitzhaki (1974) proposed that a penalty would be more effective if imposed on the 
evaded taxes instead of on the undeclared tax. He argued that there are no 
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contradictory effects on such impose with the assumption that the taxpayer fully risk- 
averse, a notion that deemed as more realistic (Devos, 2013). Meanwhile, other 
scholars found that the level of penalty severity affected taxpayer’s compliance (Beck & 
Jung, 1989; Kirchler, Kogler & Muehlbacher, 2014). Regarding the subject of who incurs 
a penalty, Crocker and Slemrod (2005) argued that imposing a penalty on tax 
managers rather than on the corporation is more effective in reducing corporate non-
compliance.  
Detection probability 
One of the variables used in Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) study was the probability 
of detection. They constructed a tax compliance model that illustrated how the 
taxpayers are maximising their utility given the available choices. In the model, they 
argued that a taxpayer is more likely to report less actual income if the probability of 
detection is less than the expected utility. The notion that the likelihood of being 
caught by the authority affects compliance was also confirmed by Chen and Chu 
(2005) and Morse, Karlinsky and Bankman (2009) who found in their studies that a 
taxpayer might consider evading if the risk of being detected for the infringement was 
small. A variation of the study regarding audit as a deterrent that influences 
compliance was offered by Dubin, Graetz and Wilde (1992) and Alm, Kirchler and 
Muehlbacher, (2012), while Strumpel (1969) argued that the rigidity of assessment 
during the audit may influence the compliance as well. However, the results of the 
study conducted by DeBacker, Heim, Tran and Yuskavage (2013) contradicted those of 
previous studies regarding the effectiveness of audit as a deterrent. They found that, in 
the long run, the post-audit corporation becomes more tax aggressive than prior to the 
audit by reducing their effective tax rate by around eight percent.  
Tax rate 
In simple terms, the tax rate is generally related to the taxpayer’s willingness to 
comply. An increase in the tax rate makes it more profitable for taxpayers to seek ways 
to lower their effective rates, thereby making them less compliant (Downs & Stetson, 
2014). These researchers found that taxpayers are more willing to be non-compliant 
when a tax rate increase made it more profitable for them to evade taxes. The finding 
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of Down and Stetson (2014) is supported by the concept of the taxpayer as a logical 
entity that always sought to maximise its utility (Becker, 1967; Allingham & Sandmo, 
1972; Yitzhaki, 1974; Kinsley, 1992). 
Regarding the issue of the tax rate in the context of corporate taxpayers, the 
multinational companies are always seeking ways to maximise their tax savings, one of 
which is to make use of places that offer lower tax rates.  Slemrod (2001) argued that 
the MNCs take full advantage of tax havens to minimise their ETR by using a global 
tax planning strategy. Rego (2003) found that the United States’ MNCs have a lower 
ETR than the domestic ones since they are more capable of avoiding their taxes. The 
tax haven is frequently used by MNCs who direct their income from a foreign source 
to a place with a lower tax rate rather than repatriating this income and being taxed at 
a higher rate (Desai, Foley & Hines, 2006).  In another study, Desai, Dyck and Zingales 
(2007) posited that a country with a high corporate tax rate and poor enforcement is 
more likely to have a greater incidence of tax evasion.  
Manager Compensation 
The manager plays a significant role in determining a firm’s compliance. By reducing 
the firm’s ETR thereby maximising its profits, managers are looking after the interests 
of the shareholders as well as their own, particularly if they receive bonuses for their 
efforts. Crocker and Slemrod (2005) argued that non-compliance can benefit the 
manager’s self-interest. This notion was supported by other studies’s findings that if 
managers receive bonuses for performance, this might encourage them to seek any 
means of reducing the firm’s ETR, whether it be legal or not, and this would decrease 
the firms’ level of compliance (Philips, 2003; Rego & Wilson, 2012; Powers, Robinson, & 
Stomberg, 2013). An empirical study conducted by Taylor and Richardson (2014) on 
the dataset of 200 listed Australian companies from 2006 to 2010 indicates three 
factors that have strong relationships with corporate non-compliance: (i) the 
executives’ tax expertise, (ii) the bonus-based performance packages, and (iii) the 
company status with many international transaction arrangements. 
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Risk Appetite 
Van der Hel-van Dijk and Siglé (2015) argued that theoretically, risk appetite is a 
principal factor for corporate compliance since slight changes in the appetite may have 
a profound effect on the compliance. Further, they believe that many large businesses 
have a formalised business strategy with a formalised risk appetite included. However, 
a formalised risk appetite has a disadvantage as it places the business in a potentially 
fragile position of non-compliance by formally encouraging the firm to minimise its 
tax inefficiencies.  As Deloitte (2008, 10) put it, firms will experience, “tax inefficiencies 
or missed opportunities [are] resulting from low-risk appetite.” To overcome the 
problem caused by risk appetite, Neubig and Sangha (2004) suggested that board of 
directors to have clear guidelines regarding their business risk appetite, and an 
adequate risk management strategy is needed to align the “risk-reward-reputation” 
preferences of all stakeholders.  
Moreover, regarding risk appetite, Blakelock and Whitney (2015) noted that the role of 
business owners cannot be underestimated because of their risk acceptance level 
which is influenced by two factors: (i) the owner’s shares in the business and, (ii) the 
innate characteristics of the business owner such as the unwillingness to have a 
conflict with the authority. If the business owner becomes a greater risk-taker, then 
the business is likely to have a greater risk appetite.  
Complexity of the law 
Cuccia and Carnes (2001) explored the relationship between tax complexity and tax 
equity perceptions with identical economic consequences. The results indicated that 
the complexity of regulations might encourage taxpayers to engage in non-compliant 
behaviour. It has been suggested that the complexity of regulations is one factor that 
influences compliance. Further, van der Hel-van Dijk and Siglé (2015) argued that this 
complexity may confuse taxpayers and may lead to unintentional non-compliance. 
However, the more knowledgeable and sophisticated taxpayers may take the 
opportunity to exploit this complexity for their own gain, thereby increasing their 
non-compliance (Agha & Hauton, 1996).  On the other side, the complexity of 
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regulations poses problems for the tax authority in terms of accurate execution and 
making the correct decision as required by the law (Kirchler, 2007).  
Ambiguity and complexity in the law are frequently viewed as a combination factor 
that negatively affects compliance (Erle, 2008; Agha & Haughton, 1996; Kirchler, 2007; 
Cuccia & Carnes, 2001; Sandmo, 2005). Ambiguity increases the likelihood of a 
deliberate misinterpretation of the law and therefore increases the risk of non-
compliance (Erle, 2008). Ambiguity in the law can also make it difficult for the 
taxpayer to understand it, and may lead to unintentional non-compliance (Agha & 
Haughton, 1996).  
Uncertainty 
The empirical study conducted by Casey and Scholz (1991) showed that taxpayers’ 
decisions are sensitive to how the information uncertainty is presented. Information 
uncertainty relates to precise information regarding the probability of detection, the 
correctness of the law interpretation, the severity of penalties and the rigidity of the 
conducted audit. As Casey and Scholz (1991, p.840) put it “ambiguity and vagueness 
effects suggest that compliance decisions are affected by the degree of imprecision in 
estimates of the probability of detection”.   
Uncertainty could result from the issue of regulatory overlap which is a greater 
problem in the developing economies. If there is regulatory overlap among various 
institutions in a country, this creates confusion and uncertainty for business 
(O’Callaghan, 2010). Previous studies confirmed that regulatory overlap creates a waste 
of resources (Ahdieh, 2006; Aagaard, 2011; Li, 2015; Middleton, 2015). Aagaard (2011) 
further indicated that regulatory overlap, in general, is caused by conflict, complexity, 
duplication and lack of coordination. Therefore, the factor of uncertainty plays a role 
in determining taxpayer compliance behaviour (Taylor & Richardson, 2013; van der 
Hel-van Dijk & Siglé, 2015) since taxpayer maintain their favourable tax position in 
anticipating uncertainties even though their precarious tax position is inclined to be 
challenged. 
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3.3.2 Non-economic factors 
The economic factors alone cannot explain the complex phenomenon of taxpayer 
compliance behaviour. It could be argued that the corporation and the individual are 
similar in some respects since a corporation is an entity comprised of people and the 
behaviour of a corporation is most likely influenced by the attitude of its managers 
(Joulfaian, 2000; Ariel, 2011; Koester et al., 2014; Olsen & Stakelberg, 2015). It also has 
been known that people’s response to risk usually is not based on their utility 
maximisation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Instead, people tend to be risk-takers 
when they are facing losses, and in the opposite situation, they are risk-averse. 
Moreover, the characteristics of taxpayers regarding risk preferences also affect their 
decision to comply (Triverdi, Shehata & Lynn, 2003). Hence, psychological and social 
factors with the fiscal psychology models, although non-economic, also influence 
decisions regarding compliance. Hence, it can be assumed that taxpayers are not 
wholly independent and always maximising their utility but, in fact, their actions are 
influenced by their various attitudes, norms and roles (Elffers, Weigel & Hessing, 
1992). 
Personal norms 
Although an individual in a firm may decide his/her firm’s action based on firm’s 
policy, it is recognised that the decision made to some extent is affected by their 
personal norms. In this case, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) believed that an individual is 
aware of his/her actions and their implications and they concluded that the intention 
to engage in a certain behaviour is determined by two factors: the individual’s attitude 
and the social norms. Later Azjen (1991) argued that that when an individual is 
planning about whether or not to perform a certain action, s/he considers whether it 
can be achieved successfully. In a subsequent study, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) 
explained that besides intention, the factor of perceived control and self-efficacy are 
significant in determining an individual’s behaviour. It is essential to understand these 
factors that influence individual behaviour as the moral standards of managers affect 
their corporate tax behaviour (Law & Mills, 2017). 
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Several more recent studies found a relationship between the managers’ 
characteristics and their corporate behaviour (Law & Mills, 2017; Kubick & Lockhart, 
2017; Chyz, 2013; Gaertner, 2014; Olsen & Stekelberg, 2015). Law and Mills (2017) 
conducted a study of 1,500 managers listed in the ExecuComp database from 1992 to 
2011 and who had a military background. Their study demonstrated that managers 
with past military experience pursue less tax avoidance and undertake less aggressive 
tax planning strategies. These ex-military managers' companies on average pay USD 
one to two million more in corporate taxes per firm each year.  Chyz (2013) conducted 
a study with a sample of 1,055 executives who had experience in personal tax evasion. 
His study result showed that these managers were positively associated with corporate 
tax sheltering activities. The companies headed by these managers also had higher 
cash tax savings compared with those firms that were headed by managers without 
such past experiences. Kubick and Lockhart (2017) found that the factor of the CEO’s 
overconfidence affects their corporate tax policy. An overconfident CEO may 
underestimate the likelihood that his firm will be audited for its tax position and will 
tend to engage in more aggressive tax planning. Gaertner (2014) investigated the 
association between CEOs’ remuneration packages and corporate tax avoidance. He 
argued that there is a positive correlation between the post-tax incentives and the 
corporate ETRs, which is consistent with the economic theory concerning the use of 
post-tax incentives for executives.  Meanwhile, Olsen and Stakelberg (2015) studied a 
personality trait of executives, narcissism, and its association with corporate tax 
sheltering. They found that, similar to the study conducted by Kubick and Lockhart 
(2017), the CEOs’ narcissism influences the likelihood that their firms will engage in 
corporate tax sheltering activities.  
Social norms 
Social norms can be viewed as the standard of morality that orients a particular group. 
Wenzel (2005) argued that the factor of social norms does affect tax compliance and 
vice versa. The study undertaken by Bobek, Roberts and Sweeney (2007) and Traxler 
(2010) supported Wenzel’s (2005) findings that social norms are significant in 
explaining compliance behaviour. Moreover, Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren (1990) found 
that there was a tendency for an individual to imitate the behaviour of others based on 
the perception of what is acceptable. The factor of social norms such as ethics and 
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cultural values also affects the compliance of the individual in a complex way (Bobek, 
Hageman & Kelliher, 2013). For example, a survey study conducted by Cummings, 
Martinez-Vazquez, McKee and Torgler (2009) in Botswana and South Africa provided 
evidence that compliance behaviour is also affected by the social norms and by the 
responsiveness of their government to listen to their people’s aspirations. 
One feature of social norms that directly affects corporate compliance is the 
corporation’s reputation. Several studies indicate that most corporations are 
concerned about maintaining their impeccable reputation (Cooper, 1994; Oats & Tuck, 
2008; Toumi, 2009; Mulligan & Oats, 2009). Hanlon & Slemrod (2009) explained that 
when news about the harmful conduct of a firm, such as its engagement in tax 
shelters, is made public,  then the firm’s stocks price may subsequently decline. Hence, 
when a company comes under the spotlight for corporate non-compliance either 
through public scrutiny or legal action, then its reputation is at stake (Williams, 2007). 
Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin and Shroff (2013) argued that the company’s reputation is a 
significant factor for managers when applying the correct tax planning strategy as 
reputational cost is at stake. Erle (2008) added that by maintaining a good reputation, 
managers believe that they have acted in accordance with the interest of the 
shareholders. Lavermicocca (2011) argued that there was a consensus among large 
corporations that non-compliant behaviour negatively impacts on reputation; 
therefore the reputational cost is suggested as a critical factor that may curtail the tax 
avoidance efforts of corporations (Gallemore, Maydew & Thornock, 2014) since the 
effect of reputational damage on a corporation is much more pronounced than that on 
the individual (Ford, 2005).  
Fairness 
The study of Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008) indicated that the issue of fairness is 
perceived as the most critical factor determining individual taxpayer compliance.  
Taxpayers are more inclined to comply when they perceive that the tax system is fair 
(Slemrod, 2007; Schweitzer & Gibson, 2008). Several aspects of fairness are considered 
as vital determinants of compliance. These are: (i) Distributive justice: the feeling that 
society does not have a just allocation of goods when compared with the tax that one 
must pay (Wenzel, 2002; Verboon & Van Dijke, 2007); (ii) Retributive justice: the 
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perception that the tax authority imposes the appropriate penalties for rules-breaking 
(Wenzel, 2002; Walsh, 2012); (iii) Procedural justice: the perceived fairness of the 
procedures and the treatment received from the authority (Wenzel, 2002; Murphy, 
Tyler & Curtis, 2009); (iv) Horizontal equity: equal treatment for taxpayer relative to 
other taxpayers in similar cicumstances (Goetz, 1978; Kinsey & Grasmick, 1993); and, 
(v) Vertical equity: the fairness of the burden of taxes for certain social strata relative 
to other strata (Kinsey & Grasmick, 1993; Wenzel, 2002). An empirical study 
conducted by Murphy (2004a) of 6,000 Australian taxpayers showed that, in general, 
taxpayers would be less inclined to commit an infringement if they perceived that the 
tax system was fairer. Posner (2000) argued that tax compliance has a positive 
association with the perception of the fairness of tax systems in terms of appropriate 
tax policy, reasonable tax rates and unprejudiced enforcement.   
The OECD (2004) argued that the factor of unfairness in a tax system may create an 
increased risk of non-compliance among taxpayers. As Mello (2009) stated, a tax 
system ideally should be neutral, fair, and should accommodate the interests of both 
the taxpayers and the tax authority. If the tax system regulations are perceived as 
unfair, this would undermine the taxpayers’ compliance with the law (Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2013). This is particularly relevant for developing countries situation where the 
fairness of the law and the regulations is considered to be far from ideal. Moreover, the 
low level of trust in the tax authority and the inconsistency in the application of the 
law are two significant problems that result in low compliance (Mascagni, Moore & 
McCluskey, 2014). Therefore, when the tax system is perceived as fair, the taxpayers 
are more inclined to comply with the rules. 
 Trust 
Empirical evidence shows that the factor of trust in the authority and the government, 
has a considerable effect on tax compliance (See for example, Torgler, 2003; Torgler, 
2008; Alm et al., 2006; Kirchler et al., 2008; Bird, 2008; Cheema, 2010; Blind 2010). 
Taylor (2002) argued that the taxpayer’s willingness to pay taxes was influenced by the 
level of trust in government. Further, Bird (2008) asserted that the trust between the 
taxpayer and the government not only establishes a sound tax system but also 
becomes a dynamic interaction which means that an increase in trust may increase 
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legitimacy and lead to a greater inclination to comply. Conversely, low trust in the 
government and the tax authority results in a higher level of tax evasion (Richardson, 
2008; Kirchler et al., 2008). 
Trust in the government is affected by several factors. Van der Hel-van Dijk and Siglé, 
(2015) argued that government activities such as the efficiency and efficacy of 
politicians and the political structure factor such as direct versus indirect democracy 
influence the government legitimacy. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that factors such 
as corruption and unfair treatment may decrease legitimacy. In terms of corruption, 
past studies have found that the corruption of State officials has a negative impact on 
taxpayers’ compliance (Flatters & Macleod, 1995; Picur & Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006; Bird et 
al., 2008; McKerchar & Evans 2009; Bird & de Jantscher, 1992, Rosid, Evans & Tran-
Nam, 2016). Also, the feeling of having been mistreated by the tax authority also has a 
negative impact on compliance (Slemrod, 1992; Wenzel, 2002; Murphy, 2004b; 
Slemrod, 2007; Schweitzer & Gibson, 2008). Hence, Kogler, Batrancea, Nichita, Pantya, 
Belianin, & Kirchler (2013) suggested that the government needs to cultivate the 
taxpayers’ trust by providing better treatment and procedural fairness with the 
objective of achieving better voluntary compliance. The World Bank confirmed that 
the public does not trust a tax authority if taxpayer issues are not resolved, and this 
may undermine the government’s legitimacy in collecting taxes (Guerrero, 2011).  
3.3.3 Corporate Characteristics 
Several empirical studies demonstrated that corporate characteristics do influence 
corporate tax compliance (See for example Hanlon et al., 2005; Chen & Chu, 2005; 
Slemrod, 2007; Lanis & Richardson, 2011; Taylor & Richardson, 2013; Richardson, Taylor 
& Lanis, 2013). Firms have several characteristics that influence tax compliance.  
Factors such as the composition of the Board of Directors (BOD), tax risk 
management, the use of tax advisors, business profitability and ownership are 
considered the major corporate characteristics (van der Hel-van Dijk-van Dijk, & Siglé, 
2015). It is worth noting that the degree of importance of each factor is not the same 
for every corporation and factors interact dynamically and can be interrelated in 
influencing the corporate compliance behaviour (Lavermicocca & McKerchar, 2013).  
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Tax risk management 
Chen and Chu (2005) asserted that a firm with robust internal control tended to have 
a lower tax aggressiveness. The quality of tax risk management (TRM) as an element of 
a company’s internal control plays a part in determining the corporate compliance 
since not all tax decisions in a large business are made by those who are responsible; 
hence, a ‘tax control framework’ affects compliance (van Dijk & Siglé, 2015). 
Lavermicocca (2009) argued that TRM is not only about minimising tax risk; rather, it 
also concerns the level of tax risk that is accepted by a firm while at the same time 
ensuring that the right processes and procedures are taken into account. Further, the 
empirical study of Lavermicocca and McKerchar (2013) showed that there are several 
positive impacts of TRM operationalisation in a business. It: (i) reduces the level of tax 
risk, (ii) provides more informed tax decision making, (iii) lowers the tax risk profile, 
(iv) identifies potential non-compliance, (v) identifies opportunities to minimise 
income tax, (vi) acts on issues identified and, (vii) places greater importance on 
income tax compliance. It is worth noting that the effectiveness of a TRM system is 
determined mostly by its ability to enhance the information flow within a company. It 
needs to be highlighted that the application of TRM does not eliminate the tax risks 
faced by a company since there are several external factors that are beyond the control 
of a company. Nevertheless, the existence of a TRM in a company makes the 
management aware of the potential risks. Therefore, the implementation of a 
comprehensive and successful TRM system results in more informed decision-making 
and establishes good governance practices in a business (Lavermicocca & McKerchar, 
2013).  
As part of the corporate governance system, Erle (2008) argued that the role of TRM 
has become more important as the tax authorities in many countries have tended to 
tighten their tax laws and regulations, and they give credit to the corporate taxpayers 
who have applied strong internal control. The short-term view taken by managers that 
tax is merely a cost factor needs to be reoriented to a long-term perspective by taking 
into consideration factors such as company reputation. Further, Erle argued that a 
balance between maintaining the reputation and strategically minimising ETR is vital 
for a company’s sustainability as it will result in the company’s annual report and the 
general public will later appreciate the management’s efforts. Conversely, the 
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management’s failure to identify significant tax risks and to develop appropriate tax 
measures may cost the company far more than money. Therefore, as remarked by 
Lavermicocca (2009), the recognition of TRM as a component of good corporate 
governance signifies changes in the culture and attitude of not only the management 
toward tax function but also the stakeholders in a large business.   
Composition of the Board of directors 
Lanis and Richardson (2011) conducted a study of the effect of Board of Directors 
(BOD) on corporate tax aggressiveness in Australia. They analysed a sample of 32 
corporations, categorising them according to their level of tax aggressiveness.  Sixteen 
corporations were categorised as tax-aggressive, and the remainder were considered 
non-tax-aggressive. The study found that the likelihood of being tax-aggressive can be 
reduced by having more independent BOD members in the organisational structure. 
This result was later confirmed with cross-sectional data of 401 corporations using the 
ordinary least squares regression method. The researchers concluded that the 
composition of the BOD might have an impact on tax aggressiveness; thus, a greater 
number of independent BOD members appears to deter tax aggressiveness as a result 
of better corporate governance. Minnick and Noga (2010) conducted a study using a 
sample of 456 S&P companies covering the period 1996 to 2005, to determine the 
influence of corporate governance on tax management and its performance in the long 
run. They found that a more independent BOD composition tends to focus more on 
foreign tax management and, in contrast, the larger size BOD tends to focus more on 
domestic tax management.  
Another empirical study conducted by Zemzem and Ftouhi (2013) of 73 French public 
companies for the period from 2006 to 2010 was intended to determine the variables 
that can reduce tax aggressiveness. They found that the BOD size factor and, 
interestingly, the proportion of women on the board affect the company’s level of tax 
aggressiveness. A similar finding emerged from the study conducted by Lanis, 
Richardson and Taylor (2017) with a sample of 418 United States firms covering the 
period of 2006-2009. Their study indicated that female representation in the BOD has 
a negative association with the tax aggressiveness activities. This is consistent with the 
finding of several past studies that the factor of gender is an essential determinant of 
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compliance behaviour (See, for example, Hasseldine, 1999; Wartick & Rupert, 2010; 
Kastlunger, Dressler, Kirchler, Mittone & Voracek, 2010). 
Ownership  
The corporation’s ownership to some extent influences corporate tax compliance. Past 
studies usually focus on ownership characteristics - whether they are publicly listed, 
foreign-owned, hedge fund or family ownership (Hanlon et al., 2005; Slemrod, 2007; 
Chen et al., 2010; McGuire, Omer & Wang, 2012; Badertscher, Katz & Rego, 2013). The 
empirical study by Hanlon et al. (2005) in the United States using Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) audit data found that companies with annual bonus packages and 
transnational corporations had a higher deficiency in the ETR. In mathematical terms, 
their calculation showed that the tax gap between the supposed liability and the real 
taxes paid by large corporations was 13 percent lower from 1983 to 1998, indicating 
transnational corporations adopted more aggressive tax policy. Hence, they concluded 
that non-compliance is related to the observable characteristics of a company such as 
the nature of the ownership. Compared to the public firm, the private firm is 
associated with higher non-compliance as it is less affected by the obligation to report 
its earnings publicly. Another study by Slemrod (2007) indicated that the large 
business with assets greater than USD five billion has the largest percentage gap of 
ETR deficiency, being 74 percent. Moreover, this study also showed that on average, 
the private companies have the highest deficiency rates at 17.1 percent compared to the 
listed companies at 12.5 percent. 
In terms of ownership structure, Desai et al. (2005) argued that the tax policy can have 
significant implications for shaping ownership concentration, whereby a greater 
concentration can lead to a greater incentive to engage in tax avoidance (Desai & 
Dhamapala, 2008). The family firm in Italy which was examined in the Mafrolla and 
D’Amico (2016) study, is an example of concentrated ownership, and may be more or 
less tax aggressive depending on how entrenched the family is in the proportion of 
ownership and the management. They claimed that the controlling family could affect 
the earning capacity by opportunistically managing the firm’s financial reporting. In 
contrast, Chen et al. (2010) argued that the family firm in the US has lower tax 
aggressiveness since the owner is more concerned with the potential non-tax cost such 
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as reputational damage cost, potential penalties from the tax authority and resulted in 
the subsequent drop in the value of shares. Moreover, family firm run by its founders 
or non-professional managers in the US is less likely to use tax shelters. However, it 
should be noted as abovementioned that family entrenchment may have different 
consequences in different countries although, generally, the highly concentrated 
family firm is more likely to resemble the individual in its behaviour (Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010). 
Tax advisors 
The use of tax advisors by a firm can have different effects on corporate compliance 
(Klepper & Nagin, 1989). Tax advisors may help the company to exploit the ambiguous 
features of the law or alternatively, may encourage the firm to fully obey the law by 
enforcing the law’s unambiguous features and by discouraging the reporting of a tax 
position that is likely to be challenged by the authorities.  
Spilker, Worsham Jr. and Prawitt, (1999) conducted an experiment with 63 tax 
advisors comprising people with different positions and levels in the US to examine 
the attitude of tax professionals toward ambiguities in the tax law. They found that tax 
advisors would be likely to interpret ambiguity to the benefit of their client ranging 
from advising aggressiveness in terms of compliance but conservativeness in the 
context of tax planning with the caveat that the efforts were made to achieve client-
preferred outcomes. In the same vein, Tan (2011) noted that tax advisors appeared to 
be afraid of losing their clients if they were unable to meet their clients’ demands by 
exploiting the ambiguity of the tax law. She further argued that tax advisors are 
sensitive to their client’s risk propensity and larger tax advisor firm tend to have larger 
corporations as clients which generally means that they have more complex 
transactions. Wurth and Braithwaite (2016, p.13) supported these studies and 
concluded that “tax practitioners in the aggressive group were distinguished by an 
increased propensity to compromise their preparation ethics and exploit the 
opportunity afforded by ambiguity within their clients; tax affairs”. 
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Profitability 
Some empirical studies reported the negative association between a firm’s profitability 
and its corporate tax compliance (see for example Rego, 2003; Mutti & Grubert, 2009; 
Richardson et al., 2013). Rego (2003) investigated whether more profitable firms in the 
US avoid more taxes that result in lower ETR. She found that the firms with higher 
pre-tax income had lower ETR and the MNC with extensive foreign operations, in 
general, have lower ETR than the US domestic firms. Therefore, the more profitable 
firms in the US are likely to engage in particular schemes or transactions to avoid 
taxes. Richardson et al. (2013) examined the major determinants of transfer pricing 
aggressiveness with a sample of 183 Australian publicly listed firms. They found that 
profitability is positively associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness. In addition, 
the highly profitable corporations are not only able to locate their expenses in a high-
tax jurisdiction, but are also able to arrange their profits in a low tax jurisdiction. For 
example, Microsoft transferred royalty payments from a country with a high tax rate to 
Ireland that has a low corporate income tax rate (Mutti & Grubert, 2009).   
Several studies also reported that corporations which are under pressure from 
profitability issues and financial constraints tend to be more tax aggressive (Edwards,  
Schwab, & Shevlin, 2016; Law & Mills, 2015; Dyreng & Markle, 2016; Akamah, Omer & 
Shu, 2016). When there are financial constraints, the managers focus more on 
generating additional operating cash flows, and they are reducing their expectation in 
terms of current earnings. One way to generate the additional cash flow is by 
increasing tax savings through more aggressive tax planning schemes utilising 
deferred-based strategies (Edwards et al., 2016). The firms under financial constraints 
are also utilising more foreign operation in tax haven location while in the meantime 
they reported higher unrecognised tax benefit with the objective to lower the ETR 
(Law & Mills, 2015). Meanwhile, Dyreng and Markle (2016) found that the US MNCs 
are engaged in income shifting in a systematic way following tax incentives policy, and 
the financially constrained firms shift less income to their overseas affiliations 
compared to their unconstrained counterparts. Moreover, Richardson et al. (2014) 
argued that the financial distress situation as the result of the global financial crisis or 
internal hardship has a positive association with more aggressive tax avoidance 
activities. Therefore, the financial constraints situation is likely to encourage the firms 
55 
 
to seek more tax savings, and they make a more concerted attempt to pursue more tax 
aggressiveness (Akamah et al. 2016). 
3.4 The responsive regulation approach 
In the past, taxpayer compliance has been sought by means of a ‘command-and-
control’ approach (Braithwaite 2007, Leviner, 2009). The approach involves regulators 
applying direct enforcement measures to execute the law (Braithwaite, Murphy & 
Reinhart, 2005). With this mechanism, the regulators ‘command’ taxpayers to obey the 
law and ‘control’ their behaviour by using punishment as a threat to violators (Sinclair, 
1997). This approach to regulation is equivalent to the work of criminal justice 
agencies that upon established laws that impose, "threatened penalties for non-
compliance, and punishment for violators” (Job & Honaker, 2003, p.3). 
Critics, however, have expressed their criticism that the approach of command and 
control has wrongly interpreted the meaning of non-compliance, and this flaw has 
resulted in inefficiency in practice. The approach does not recognise the nature of 
non-compliance, since the notion of a ‘one-stop pit’ for all misconduct seems ill-suited 
to the practical realities (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996; Aalders & Wilthagen, 1997; 
Vaughan, 1998). 
Some argue that the law enforcers should be moving from command and control to a 
more naturally suited approach (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Vaughan 1998; Sparrow, 
2011). One alternative offered is to pursue taxpayer compliance through persuasion, 
education, encouragement and assistance (Braithwaite, 2003). This alternative 
approach that is termed ‘responsive regulation’ is considered as the soft approach. This 
approach recognises that to achieve compliance, it should be acknowledged that it is 
impossible to detect and enforce every contravention of the law. Moreover, it would be 
more effective to persuade taxpayers to comply voluntarily with tax law and to 
encourage self-regulation (Braithwaite, 2007). The responsive regulation arguably 
favours cooperation from the taxpayer and is aligned with the objective of regulators 
to stimulate an optimum level of regulatory compliance (Welsh, 2009). As noted by 
Braithwaite (2011, p.489), “the job of responsive regulators is to treat offenders as 
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worthy of trust because the evidence is that when they do this, regulation more often 
achieves its objectives”. 
Also, this approach enables regulators to decide how misconduct should be handled - 
by using either a ‘stick’ or ‘carrot’ approach. ‘Stick’ is a symbol of punishment for those 
who fail to comply and, in contrast, ‘carrot’ represents a reward for those who follow 
the law.  Regulators are advised to apply ‘stick’ or ‘carrot’ depending on the taxpayer 
situation or the people with whom they are dealing (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; 
Braithwaite, 2002; Andreoni, Harbaugh & Verlund, 2003).   
The responsive regulation approach is based on the notion that regulators should be 
responsive to the conduct of taxpayer in deciding whether to escalate or de-escalate 
the intervention level of action (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). This theory assumes that 
the soft approach is more likely to encourage compliance. Braithwaite (2003) argues 
that persuasion, education, encouragement, and the assistance from the authority are 
the main instruments to enhance voluntary compliance. In particular, the regulator 
should be responsive to the way taxpayer regulate themselves before the regulator 
decides to either persuade or punish (Braithwaite, 2002). In this context, the law 
enforcer frames the aspiration that the tax office is trusting taxpayers. The argument is 
that taxpayers will regard stronger enforcement as fair and procedural if they have 
been persuaded. The application of persuasion as the frontline measure and 
punishment as a fallback would arguably minimise the undesirable consequences of 
this deterrence measure if it backfires (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1994). As noted by 
Nielsen and Parker (2009, p.382), law enforcers are encouraged to be “fair, open-
minded, respectful, not stigmatising, persuasive and cooperative”. In all, Braithwaite 
(2011) summarised the principles of responsive regulation as shown in Figure 3-1 below. 
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1. Think in context; don’t impose a preconceived theory. 
2. Listen actively; structure dialogue that: 
 Gives voice to stakeholders 
 Settles agreed outcomes and how to monitor them; 
 Builds commitments by helping actors find their own motivation to improve; 
 Communicates firm resolve to stick with a problem until it is fixed. 
3. Engage those who resist with fairness; show them respect by construing their resistance as an 
opportunity to learn how to improve regulatory design. 
4. Praise those who show commitment: 
 Support their innovation 
 Nurture motivation to continuously improve; 
 Help leaders pull laggards up through new ceilings of excellence. 
5. Signal that you prefer to achieve outcomes by support and education to build capacity. 
6. Signal, but do not threaten, a range of sanctions to which you can escalate; signal that the 
ultimate sanctions are formidable and are used when necessary, though only as a last resort. 
7. Network pyramidal governance by engaging wider networks of partners as you move up a 
pyramid. 
8. Elicit active responsibility, (responsibility for making outcomes better in the future), resorting 
to passive responsibility (holding actors responsible for past actions) when active responsibility 
fails. 
9. Learn; evaluate how well and at what cost outcomes have been achieved; communicate 
lessons learned. 
 
 
FIGURE 3-1 NINE PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
Source: (Braithwaite, 2011, p.476) 
To indicate the responsiveness to persuasion or punishment, Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992) developed a regulatory pyramid. The basic assumption underlying this pyramid 
is that enforcement strategies are driven by hierarchical order. The base of the 
pyramid is the widest area represents where the most regulatory action was taken: 
persuasion or dialogue. Regulators move up to the next level when the persuasion 
measure alone does not work. The enforcement escalation process continues to the 
upper level if the simple forms of punishment fail on the base level and as a 
consequence, the full enforcement is applied at the apex of the pyramid.    
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FIGURE 3-2 RESPONSIVE REGULATORY APPLICATIONS FOR TAX PURPOSES 
Source: Adapted from the ATO (2000) 
The adjustment of the standard regulatory pyramid for tax administration purposes is 
illustrated in Figure 3-2. The ATO adopted a policy to handle taxpayer’s compliance 
based on responsive regulation approach concerning taxpayers’ responses. For 
example, the base of the pyramid is the most desirable area for the operations of 
business and the tax administration. At this level, tax administration applies the 
approach by educating taxpayers and encouraging voluntary compliance through 
cooperation and self-regulation. At the middle level, taxpayers are persuaded to be 
self-regulated with the assistance of tax officials. Moreover, the full, active 
enforcement is applied when the previous measures fail as shown at the top of the 
pyramid. The diagram also shows that flexibilities apply during the movement both up 
and down the pyramid from the self-regulation and cooperation to the active 
enforcement depending on taxpayers’ responses (ATO, 2000).  
3.5 Compliance risk management (CRM) 
The European Commission (2006, p.5) defined the compliance risk management for 
tax administration purposes as: 
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a systematic process in which a tax administration makes deliberate 
choices on which treatment instruments could be used to effectively 
stimulate compliance and prevent non-compliance, based on the 
knowledge of all (taxpayers’ behaviour) and related to the available 
capacity.  
The European Commission (2006, p.6) stated further that “risk analysis also involves 
the why question: why is the taxpayer behaving in a particular fashion. Taxpayer 
behaviour is critical because it contributes to the assessment and the choice of the 
most efficient and effective form of treatment”.  However, the OECD (2004, p.8) 
prefers a more practical concept where compliance risk management is perceived as 
“structured process for the systematic identification, assessment, ranking and 
treatment of tax compliance risks”. 
The CRM definition established by the European Commission was based on the 
responsive regulation principle (as shown in Figure 3-2) where the tax administration 
should be responsible for the conduct of taxpayers, encourage taxpayers to self-
regulation by utilising instruments that effectively stimulate compliance before 
intervening action is taken (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). As Sparrow (2011) noted, the 
regulator should conduct any interaction with the taxpayer in a responsive, respectful 
and professional manner.   
 
FIGURE 3-3 THE CRM PROCESSES 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2010, p.9) 
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Subsequently, the OECD (2004) framed the way that the process of compliance risk 
management should occur at each stage of a sequence of actions (as shown in Figure 
3-3). The stages are: risk identification, risk assessment and risk prioritisation, 
compliance behaviour analysis, determining the strategy to be applied, and the 
planning and implementation. These five stages of the compliance risk management 
process have been promoted by the OECD and the European Commission as practical 
guidelines for tax administration to manage compliance risks systematically. 
This first stage is a significant step because if the risks are not identified, then they are 
unlikely to be addressed (EC, 2010). This step is needed to identify specific types of 
non-compliance behaviour that poses substantial compliance risks if left untreated, 
and the risk should be identified more specifically in order to provide proper 
treatment35. In general, the purpose of the risk identification is “to identify the specific 
compliance risks that a revenue authority must confront as comprehensively as 
possible, minimising the possibility of oversight, and facilitating the subsequent in-
depth analysis” (EC, 2010, p.16). This step will produce a list of potential risks, and all 
risks will be comprehensively registered (OECD, 2004).  
The second stage in the OECD framework involves assessing and prioritising 
compliance risks by quantifying previously identified risks. This step aims to separate 
the significant risks from the minor ones based on the consequences that are 
anticipated based on their impact upon the organisational objectives and the 
likelihood of the occurrence of the risks either qualitatively or quantitatively or both. 
Prioritisation is necessary because it is not possible to address all risks. The tax 
authority needs to balance the approach regarding significant risks that may affect the 
organisation’s achievement of its objective (OECD, 2004). Hence, the tax authority 
needs to consider not only the behaviour, attitude and culture of taxpayers, but also 
the internal environments of the tax administration (Black & Baldwin, 2010)36. This 
stage produces two outcomes: a quantified and prioritised register of risks and a 
                                                          
35
 For example, the risk of cash economy transactions should be mitigated by the detailed identification 
of specific group behaviour according to its community in which it is toned (OECD, 2004). 
36
 The CRM is an iterative process instead of a single process in facilitating better decision-making. 
Hence, it requires efforts of analysis, research, fact-finding and careful judgment (OECD, 2004). 
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documented compliance programme which needs to be undertaken based on the 
objective evidence (OECD, 2004). 
In the third stage, the OECD (2004) suggests that an understanding of taxpayers’ 
behaviour is a significant issue with economic factors (financial burden, the cost of 
compliance, disincentives and incentives) and behavioural factors (individual 
differences, perceived inequity, perception of minimal risk and risk-taking) requiring 
identification and analysis by the tax administration. The understanding is aligned 
with the reasons for non-compliant behaviour as pointed out by Webley (2004) such 
as the perception of equity, the opportunity for non-compliance, individual 
differences, social norms and dissatisfaction with tax authorities. In short, this step 
includes compliance behaviour analysis. One of the advantages of applying CRM is 
that it produces a focus on the underlying drivers rather than only the symptoms 
which means there is no single measure that is appropriate for every problem (OECD, 
2013). In this case, a sustained longer-term compliance outcome can be obtained by 
allowing the authority to recognise the ‘causes’ of specific non-compliance. 
Conversely, failure to recognise the causes of non-compliance can result in 
inappropriate treatment that not only aggravates the underlying issues but also may 
anger the community (Leviner, 2008).  
In the fourth stage, determining appropriate treatment strategies means that the 
outlined compliance programs provide a different response to those who want to 
comply and apply stricter enforcement to those who do not (OECD, 2004). In this 
stage, treatment needs to be delivered with fairness and respect that will secure the 
taxpayers’ trust and encourage voluntary compliance (Feld & Frey, 2007). It has been 
recognised that inducing changes in taxpayer behaviour is not an exact science, but it 
is also not a matter of pure conjecture (OECD, 2010). Treatment strategies can be 
applied only if the recognised risks have been addressed and the causes of non-
compliant behaviour have been identified (OECD, 2004). The tax administration is 
also advised to strengthen community partnerships by building strategic alliances with 
other institutions, industry bodies and tax advisers in order to obtain significant 
leverage in its compliance activities (OECD, 2004). Aside from the general strategy to 
encourage voluntary compliance, the tax authority also must have a range of tools to 
deal with non-compliance since it is impossible to apply only a single tax strategy. 
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These have to be applied appropriately according to the level of the risk as the tax 
authorities not only have finite resources but also have to anticipate dealings with 
various types of taxpayers. For example, Kornhauser (2008) suggested a shaming 
approach as a strategy for dealing with high-profile delinquent taxpayers by 
publicising their names and their tax arrears in the mass media. On the other hand, 
for taxpayers who manage non-compliance risks, OECD (2004) suggested the 
authorities give such taxpayers incentives such as promoting a withholding tax system 
as this system enables taxes to be collected at the same time as income is earned, or 
encouraging taxpayers to improve their bookkeeping as the audit trail records would 
prevent tax evasion and even money laundering. 
For the final stage, the OECD (2004) argues that an effective application of these 
treatment strategies relies on three fundamental capabilities, namely, resources, 
design and execution. These procedures are applied in a way that demonstrates 
efficient use of resources, engages stakeholders in its implementation, and ensures 
effective execution. Another important step to be taken by the tax authority is the 
evaluation of the outcomes. The evaluation will measure the success of those 
implemented strategies and determine the effectiveness of the compliance 
programme. The OECD also advises the monitoring of performance and outcomes in 
terms of the planned objective. As iterative process, the CRM process could be seen as 
a continuous cycle.  
3.6 Tax administration in developing countries and responsive regulation 
Understanding the true nature of taxpayer behaviour and applying the right strategy 
such as CRM are suggested by both OECD (2004) and the European Commission 
(2010) as the means to improve taxpayer compliance. However, the guidelines issued 
by the OECD or the European Commission are formulated with developed countries 
in mind, and their circumstances are quite different from those of developing 
countries. Several studies have indicated various challenges faced by tax 
administration in developing countries, both internally and externally (Baurer, 2005; 
Baer & Silvani, 1997; Trasberg, 2004; Mascagni et al. 2014; Tanzi & Zee, 2000; 
Brautigram et al., 2008; Bird, 2008; McKerchar & Evans, 2009; Gordon & Li, 2009). For 
example, a limited organisational capacity, rampant corruption, a mounting cash 
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economy problem and a lagging behind in technology. Moreover, emerging issues 
such as the globalisation of commerce have caused additional problems for the tax 
administration in preventing tax evasion since business operations have become more 
global and with a more complex structure. All of these challenges are likely to result in 
lower enforcement capabilities (Baurer, 2005).  
Surprisingly, many tax administrations in developing countries are still adopting the 
deterrence approach to prevent tax violations by spreading fears among taxpayers, 
which is arguably not a good means of ensuring voluntary compliance (Mahmood, 
2012). Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, p.26) asserted that developing compliance through 
deterrence inevitably incurs high costs, consumes resources that a developing country 
lacks, stating that, “persuasion is cheap, and punishment is expensive”. Moreover, 
Braithwaite (2006) argued that adopting deterrence as an enforcement method is not 
suitable for a developing country as its execution is costly.  
Furthermore, Braithwaite (2006) suggested that a developing economy with limited 
regulatory capacity may benefit from the use of responsive regulation. The application 
of a soft approach such as responsive regulation is considered more suitable (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992). The application of a soft approach is not a complete substitute for 
the punishment approach. Instead, punishment as deterrence is used when the 
persuasion is failed in maintaining compliance. This is known as a ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy 
which posits that both persuasion and punishment are used alternately in fostering 
compliance and preventing non-compliance. The flexibility in responsive regulation 
allows tax administrations to prioritise enforcement strategies in the case of the high-
risk flag. The advantage of this strategy is its cost efficiency as the resources of the 
organisation are appropriately allocated according to the pecking order of case 
management which prioritises cases with higher revenue potential (Braithwaite, 2007; 
Baldwin & Black, 2008).  
However, due to its flexibility, responsive regulation is criticised for its enforcement 
consistency. The conservative measure or deterrence approach is considered to be 
more consistent because, theoretically, all offenders would be punished for their 
violation. Braithwaite et al. (2005) acknowledged this shortcoming and in reality, the 
enforcement flow perhaps does not always follow the rule of responsive regulation 
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which systematically moves up or moves down level by level from the base pyramid to 
the top or vice versa. For example, compliance might be hard to achieve by means of 
dialogue or persuasion alone in the case of certain violators (Daly, 2003). Nielsen and 
Parker (2009) added that the expectation for the regulators to consistently behave as 
requested by tit-for-tat strategy is quite difficult, even when they are trying to act 
responsively. 
Nevertheless, despite the criticism, Leviner (2009, p.381) claimed that “responsive 
regulation may, therefore, constitute a superior method for regulating tax 
compliance”. He argued that responsive regulation establishes a framework that 
integrates a balanced and forward-looking method for enforcement. This approach 
conceptualises behaviour not only as a product of the desires, needs and limits of self-
directed taxpayers, but it also acknowledges that taxpayers are affected by 
environmental and personal factors such as values, norms, habits and their interaction 
with the authorities. By emphasising that the interaction plays a significant role in 
moulding taxpayer behaviour, the tax authority is empowered to live up to its own 
responsibilities and might be able to explore various ways to manage the relationship. 
The point here is not only to enforce compliance when it is poor, but also to 
strengthen and manage the current compliance efficiently and fairly with the aim of 
improving voluntary compliance. Given the ever-changing tax laws, the improvement 
of voluntary reporting has become more critical. Further, the enforcement policy 
might be more effective if the authority encourages self-regulation through 
persuasion, assistance and education, while punitive enforcement should be applied 
only when necessary. That is where responsive regulation asserts its superiority as an 
enforcement strategy as it applies penalties in a gradual and proportionate manner. 
Responsive regulation represents a shift from rigid deterrence to a dynamic framework 
that encompasses the interplay of tax authority-taxpayer interaction. It no longer 
applies a particular formula to achieve optimal deterrence, but instead has realised the 
optimal way to play the ‘enforcement game’ (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). 
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3.7 Corporate tax compliance studies in Indonesia and knowledge gap 
To date, few studies have investigated the tax compliance behaviour of Indonesian 
large business. The researcher has documented several general corporate compliance 
studies in Indonesia that do not deal specifically with corporate tax behaviour, but 
whose titles indicate the research direction. These are presented in Table 3-2 below.     
TABLE 3-2 CORPORATE TAX COMPLIANCE STUDIES IN INDONESIA 
No. Author Year Title 
Research 
Method 
1. Hartadinata, O. S., 
& Shauki, E. R 
2013 Agency, Leverage Policy and Tax-
aggressiveness During Transition Period: 
Evidence from Indonesia 
Quantitative 
2. Sari, D. K., & 
Martani, D 
2010 Ownership Characteristics, Corporate 
Governance and Tax Aggressiveness 
Quantitative 
3. Sari, D., & Tjen, C 2017 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Disclosure, Environmental Performance, 
and Tax Aggressiveness 
Quantitative 
4. Sitardja, M., & 
Dwimulyani, S. 
2016 Analysis About the Influences of Good 
Public Governance, Trust Toward Tax 
Compliance on Public Companies that 
Listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange 
Quantitative 
5. Susila, B., & Pope, 
J. 
2012 The tax compliance costs of large 
corporate taxpayers in Indonesia. 
Quantitative 
6. Mulyani, Y. 2010 Factors Influencing Transfer Pricing 
Compliance: An Indonesian Perspective 
Mixed 
method 
7. Harinurdin, E 2009 Corporate tax compliance behaviour* Quantitative 
8. Rahayu, N 2013 Tax avoidance practices by foreign direct 
investment limited companies* 
Mixed 
method 
Note: * in the Indonesian language 
Hartadinata and Shauki (2013) conducted a quantitative study to examine the effect of 
income tax rates changes on the tax payment compliance. They used 222 Indonesian 
listed companies as the sample covering the 2008-2010 period, using ordinary least 
square and logistic regression for data analysis. They found that the decrease in 
income tax rates has driven lower tax aggressiveness and the increase of debt financing 
has a negative association with tax aggressiveness. They also found that the changes in 
corporate characteristics such as managerial ownership, audit quality and corporate 
governance do not have a significant influence on tax aggressiveness.  
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Sari and Martani (2010) compared the tax aggressiveness of family-ownership 
companies with that of corporate governance. They used 40 listed manufacturing 
firms covering the 2005-2008 period and analysed the data using analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). They showed that corporate governance has a negative association with tax 
aggressiveness, while family-owned firms in Indonesia tend to be more tax aggressive 
than the non-family firms. Sari and Tjen (2017) conducted a study with a sample of 188 
non-financial firms that were listed on the Jakarta stock exchange from 2009 to 2012. 
They examined the relationship between corporate tax aggressiveness and the 
corporations’ social responsibility (CSR) and environmental activities. Their study 
found that the firms with active CSR and environmental activities tend to be less tax 
aggressive. Sitardja and Dwimulyani (2016) examined 87 non-financial listed 
companies in order to determine the relationship between good public governance 
and tax compliance. Their study showed that the three aspects of good public 
governance which are tax fairness, tax reputation and tax transparency, have a positive 
association with taxpayer compliance.  
Susila and Pope (2012) calculated tax compliance costs of large businesses in Indonesia 
for 2010. They found that the gross compliance costs were estimated at 3.16 percent of 
total tax revenue collected from those large businesses in the year of interest. 
Mulyani’s (2010) study examined the factors that influence transfer pricing 
compliance. She found that some determinants affecting tax compliance are the 
probability of audit, and that penalties have a positive association with the 
compliance, while the perception of corruption and tax rate have a negative 
association with compliance.  
Harinurdin (2009) examined the behaviour of large businesses that were registered 
with the Large Tax Office, DGT in 2008. He analysed the data using Structural 
Equation Modelling to investigate the correlation between tax compliance and 
predetermined indicator variables. His study found that the variables that significantly 
influence taxpayer behaviour are: detection probability, profitability, corporate climate 
and the use of tax advisor. The result of Rahayu (2013)’s study indicated that three 
schemes tend to be used by foreign investment companies in Indonesia to avoid tax; 
these are transfer pricing, thin capitalisation and treaty shopping.  
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The abovementioned studies provide useful information about the corporate tax 
compliance situation in a developing country. However, only two studies have focused 
on large business in Indonesia; these were conducted by Harinurdin (2009) and Susila 
and Pope (2013). Both studies employed the quantitative method to analyse data with 
predetermined variables to obtain the results. It is worth noting, however, large 
business tax compliance is a major issue in tax research because of its economic 
importance (van der Hel-van Dijk-van Dijk & Siglé, 2015) especially in developing 
countries, considering the contribution made by corporate tax revenue to the total 
State revenue (Arnold, 2008). The determinants that shape large business compliance 
especially in developing countries are, unfortunately, rarely fully explained in the body 
of literature.  
The area of corporate tax research, in general, is an area of tax study that has been 
flourishing in recent years. Feller and Schanz (2014) calculated that the pace of 
corporate tax research alone had outperformed other tax research area by more than 
six-fold in the period 2004 to 2013 compared to the preceding decade or from 1994 to 
2003. Tax compliance as a complex social phenomenon has attracted the interest of 
scholars from various disciplines such as law, politics, economics, accounting, history 
and psychology (Oats, 2012; McKerchar, 2008;). Both researchers and policymakers 
alike have a deep interest in discovering more about the true nature of the corporate 
sectors’ motivation to pay taxes. However, as stated by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, 
p.168), “Has tax research progressed since Shackelford and Shevlin (2001)? 
Undoubtedly, it has. Although the effects of taxes on ’real’ corporate decisions are at 
times difficult to document, they are important to examine.” Therefore, any study 
conducted to improve corporate tax compliance is more than welcome. Furthermore, 
the study of corporate tax compliance becomes more relevant as the government 
attempts to reduce the tax gap, improve compliance and collect more revenue 
(Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Then, this omnipresent phenomenon of companies and 
taxes generates an important question: What motivates companies to pay taxes? 
The literature does not answer this question adequately. Feller and Schanz (2014) 
observed that tax research is currently dominated by quantitative empirical research, 
which to some extent leaves many puzzles and conflicting evidence to be reconciled. 
For example, there is no consensus among researchers regarding the factors that 
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impact the most on taxpayers’ compliance (McKerchar & Evans 2009). Hence, it is 
argued that a more in-depth understanding of the true motivation of companies to pay 
taxes and the factors that make them pay is still lacking in the current discussions. 
Considering the state of current research, it is reasonable to conduct a study that 
would be beneficial and highly relevant in revealing the factors that motivate 
companies to pay their taxes since taxation is part of a social phenomenon 
(McKerchar, 2008). As stated by Boden, Killian, Mulligan and Oats (2010, p.543), 
“critical analyses of tax as a social phenomenon of considerable significance to 
scholars”. 
Hence, this study was designed to fill the gap in tax compliance studies, particularly in 
the area of corporate tax compliance in a developing country, which is rarely 
addressed in the body of literature. This, therefore leads to the aim and the research 
problem of this study: 
What are the factors that influence large businesses tax compliance risks from the 
perspectives of the tax officials, the tax managers, and the independent tax advisors? 
---- and ---- 
How does the tax authority manage large business taxpayers’ compliance risks 
according to the factors identified by addressing the previous research question? 
The factors that influence large businesses tax compliance risks and the way that the 
tax authority manages such risks are chosen as the core of this study for the following 
reasons. 
First, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, research studies have yet to investigate 
in depth the factors that influence large businesses’ tax compliance risks particularly 
in a developing economy and taking into account the perspectives of the direct actors 
in the field. Therefore, being a largely unexplored area, this theme warrants further 
study. It is apparent that as a social phenomenon, the companies’ motives either to 
comply or not to comply have captured the interest of numerous scholars, and the 
subject has been discussed from many angles. However,  there is no evidence in the 
body of literature that and study has explicitly investigated the factors that influence 
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large businesses’ tax compliance in a developing country and from the perspective of 
those directly involved in the process.  
Second, the documentation on how a tax authority in a developing country manages 
the issue of large busines tax compliance risks, to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, is rarely discussed in the literature. Most of the literature on tax 
authorities’ experiences in managing large businesses’ compliance concerns the 
developed countries.37  This is despite the fact that corporate tax revenue is more 
critical for developing countries as it contributes a significant proportion of their total 
revenue and these nations have limited ability to collect more revenue from other 
types of taxation38. Therefore, the exploration of an uncharted area of corporate tax 
compliance where the sources of data are the key informants is of great significance as 
previous studies have rarely included the tax officials’ perpectives in the discussion.  
Finally, although some studies have identified compliance determinants for large 
corporate taxpayers, the true nature of corporate decisions that are affected by taxes is 
not fully understood. There is no evidence that past studies have investigated 
systematically the perspectives of inter-related actors that shape the compliance of 
large corporate taxpayers in a developing country. Hence, a rigorous study of 
economic and behavioural factors is necessary to reveal the real issues faced by both 
taxpayers and tax authorities and to improve the quality of existing theories. 
Nevertheless, this study was unable to capture all determinants that influence 
compliance. Instead, firstly, it relied on information from the data sources to reveal 
the actual factors that are perceived as influencing compliance as these are 
corroborated by the findings of previous studies. Secondly, the methods used by tax 
authorities to manage compliance risks have been investigated to provide readers with 
a comprehensive picture of the real situation regarding the enforcement of 
compliance. Finally, responsive regulation theory, as the current best practice in 
managing tax compliance, has been examined to determine its suitability for a 
developing country.  
                                                          
37
 See for example: Benon, Baer and Toro (2002); OECD (2009); EC (2010). 
38
 Developing countries are more susceptible to the large business tax avoidance activities as they rely 
heavily on corporate taxes as their main revenue source compared to the developed ones where the 
proportion of tax revenue is relatively more balanced  (Dharmapala, 2014).  
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Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that a qualitative approach is arguably the most 
appropriate as this study seeks an in-depth understanding of large businesses tax 
compliance behaviour as a social phenomenon. A detailed discussion of the adopted 
research design and methodology is presented in the next chapter.  
3.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter reviewed the major concepts and the literature related to the research 
problem. It begins with an overview of the concepts of tax compliance, tax avoidance 
and tax risk. It was found that tax compliance, tax avoidance and tax risk are fluid 
concepts that have various meanings depending on the perspectives encompassing 
various aspects. It was concluded that tax compliance definitions could be divided into 
two categories which are the conceptual definition and the practical one. Regarding 
tax avoidance, it was found that there is no consensus among scholars for the 
boundary of tax avoidance; however, in terms of tax evasion, this study adopted the 
OECD definition of tax evasion as referring to any illegal arrangements. The revenue 
loss caused by tax avoidance practices is also more pronounced in developing 
countries which, as a result, suffer the most harm. The term ‘tax risk’ has a meaning 
for the authority that differs from that of the taxpayers even though both parties need 
to manage the risks appropriately with respect to their own objectives. 
Factors influencing corporate compliance can be categorised into three major groups, 
namely, economic factors, socio-psychological factors and corporate characteristics.  
The elements of these major groups are further discussed. The group of economic 
factors consist of penalties, detection probability, tax rate, manager compensation, risk 
appetite, complexity of the law, and uncertainty. The group of socio-psychological 
factors comprises personal and social norms, fairness and trust, while the group of 
corporate characteristics consists of BOD’s composition, tax risk management, 
ownership, the use of tax advisors, and profitability. 
The concept of responsive regulation and the CRM are reviewed in Section 3.4 and 3.5, 
respectively. It was concluded from Section 3.4 that mostly tax compliance could be 
encouraged by taking the soft-approach involving persuasion, education, 
encouragement and the assistance from tax office as the main instruments rather than 
relying on mere deterrence. The OECD and the European Commission suggest that a 
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CRM be established based on the responsive regulation concept as a practical guide to 
assist tax administrations to manage their compliance risks systematically. The tax 
administration in developing countries is discussed in Section 3.6, together with the 
possibility of adopting a responsive regulation approach.  
Finally, Section 3.7 discussed the studies on corporate compliance in Indonesia, 
followed by the identification of the knowledge gaps in the literature and the context 
of this study.  Further research is needed to explain the phenomenon of corporate tax 
compliance in a developing country. 
Chapter 4 explains the choice of research design and includes methodology, theory, 
the domain, and research method. The chapter also discusses the data collection and 
analysis process, and the issue of reliability and validity of the study. 
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a discussion of the research design and methodology employed 
in this study in order to achieve the research objectives. This chapter is organised into 
five main sections. Section 4.2 addresses the research questions and section 4.3 
presents a justification of the research design with four subsections of methodology, 
theory, domain and research method. Section 4.4 describes the process used for the 
data collection (interviews) and for the data analysis.  Section 4.5 discusses the issues 
of reliability and validity, and section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Research questions 
This research examines the factors contributing to the income tax compliance of large 
business in Indonesia and how the tax authority responds to such issues. Specifically, 
it addresses two research questions under one integrated study. The details regarding 
the selection of research questions, the research objectives, the background and the 
motivation for conducting this study are presented in Chapter 1. The two research 
questions are re-stated here as they determine the selection of an appropriate research 
methodology.  
Research Question One: What are the factors that influence large business taxpayers’ 
compliance risks from the perspectives of the tax officials, the tax managers, and the 
independent tax advisers? 
Research Question Two: How does the tax authority manage large business 
taxpayers’ compliance risks according to the factors identified by addressing the 
previous research question? 
  
73 
 
4.3 Research design 
In order to choose a suitable method and to guide the research, it is useful to apply 
four fundamental research concepts suggested by Ahrens and Chapman (2006). These 
concepts, and their application in this study, are summarised in Table 4-1 below. A 
more detailed discussion of our approach is presented in subsections 4.3.1 to 4.3.4. 
TABLE 4-1 FOUR FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH CONCEPTS, DESCRIPTION AND APPLICATION 
No. Concept Description Applied to this study 
1. Methodology General approach to research Qualitative interpretative 
2. Theory The explanatory concept Tax compliance literature, 
responsive regulation 
3. Domain Space in which data is 
collected 
The field of large businesses, tax 
office and tax advisors 
4. Research Method Specific research technique Semi-structured interviews 
Source: Adapted from Ahrens and Chapman (2006, p.821) 
4.3.1 Methodology 
This study attempts to answer the call for tax research in the area of corporate tax 
compliance. As stated by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p.168),  
Has tax research progressed since Shackelford and Shevlin (2001)? 
Undoubtedly, it has. Although the effects of taxes on ’real’ corporate 
decisions are at times difficult to document, they are important to 
examine… The relevance of tax avoidance research will increase as 
governments try to close the tax gap, increase compliance, and 
collect more revenue.  
Therefore, any research related to the area of corporate tax compliance will be 
welcomed in the literature regardless of the research method employed. As noted by 
Shevlin (1999, p.427),  “… all methodologies can be found in tax research: namely, 
experimental markets, behavioural/judgement and decision making, analytical, and 
archival empirical”.  Hence, the tax researcher may have a background comprising one 
or more different academic disciplines, each having a different research method since 
interdisciplinary knowledge in taxation research has been well recognised. For the 
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purposes of this study, a qualitative approach is adopted for the research. The 
rationale behind this choice is discussed below. 
First, the two research questions stated above are concerned with acquiring an 
understanding of and the insight into various aspects of tax compliance practices and 
its process in large businesses in a developing country. To obtain such understanding, 
a further subjective interpretation is necessary. Hence, the general approach pursued 
in this research is the interpretative approach since it is the most appropriate given 
the phenomenon of interest. As argued by Ahrens and Chapman (2006), the 
interpretative approach accommodates the validity of the internal situation that exists 
in the field during the data collection and data analysis stages. Consequently, the 
meaning or the interpretation of the data may become more fluid and may result in 
multiple layers of meaning or even various levels of interpretation (Abernethy, Chua, 
Luckett & Selto, 1999). For example, the responses from participants lacked consensus 
on a particular factor that affects corporate tax compliance such as the factor of 
business profitability vis-à-vis reputation. Table 4-2 below presents the paradigm 
characteristics of interpretivism that are used in this study. 
TABLE 4-2 CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERPRETIVISM AND ITS STANCE 
Feature Interpretivists stance 
Ontology (nature of reality) Multiple, constructed realities exist 
Epistemology (the relationship of the knower to 
the known) 
Inseparable 
Axiology (the role of values in inquiry) Value-bound 
Generalisation of time and context Not possible 
Logic Inductive (particular to general) 
Source: Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, p.7-10) 
Second, the key criterion for successful qualitative research concerns its rigour, which 
relates to the validity and reliability of findings resulting from strict adherence to the 
referenced theory and its relevance during the research process (Lamb, Lymer, 
Freedman & James, 2004). Otley (2001) suggests a specific technique to prevent the 
possibility of conflict between rigour and relevance. The technique involves making a 
direct connection with a real organisation and its daily operations by means of a field-
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based research method to investigate a particular aspect of the organisation’s practice. 
Consequently, the level of creativity and the researcher’s insight into the process of 
investigation and data collection may determine the success of a qualitative study 
(McKerchar, 2008). Also, the past experiences of the researcher are a key factor in 
qualitative research, as the themes that emerge from the analysis may contribute 
significantly to an understanding of the factors that influence large business tax 
compliance. As noted by Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p.29), “Qualitative researchers 
report on their own observations of the social world, including reports of his/her 
experiences”. 
To conclude, the qualitative interpretative approach is appropriate for the research 
carried out for this study as it explores the perspectives of various participants. The 
selection of semi-structured interviews is intended to obtain comprehensive and 
detailed information about the practices of large businesses in regard to taxation. As 
argued by Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p.10), “The word ‘qualitative’ implies an emphasis 
on the quality of entities and processes and meanings that are not experimentally 
examined or measured regarding quantity, amount, intensity or frequency”. Hence, for 
the purposes of this study, the qualitative interpretative approach provided a more in-
depth understanding of the social phenomenon of interest as it related to perspectives 
and human interactions (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Furthermore, statistics and other 
quantitative measures would be an inadequate means of exploring people’s 
behaviours, thoughts and feelings (Kalof & Dietz, 2008). In addition, the qualitative 
interpretative method was chosen for this study as the most suitable for addressing 
the research questions. Hence, the research questions, the theoretical framework, and 
the collected data should be aligned in order to produce valid and reliable findings 
(Torgler, 2007). In this study, those qualities are embedded in the qualitative research 
because the expected information is the knowledge that comes from contextual 
understanding and the participants’ rich experiences. This method also allows the 
researcher to have a broader access to the interviewees’ perceptions and their 
knowledge about the phenomenon of interest. Thus, the qualitative interpretative 
approach enables the researcher to explore the insights and the rationale behind 
company decisions regarding tax compliance. 
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4.3.2 Theory 
Another key concept is the theory. Choosing the correct theory is not only important 
as the explanatory concept but also as a device to provide a fuller understanding of the 
process that occurred within the ongoing research. Moreover, unprompted insights 
could be elicited by the researcher’s interaction with the organisations’ members 
(Llewelyn, 2003). The critical concept in this study is related to a particular framework 
to support the explanation of the research problem. Therefore, the explanatory 
conceptual framework in this study represents an array of relevant literature, as 
suggested by Hopper and Hoque (2006) that is used to examine the similar dimension 
of a research problem.  In this study, as the events in the field might best be explained 
with reference to multiple theories (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006) then the theory in 
relation to tax compliance and its supporting literature were chosen in order to 
acquire a deeper understanding of large business tax compliance issue in a developing 
country. 
The selection of tax compliance literature and the responsive regulation approach in 
this study is intended to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the practice 
of and the processes of large businesses tax compliance including the factors that 
influence their compliance. Moreover, this literature is selected because responsive 
regulation promotes persuasion and encouragement as an effective means of 
improving tax compliance (Braitwaite, 2000) and this notion is supported by Leviner 
(2009, p.1), “responsive regulation may, therefore, constitute a superior method for 
regulating tax compliance”.   
4.3.3 Domain 
The term ‘domain’ in this study refers to the space where the research took place and, 
more importantly, the field which was deemed the most useful for answering the 
research questions. The field of a domain might be seen as simple because it is the 
venue where data is collected. However, the usefulness of the field, in fact, might 
determine the accuracy of the researcher’s responses to the disclosed research 
problems. As noted by Ahren and Chapman (2006, p.824), “where, how and when the 
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researcher exposes him/herself to such data is determined by theoretical and 
methodological considerations”.  
In the field, the careful exposition is applied by the researcher at the time of open-
ended interaction between himself and his participants because such interactions may 
result in the obtaining of complicated, extensive and unnecessary data. The over-
abundance of data may impede the researcher’s focus on answering the specified 
research questions. Also, there is the possibility that intervieews may challenge 
researcher’s thoughts or ideas or may even create a confrontation. However, unlike 
laboratory experiments, the interactions among humans in this study offered the 
researcher the opportunity to gather various perspectives, even though some might 
have been quite unique or even absurd.  However, these characteristics enriched the 
quality of the study since the researcher was always mindful of the study objectives.  
4.3.4 Research Method 
As this study attempted to capture various perspectives in order to analyse the issue of 
large business taxation compliance in Indonesia, the selection of three different groups 
of participants with their interrelated functions namely, tax officials, tax managers and 
tax advisors, was intended to address the issue. These three groups were directly 
involved in the tax system, and they were well-positioned to determine their 
respective companies’ taxation compliance. Moreover, the views of these participants 
provided holistic pictures of the problem being addressed. Thus, both valuable 
information and more profound insightful perspectives were obtained from the 
participants. 
As previously stated, because this study was conducted in order to acquire a deeper 
understanding and more comprehensive insights regarding the tax compliance of large 
businesses in Indonesia, hence, a semi-structured interview approach was selected as 
the most suitable method for collecting data. This method allows the researcher to 
address an array of themes based on the research problems presented in Section 4.2 
above. Further, the semi-structured interview enabled the researcher to be flexible 
while keeping his focus on particular issues. This method also encouraged spontaneity 
which meant that the researcher could express his thought with some degree of 
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freedom as stated by Horton, Macve and Struyven (2004).  Moreover, as argued by 
Pedhazur and Schmelkin (2013), the semi-structured interview has advantages 
compared to the other research method by, for instance, addressing more complex 
questions, providing opportunities to probe the interviewee’s responses, and 
identifying previously-undetected errors.   
The other two interview approaches, namely the unstructured interview and the 
structured interview, were not selected for several reasons. The highly unstructured 
interview approach requires a significant amount of time for the collection of data, 
and the researcher has less control in directing the conversation to the topic that is 
supposed to be the primary focus. Moreover, as argued by Zhang and Wildemuth 
(2009), the researcher faces greater challenges when attempting to analyse the 
abundance of data collected from the interview. Meanwhile, the other method, the 
structured interview does not allow the researcher to pursue ‘interesting’ issues that 
may arise during the interview (Patton, 2005). Further, the structured interview also 
might raise the issue of data reliability or ‘true responses’ because participants are 
being directed to answer, or they forced to choose among alternatives provided. 
Therefore, the structured interview could be perceived as creating tension and 
intimidating the interviewee, which might result in a limited rapport between the 
interviewer and the interviewees, thereby possibly biasing participants’ responses.  
Therefore, the semi-structured interview was selected for this study. It was conducted 
in two stages: the preliminary interview and the core interview. The first stage of the 
interview and the second stage are discussed further in section 4.4.1. The responses to 
questions asked in the interviews were then analysed by coding the answers and 
subsequently isolating the key themes, and finally grouping them according to the 
corresponding research questions of this study. 
4.4 Data collection and analysis 
Prior to conducting the field research, ethics clearance was acquired for a low level of 
risk research category. The study was approved by the RMIT University Business 
College Human Ethics Advisory Network (BCHEAN) under the Notice of Approval, 
Project number 18984 (see appendix D for detail).  
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As previously mentioned in subsection 4.3.4, the data was collected from semi-
structured interviews. Moreover, the researcher’s background as a tax officer was 
advantageous as it enabled him to understand the problems thoroughly and to identify 
the appropriate questions to be asked, particularly in terms of the local context. 
Subsequently, separate preconceived themes were established for the three different 
groups according to their respective functions. The details of the interview process of 
the study are discussed in subsection 4.4.1. 
Subsection 4.4.2 discusses the process of data analysis. The analysis in this study 
followed Lillis’ (1999) proposition that the analysis involves the process of sound 
reduction, appropriate classification and adequate interpretation. However, as 
anticipated, the transcript of the interviews and the post-interview notes constituted a 
significant amount of data that required painstaking analysis. Therefore, in this study, 
the researcher followed Patton’s (2002) suggestion, to be aware of the challenges 
associated with the analysis of a large volume of data so that the results are valid.  
4.4.1 The interview process 
The interview is one of the most potent methods for collecting data in qualitative 
research (Silverman, 2013). The face-to-face interview offers a more personalised 
interaction between the participants and the interviewer during the conversation. The 
interviewer can also probe or follow up the questions. Another significant advantage 
of the face-to-face interview, according to Opdenakker (2006), is that more 
spontaneous responses can be obtained from the interviewee without any prompting 
and, moreover, so that the interviewer has the advantage of observing social cues or 
non-verbal responses such as body language, and of changes in tone.   
Two interview stages were conducted in this study. The first phase involved 
preliminary interviews that were conducted with five tax officials. The purposes of 
these were as follows: 
a. to establish a foundation regarding what is considered as critical to large 
business tax compliance;  
b. to provide insights into the type of information that the interviewee may be 
willing to offer; and 
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c. to create a useful framework for the second interview phase.  
This study followed David and Sutton (2011) suggestion that a preliminary interview 
session be conducted prior to the core interview. One advantage of the preliminary 
session is that it establishes a basis for the interaction between the researcher and the 
interviewees. Also, it enables the researcher to rehearse the interview and ascertain 
the participants’ understanding of the questions asked. As a result, the feedback 
obtained from the preliminary session was valuable as it led to the revision of the 
proposed questions and enabled the researcher to estimate the average time needed 
for each interview.  
For the core interview, the participants were recruited via various avenues. For 
example, tax officials (the first group of participants) were recruited after the 
researcher received approval from the Directorate of Human Relations of Directorate 
General of Taxes (DGT). The officials were recruited from the Large Taxpayer Office 
One, the Large Taxpayer Office Two, the Regional Large Taxpayer Office and the 
Directorate of Tax Potential, Compliance and Revenue. The researcher followed up the 
candidates by contacting them via a formal letter, email and telephone to determine 
their availability to participate in the study. 
In the second group, tax advisors were recruited according to the leading firm's 
classification from the International Tax Review (2015), a worldwide media for tax 
advisory practices.  The researcher made contact with tax advisors who held various 
positions ranging from Partner, Director and Senior tax consultant and invited them 
to participate in this study. The group of tax managers was recruited from large 
taxpayers that were registered with the Large Taxpayer Office in Indonesia. Tax 
directors and tax managers were contacted via email and telephone to determine their 
interest in participating in the research. There were 101 potential participants 
contacted from all groups. However, 47 of them did not reply to the researcher’s email 
and six of them refused to be interviewed, leaving 48 interviewees for this research.  
Participant groupings are presented below in Table 4-3 below. 
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TABLE 4-3 PARTICIPANT GROUPS CONTACTED AND INTERVIEWED 
No. Category Contacted Responded 
Refused      
to be 
interviewed 
Agreed to be 
interviewed 
and to be 
recorded 
1. Tax Official 25 25 4 21 
2. Tax Advisor 28 15 1 14 
3. Tax Manager 48 14 1 13 
Before the interview session began, the researcher handed the participant a copy of a 
letter of participant information and consent form, the explanation about the research 
and the interview questions upon participant request. Further, the researcher 
informed each participant that participation was totally voluntary, the participant 
could withdraw at any time without providing an explanation, and all responses would 
remain confidential unless the participant gave specific permission for disclosure of 
information. The interview questions and the consent form are provided in Appendix 
C and E.  
The interview was conducted with 48 participants comprising three separate groups. 
As presented in Table 4-3, 21 tax officials, 14 tax advisors and 13 tax managers were 
interviewed. All of those interviewees were selected by means of the purposive 
sampling approach. Purposive sampling is commonly used in qualitative studies since 
there are no exact rules governing the size of the sample population (Kaczynski, 
Salmona & Smith, 2014). This approach requires that potential participants be 
identified according to their personal knowledge or professional recommendation 
from their colleagues (Doyle, Hughes & Glaister, 2009). Patton (1990) asserts the 
advantages of purposive or selective sampling that the power of purposive sampling 
lies in the selection of information-rich sources. In this case, “The information-rich 
sources are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central 
importance to the purpose of the research” (Patton, 1990, p.169). Therefore, all 
participants in this study were considered to be information-rich. They were also key-
informants because of their knowledge of the specific issue which was the focus of this 
study. It is worth noting that the tax directors or tax managers interviewed in this 
study are regarded as corporate elites, and their exclusivity makes them valuable key 
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informants.  As stated by Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen and Tahvanainen  
(2002), access to the elites may be limited to only certain people because of their 
exclusivity in terms of the rest of society as a result of boundaries established by 
differences in status.  
The interviews were conducted from 5 January 2015 to 6 November 2015. Each 
interview session was conducted at a time and place chosen by the participant. A voice 
recorder was used during the interview session upon the interviewee’s approval. 
Silverman (2011) argues that using a digital voice recorder provides more advantages 
compared to a field note. The advantages are that it can be replayed, it has a better 
preservation of the interview content, it makes the interviewee more relaxed and 
focused during the interview because s/he is not distracted by the interviewer writing 
down all the responses. In addition, the interviewer took notes during the session only 
to capture and followed up several interesting themes that emerged. Interviews took 
from 16 minutes (shortest) to 77 minutes (longest). All interviews were conducted in 
the Bahasa Indonesia language. 
Interviews were carried out with three specific groups with various levels of position 
within respective organisations. For example, in the tax official group, interviews 
were conducted with people holding positions ranging from head of regional tax 
office to tax auditor. The tax advisor group comprised from the members of the “Big 
Four” firms to the Tier 3 ranks. In the tax advisor group, interviewee positions ranged 
from partner, director to senior tax advisor.  The participants in the tax manager 
group were selected from various industries such as the oil and gas, plantation, 
mining, automotive, banking, consumer goods and pharmaceuticals. The company 
status either as a multinational corporation or a local company also became a 
concern. The detail of the participant’s criteria, category and number of interviewees 
are presented in Table 4-4 below. 
All interviewees gave their full cooperation and responded sufficiently to all questions 
asked of them during the face-to-face interviews. Most interviewees gave answers 
concerning the current practices of the DGT and also implied several of its 
shortcomings. However, some participants requested that some of their responses be 
off the record because of the sensitive nature of the information. Such responses were 
not included in the data analysis. Most of the participant appeared to be relaxed and 
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willing to respond to all questions. However, some interviewees seemed 
uncomfortable, nervous and cautious at some point during the interview, although 
this did not reduce the overall quality of the interviews.  Therefore, the researcher was 
confident that through the semi-structured interview method, rich data was collected 
from participants thereby contributing to achieving the study’s objectives. 
TABLE 4-4 THE PARTICIPANT CRITERIA, CATEGORY AND NUMBER 
Participant Criteria Category 
Number of 
participants 
Tax Official Ranks 
Head of Regional Office 1 
Head of Tax Office/ Head of 
Division 
2 
Head of Section 7 
Tax Auditor 9 
Account Representative 2 
The Objection Reviewer 1 
Tax Advisor 
Firm ranks 
Member of the Big Four 5 
Tier 1 7 
Tier 2 1 
Tier 3 6 
Position ranks 
Partner 7 
Director 5 
Senior tax advisor 2 
Tax 
Manager 
Industry 
Oil and Gas 3 
Plantation 3 
Mining 3 
Automotive 1 
Banking 1 
Consumer goods 1 
Pharmaceuticals 1 
MNC 10 
Private local owned 1 
State-owned enterprise 2 
The sample size of 48 participants in the study was adequate in terms of reaching data 
saturation; hence, the sample was sufficient for the purpose of validity and reliability 
of the research findings. As argued by Francis, Johnston, Robertson, Glidewell, 
Entwistle, Eccles and Grimshaw (2010), data saturation is a certain point in data 
collection process when no new data is being added to the information already 
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obtained in relation to the research questions. Reaching data saturation is an essential 
concept in qualitative research because, in the context of eliciting the interviewees’ 
views or their experiences, it could result in the complexity of multiple views about the 
subject of interest or in the collected data not being strictly aligned with the purpose 
of the study. Regarding adequate sample size, Creswell (1998) argues that a range of 20 
to 30 interviews undertaken for a qualitative project would be sufficient. Also, 
Charmaz (2006, 114) as cited by Mason (2010), argues that about 25 participants would 
be adequate. While Green and Thorogood (2009) as quoted in Mason (2010, p.4) states 
that "the experience of most qualitative researchers (emphasis added) is that in 
interview studies little that is 'new' comes out of transcripts after you have interviewed 
20 or so people". Therefore, the researcher considered that 48 interviewees were an 
adequate number for this study.  
4.4.2 Data analysis  
This data analysis section discusses the analysis conducted in the study. The 
discussion of this section begins with thematic analysis as a selected data analysis tool, 
transcription, coding, development and interpretation of themes and sub-themes.  
4.4.2.1 Thematic Analysis 
This study used thematic analysis to analyse the collected information. Braun and 
Clarke (2006) defined thematic analysis as a method used to identify, analyse and 
report the pattern of themes in the collected data, which assists the researcher to 
organise the data set and describe it in rich detail. Howitt and Cramer (2007) defined 
thematic analysis as an analysis of textual material that contains a major theme; 
whereas, the theme is a topic or a subject of a person thought, wrote or spoke.  
The use of thematic analysis as stated by Jones and Forshaw (2012) involves coding 
texts, reading and rereading, and being aware of any recurring concept that emerges 
from the data. This confirms what was previously stated by Boyatzis (1998, p.4) that 
thematic analysis is “a process for encoding qualitative information”, requiring the 
researcher to engage in the coding process.   
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According to Boyatzis (1998), the coding process begins with an initial reading of all 
the data, dividing the text into segments of information, labelling segments of 
information with codes, reducing overlap and eliminating redundancy, and collapsing 
codes into appropriate themes. In this study, concepts of tax compliance, tax risk 
management and responsive regulation as presented in Chapter 3 are utilised as 
references to build relevant themes. This thematic analysis method gives some 
flexibility to the process of data analysis, allowing researchers with various 
methodological backgrounds to apply multiple theories and to engage in this type of 
analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is also appropriate for addressing 
research questions that are beyond the researcher’s experience.  The thematic analysis 
approach is appropriate for researchers who need to get close to their data and 
develop a thorough appreciation of the content. However, this method faces the 
problem of reliability because of the possibility of various interpretations that resulted 
from the themes. To overcome this issue, this study monitored the selected themes 
continuously and encoded the data throughout the process carefully as suggested by 
Guest, MacQueen and Namey (2012). The following table summarises the advantages 
of thematic analysis. 
TABLE 4-5 THE ADVANTAGES OF THEMATIC ANALYSIS 
Flexibility 
Relatively quick and easy method to learn, and do  
Accessible to researchers with little or no qualitative research background 
Results are generally accessible to an educated general public 
Useful method for working with participants as collaborators 
Can usefully summarise key features of a large body of data, and/or offer a ‘thick description’ 
of the dataset 
Can highlight similarities and differences across the data set 
Can generate unanticipated insights 
Can be useful for producing qualitative analyses suited to informing policy development 
Source: Adapted from Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 97) 
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The researcher later conducted three stages of thematic analysis following the 
suggestions of Boyatzis (1998) and Braun and Clarke (2006):  
1. Transcribing textual data. The process began with reading and transcribing the 
material collected from the interviews. The whole process from interview, 
transcription to the translation of the text assisted the researcher to connect 
with the data from the beginning of and during the analysis. The purpose of 
reading, rereading and transcribing data is to increase researcher’s familiarity 
with his data.  
2. Data analysis. The efforts conducted in this study were: (a) the researcher 
developed familiarity with the text obtained through the semi-structured 
interviews by transcribing and translating the interview texts in order to 
achieve understanding and avoid partial knowledge of the data; (b) in order to 
obtain the fine details comprising the data, the researcher analysed each 
sentence as well as the entire transcript of each participants’ interview data in 
order to ascertain and summarise the overall themes; (c) the researcher 
processed and re-processed the data to ensure its relevance; (d) the researcher, 
together with his supervisors, addressed the difficulties, and checked and 
rechecked the compatibility between the data analysis and the data themes. 
3. Identifying themes and sub-themes. The researcher developed and refined the 
themes that emerged from the analysis and ascertained the extent of their 
alignment with the existing literature. 
4.4.2.2 Coding  
The coding process conducted in this study followed the suggestion of Boyatzis (1998) 
that is the process of encoding qualitative data in order to analysing it. It also the 
process involves applying codes to the data so that the similarities and differences 
between texts can be highlighted. According to David and Sutton (2011), a code is a 
keyword, phrase or theme that may or may not correspond to the requirements in the 
analysed texts. Moreover, coding helps the researcher to eliminate unnecessary data 
and retain only the information that is relevant to the area of interest.  
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Before commencing the coding process, the researcher undertook the transcription 
and translation of the interview data since the interviews were conducted in the local 
language, Bahasa Indonesia. The researcher translated the interview questions from 
English to Bahasa Indonesia; then the interview information gathered in Bahasa 
Indonesia was translated back into English. To ensure the accuracy of the translation, 
a random sample of the interview transcripts was checked by an independent person 
who is competent in both languages. This person’s feedback and suggestions were 
used to perfect the translated transcription. The following table provides the sample of 
two fragments of revised transcripts39. 
TABLE 4-6 REVISED INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS TRANSLATION 
No. Fragment of transcript 
in Bahasa Indonesia 
Original translation to 
English 
Revised translation to 
English 
1. Jadi ini juga sebetulnya 
tantangan juga ya bahwa 
bagi administratur pajak 
bagaimana bisa 
memandang atau 
memperlakukan Wajib 
Pajak-Wajib Pajak Besar 
ini dengan cara yang 
efektif, efisien, lebih 
penting lagi adalah trust-
nya. 
(TM04 
So it's also a challenge, too, that 
for tax administration how to 
view or treat these Large 
Taxpayers in an effective, 
efficient way, more important is 
their trust. 
(TM04) 
Feedback received: Omit the 
word ‘too’ ‘efficient’ and the 
sentence needs to be softened 
 
Revised translation: 
So it is a challenge for a tax 
administration on how to view 
or to treat the large taxpayers 
in such effective way by 
earning their trust.  
(TM04) 
2. Eh, saya pikir pertama 
trust ya. Trust kepada eh 
bagaimana selama ini 
mereka di-treat oleh, ck, 
negara ya secara umum--  
Dengan oleh otoritas 
pajaknya ya. 
(TA02) 
Uh, I think first trust yes. Trust 
to eh how they have been 
treated by, ck, country yes in 
general-- By by the tax 
authorities yes. 
(TA02) 
Feedback received: Omit the 
stuttering ‘by’ and unnecessary 
interjections such as ‘uh’ ‘yes’ 
and the sentence needs to be 
softened 
 
Revised translation: 
I think first is about trust. Trust 
to the nation in which in this 
case on how they are being 
treated by the government, by 
its tax authority. 
(TA02) 
                                                          
39
 For the reader’s information, the researcher made a coding differentiation of the interviewees based 
on their participant group tax officer, tax advisor or tax manager. Code TO refers to a tax official, code 
TA to a tax advisor and code TM to a tax manager respectively. The number after the code, for 
example as shown in the Table 4.6 – TA02, indicates the sequence of the participants in alphabetical 
order. This segregation of codes is intended to provide nuances of response from the participant for a 
similar question as well as to enrich the insights that can be drawn from each participant’s experiences. 
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When the transcriptions and the translations of the interview data were completed, 
the researcher began the coding process. As stated by Miles et al. (2014), coding is a 
deep reflection of in-depth analysis and interpretation of the data meanings. 
Meanwhile, codifying requires organising or categorising the data systematically, and 
placing it into a section of a particular system or classification (Saldana, 2013). This 
coding and codifying mechanism enables the researcher to retrieve and categorise 
chunks of similar data so that s/he can easily locate, extract or cluster the segments 
that are related to a specific research question or theme.  
The process of clustering of the condensed data helps the researcher to establish the 
steps for further analysis and inferences drawn from the analysed data (Miles et al., 
2014). According to Boyatzis (1998), the coding process begins with an initial reading 
of the data, then dividing the text into segments of information, labelling segments of 
information with codes, reducing overlap and redundancy and collapsing codes into 
appropriate themes. In this study, the researcher followed the abovementioned coding 
steps suggested by Miles et al. (2014) and Boyatzis (1998). 
Following the transcription and translation of all the interview data, the researcher 
utilised NVivo software to assist him with data coding. NVivo is a qualitative data 
analysis software package that has been widely used by many qualitative researchers to 
support their analysis. The software’s ability to record, sort, match and link the data 
allowed the researcher to obtain a more accurate answer to his research questions 
without losing access to the source data.  Hence, it can be argued that the use of this 
software for qualitative analysis produces a more rigorous analysis and, therefore, 
enhances the reliability of findings (Bazeley, 2013). Further, Saldana (2013) explained 
that the NVivo coding uses short phrases or words from the participant’s original voice 
as a code marking in the record. By marking the code in their original language, 
Saldana (2013) further argued that there were values in respecting the original voice of 
participants and the NVivo acted as the first gate in coding the data before continuing 
to the analysis process. Therefore, the NVivo was selected for this study because it 
greatly assisted the researcher to refine the themes, to elicit the relevant meanings 
from the data and to establish the credibility of the findings. As stated by Oats (2012), 
it will convince the readers of the value of the study. Figure 4-1 below summarises the 
process of data analysis used in this study.  
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FIGURE 4-1 DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS STEPS 
4.4.2.3 Developing and interpreting theme/sub-theme 
Boyatzis (1998, p.161) defined a theme as “a pattern in the information that at a 
minimum describes and organises the possible observations and at a maximum 
interprets aspects of the phenomenon”.  Hence, a theme captures something 
important about the data that have particular patterns or specific meanings with 
respect to the research question. A theme itself may be given sizable space in some 
data segments, and little to none in others, or it may appear in relatively little of the 
data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Moreover, the importance of a theme does not 
depend on the quantifiable measures but on its function – that is, whether it captures 
something relevant in relation to the aim of the research question. Braun and Clarke 
(2006) state that the researcher’s judgement is crucial when determining the themes 
that is relevant to the research question.   
In this study, the researcher followed the suggestion of Braun and Clarke (2006) and 
Boyatzis (1998) where the function of the theme is to capture what is relevant to the 
research question. Therefore, both of the research questions stated in this study 
guided the theme development in the data analysis stage. The literature on tax 
compliance, tax risk management and responsive regulation as presented in Chapter 3 
is utilised as references to build relevant themes as suggested by Braun and Clarke 
(2006). 
Before embarking on the field research, some pre-established themes from the 
literature review such as the concepts of tax compliance, tax risk management and 
responsive regulation have emerged in the researcher’s review notes and, as Basit 
(2003) stated, they required answers. After extensive research, more specific themes 
relating to those concepts were discovered in the literature and, as McKerchar (2010) 
The interview 
transcripts 
Coding 
Developing 
theme/subtheme 
Interpreting 
theme/subtheme 
90 
 
argues, the discovery of relevant themes is one of the most critical tasks in qualitative 
data analysis.  
The researcher identified several themes to support a more detailed analysis of themes 
relevant to this study by referring to the categories established by van der Hel-van 
Dijk-van Dijk, and Siglé, (2015) for the factors that influence corporate tax compliance. 
As the themes identification process continued, the researcher refined the themes and 
sub-themes, placing them into their appropriate categories so that each category was 
grouped according to a specific code and its respective associations. The list of the 
major themes, the associated sub-themes and the references is presented in Table 4-7 
below. 
To summarise, for the data analysis process, the researcher referred to the literature 
on large-business tax compliance in order to categorise the results of the interview 
into designated themes. The literature was also utilised to map and evaluate whether 
the participants’ responses were in accordance with the findings of previous studies. 
This means that the themes for this study were developed from the voices of 
participants in previous studies. After the data coding and theme insertion were 
completed, the researcher arranged the verbal description regarding research 
questions. To check the consistency of judgment and to ensure reliability, the 
researcher clustered the various themes in order to provide clarity and in-depth 
analysis. Figure 4-2 below indicates the flow of the coding and analysis process applied 
in this study. 
 
FIGURE 4-2 THE FLOW OF THE CODING AND ANALYSIS PROCESS  
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TABLE 4-7 OVERVIEW OF DRIVERS, THEMES, SUB-THEMES AND REFERENCES IN RELATION TO THE FIRST RESEARCH QUESTION 
No. 
Compliance 
Drivers 
Themes Subthemes References 
1. Corporate 
Factors 
Economic factors Cost-benefit driven 
decision 
Becker (1967); Allingham & Sandmo (1972); Yitzhaki (1974); Kinsley (1992); McKerchar 
(2002); Eichfelder & Kegels (2014);  
Manager compensation Taylor & Richardson (2004); Crocker & Slemrod (2005); Rego & Wilson (2012); Phillips 
(2003); Armstrong et al., (2012); Powers et al., (2013) 
Detection probability Strumpel (1969); Dublin et al., (1990); Alm et al., (2012); Gangl et al., (2013); Chen & Chu 
(2005); Morse (2009) 
Penalties  Beck & Jung (1989); Kirchler et al., (2014); DeBacker et al., (2015) 
Risk appetite Skinner & Slemrod (1985); COSO (2011); Deloitte (2008); Blakelock & Whitney (2015) 
Uncertainty Casey & Scholz (1991); Taylor & Richardson (2013) 
Socio-psychological 
factors 
Personal norms Bobek et al., (2007); Law & Mills (2017); Wenzel (2007); Traxler (2010); Torgler (2007) 
Social norms Bobek et al., (2013); Wenzel (2005); Torgler (2007); Blanthorne & Kaplan (2008) 
Trust Torgler (2003); Torgler (2008); Kirchler (2007); Taylor (2002); De Mello (2009); Bird (2008); 
Chema (2010); Blind (2010); Turner (2005); Richardson (2008); Kirchler et al., (2008) 
Reputation Cooper (1994); Oats & Tuck (2008); Toumi (2009); Mulligan & Oats (2009); Graham et al., 
(2013); Erle (2008); Gallemore et al., (2014); Lavermicocca (2011); Williams (2007); Ford 
(2005); Loretz & Moore (2013); Lavermicocca (2009) 
Corporate 
characteristics 
Tax risk management van der Hel-van Dijk-van Dijk, & Siglé, (2015); Segal et al., (2017); Daniel (2008); van Daelen 
& van der Elst, (2010) 
Ownership structure Hanlon et al., (2005); Desai & Dhamapala (2006); Slemrod (2007); Chen et al., (2010); 
McGuire et al., (2012); Badertscher et al., (2013) 
Business size Giles (2000); Hanlon et al., (2005); Sapici et al., (2014) 
Financial constraints Edward et al., (2016); Law & Mills (2015); Dyreng & Markle (2015); Akamah et al., (2016); 
Richardson (2015) 
Tax advisor Klepper & Nagin (1989); Spilker et al., (1999); Tan (2011); Wurth & Braithwaite (2016) 
2 External 
Factors 
Regulation factors Complexity Baurer (2005); Osofsky (2011); Agha & Haughton (1996); OECD (2004); Cuccia & Carnes 
(2001) 
Ambiguity Agha & Haughton (1996); Erle (2008); Cuccia & Carnes (2001); Sandmo (2005); Kirchler 
(2007) 
Unfairness Guerrero (2011); OECD (2004); Sunshine & Tyler (2003); De Mello (2008); Mascagni et al., 
(2014); Nadler (2002) 
Regulatory overlap Ahdieh (2006); Aagaard (2011); Li (2015); Middleton (2014); O’Callaghan (2010) 
Source:  Modified from van der Hel-van Dijk-van Dijk, and Siglé, (2015, 766) and Yusof and Lai, (2014, 430) 
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TABLE 4-8 OVERVIEW OF DRIVERS, THEMES, SUB-THEMES AND REFERENCES IN RELATION TO THE SECOND RESEARCH QUESTION 
No. 
Compliance 
Drivers 
Themes Subtheme References 
1. The 
institutional 
capacity 
Human resources 
issue 
Integrity and corruption Flatters & Macleod (1995); Picur & Riahi-Belkaoui (2006); Bird et al. (2008); McKerchar & 
Evans (2009); Bird & de Jantscher  (1992), Rosid et al. (2016) 
Lack of professionalism Baer & Silvani (1997); Braithwaite & Wirth (2001); Lushi (2016); Höglund & Nöjd (2014), 
Widihartanto & Braithwaite (2016) 
Lack of sufficient human 
resources 
Baurer (2005); Gallagher (2005); Baer & Silvani (1997); Muhammadi et al., (2016); 
Widihartanto & Braithwaite (2016); Korte (2013);  
Poor data management Tanzi & Zee (2000); Baer & Silvani (1997); Torgler (2003); Kidd & Crandall (2006); Korte 
(2013) 
Poor internal coordination World Bank, (1999); Shaw et al., (2010); Kidd & Crandall, (2006); Tanzi & Zee, (2000), Baer & 
Silvani, (1997); Bird (2004); Baurer (2005) 
2 Managing 
noncompliance 
Detecting noncompliance Arnold (2008); Brondolo et al. (2008); OECD (2009); DGT (2016); OECD (2001) 
Managing noncompliance Lerche (1980); McKerchar & Evans (2009); Ayres & Braithwaite (1992); Braithwaite (2006); 
OECD (2001); DGT (2016). 
Source:  Modified from Arnold (2008, 30) and Baer and Silvani (1997, 2)  
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Figure 4-2 demonstrates an example of coding and analysis process from the 
beginning- the quote until the last step, answering the suitable research question. In 
detail, firstly, the researcher coded a quote from a participant’s interview transcription 
and labelled it with ‘trust’, ‘tax administration’ and ‘challenge’. After the initial data 
from the transcription was coded, the next step was to categorise the coded data 
according to the appropriate theme with regard to the previous literature. In this stage, 
the codes were allocated to their appropriate themes and sub-themes. For example, 
‘trust’ was categorised as related to the theme of ‘Socio-psychological factors’ and later 
grouped under the sub-theme of ‘Trust’. Finally, in the last stage, the researcher linked 
the coded data from the sub-theme category to the appropriate research question. 
4.5 Reliability and Validity 
Eisner (2017) argues that a good qualitative study can help its reader to understand a 
complicated or confusing situation. In a qualitative study, the reliability refers the 
extent to which the reader acquires an understanding of the phenomen of interest;  in 
a quantitative study, reliability refers to the quality of the research and its ability to 
accurately explain a problem (Stenbacka, 2001). In a qualitative study, an examination 
of the trustworthiness of the study report is essential to ensure its reliability (Seale, 
1999). Therefore, the researcher’s skill and ability in undertaking a qualitative study 
will determine its reliability (Patton, 2002). 
In a qualitative study where the interview was used to collect data, the aspect of 
reliability pertains to the consistency of judgment and trustworthiness of the research 
findings (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Further, they argue that the interviewer’s 
technical ability in formulating leading questions can determine the reliability since 
the responses from the interviewees are influenced by the style and the approach of 
the interviewer. The next issue related to the reliability of interview is the accuracy of 
the transcription and translation. To address this issue, Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) 
suggest using two independent persons to each transcribe the same interview and 
compare the two transcriptions. 
Also related to reliability is the accuracy of the interpretation of transcripts which 
raises the issue of subjectivity and the consistency of judgment. Boyatzis (1998) argues 
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that the consistency of judgment will protect the researcher against or at least lessens 
the contamination of projection bias. Moreover, he explains that there are two basic 
forms of consistency of judgment: (1) the consistency among various readers; and, (2) 
the consistency over time, events, or settings. Therefore, the reliability of a qualitative 
study is influenced by the way in which the data is recorded and the selection of the 
subjects that were recorded.   
Regarding validity, there is no consensus among qualitative researchers regarding 
validity, since this is regarded as an attribute of quantitative study (see, for example, 
Altheide & Johnson, 1994; Hammersley, 1987). Nevertheless, some researchers argue 
that it is necessary for a qualitative study to be checked or be measured by specific 
criteria (see, for example, Creswell & Miller, 2000; Yardley, 2007; Morse et al., 2002).  
Creswell & Miller (2000), for example, state that the validity is affected by the 
researcher’s paradigm assumption and his perception of validity; hence, they suggest 
using the method of triangulation to ensure the validity of a qualitative study.  
The interview also can be used as a supporting tool of validity since the researcher is 
able to corroborate participants’ responses from the record and compared them with 
one another (Seidman, 2013; Weiss, 1994). Seidman (2013) argued that if the 
interviewee was able to provide a logical response, then the interview was on the right 
path toward validity. Further, Weiss (1994) added that rich, detailed accounts of vividly 
recollected events are likely to be trustworthy information.  
In this study, triangulation technique is used to ensure validity and reliability since the 
key assessment criteria of a high-qualified research concerns the way in which validity 
and reliability are addressed in the research (Lamb & Lymer, 2004).40 Creswell and 
Miller (2000, p.126) define triangulation as a procedure to ensure validity where 
“researchers search for convergence among multiple and different sources of 
information to form themes or category in a study”. They further argue that the 
credibility of a study can be validated by triangulation from the perspective of the 
researcher. Denzin (1978) identified four aspects of triangulation works: data, 
investigator, theory and methodology. Triangulation is typically used to enhance the 
                                                          
40
 The example of triangulation technique is data triangulation, member checking and disconfirming 
evidence (Denzin, 1978; Creswell & Miller, 2000) 
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validity and reliability of a qualitative research or as a method to evaluate the findings 
(Maxwell, 1992). For this study, triangulation was used to ensure that the research 
findings were corroborated by and consistent with the findings of previous studies. 
Data triangulation, member checking, and disconfirming evidence as suggested by 
Denzin (1978) and Creswell and Miller (2000) were applied in this study to check the 
validity and the reliability of the findings. In this study, data triangulation involved 
comparing the data obtained from the three groups of participants: tax officers, tax 
managers and tax advisors. The variation of answers to a similar question is intended 
to enrich the findings of this study with the experiences of the participants as the key 
informants. Further, this study sought to provide a balance of opinions among those 
directly associated with large-business tax compliance in Indonesia. It is a verification 
strategy recommended by Morse et al. (2002) to enhance the research validity.  
Moreover, the interview data were also validated with relevant archival public records. 
The Law Number 7 of 1983 regarding Income Tax and the Law Number 6 of 1983 
regarding Taxation General Provisions and Procedures were used as relevant 
references. Other Indonesian government rulings and regulations relating to tax 
compliance were also used as references. Secondary sources such as scholarly journal 
articles, the DGT’s website (www.pajak.go.id), the Indonesian Tax Consultant 
Association website (www.ikpi.or.id), the Budget Statement from 2010 to 201641, the 
World Bank report, the IMF report and the OECD report were also used to support the 
arguments put forward in this study and to validate the interview data. For example, 
the tax officer participants generally felt that there were no issues regarding the way in 
which officers performed their services to taxpayers; however, the report from the IMF 
stated otherwise.  
Creswell and Miller (2000) suggest employing the method of member checking to 
check the validity of the data from the perspective of participants. Therefore, the 
researcher sent the transcriptions by email to obtain feedback from the participants 
using the method of negative confirmation which means the participant has to 
respond only if s/he does not agree with any aspect of the transcription. 
                                                          
41
 The Budget Statement is an explanatory policy document that accompanying the draft budgets at 
both national and local level. 
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Apart from the triangulation strategy as abovementioned, the researcher also applied 
another strategy to ensure the reliability and validity of the study. The researcher 
followed the suggestion of Miles and Gilbert (2005) to ask a ‘savvy reader’ to peruse the 
findings of the study and offer inputs and feedback. In this study, the savvy readers 
were the researcher’s supervisors. In addition, the use of purposive sampling in this 
study is also intended to provide a certain degree of reliability of the collected data 
quality since the participants were considered as key informants given their significant 
knowledge of and experiences with tax compliance issues in Indonesia, although their 
opinions might be inherently biased. This bias is anticipated by the method of 
disconfirming evidence as stated in the next paragraph.  
Disconfirming evidence is a necessary procedure to support the validity of narrative 
data as well as data credibility (Creswell & Miller, 2000; Yardley, 2007). The process of 
disconfirming evidence in this study was conducted by comparing the opinions of 
participants with the predetermined themes. Later, the researcher recognised that it 
was important to take into consideration the differences in the participants’ opinions 
and the backgrounds. For example, before the interviews were conducted, it was 
anticipated that there would be differences in opinion regarding the issue of tax 
avoidance between the group of tax managers and the group of tax officers. Such 
differences were confirmed by the variations in the interviewees’ direct responses and 
implied suggestions. 
4.6 Conclusion 
A qualitative interpretative approach was used in this study to acquire an in-depth 
understanding of large business tax compliance risks in Indonesia and how the related 
tax authority is managing the issue. The qualitative approach was the most appropriate 
given the nature of the research questions and involved semi-structured interviews of 
selected participants. The purposive sampling method was used to ensure that the 
study identified the appropriate participants as key informants whose opinions would 
be relevant and valuable in addressing the research questions.   
For this study, a thematic analysis approach was adopted to code and analyse the 
interview data. The process of coding, developing a theme and interpreting it were 
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applied to generate the findings. To ensure the validity and reliability of the study, the 
researcher applied the strategy of data triangulation, member checking and 
disconfirming evidence as well as asking ‘savvy reader’ to peruse the findings and offers 
feedback.  
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CHAPTER 5  
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE LARGE BUSINESS COMPLIANCE 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the methodology used in the research, the justification 
for adopting five fundamental research concepts, and described the interview process. 
This chapter explains and discusses findings regarding the factors that influence large 
business’ compliance which emerged from the interviews. To be specific, this chapter 
outlines findings related to the first research question: What are the factors that 
influence large business taxpayers’ compliance risks from the perspectives of the tax 
officials, the tax managers, and the independent tax advisors? 
The findings pertaining to the first research question that have been identified by 
participants are discussed in two sections: Section 5.2 - corporate factor, and Section 
5.3 - regulation factor.  Section 5.2 consists of three subsections in which economic 
factors, socio-psychological aspects and corporate characteristics are discussed. 
Section 5.3 consists of four subsections: ambiguity in regulation, uncertainty in 
regulation, regulatory overlap and unfairness in regulation. The summary in Section 
5.4 concludes the chapter.  
5.2 Corporate factors 
Large businesses play a crucial role in the economy of a nation. The economic growth 
of large businesses, especially in developing countries such as Indonesia, is strongly 
linked to their revenue contribution to the state budgets. The growing budget over the 
years demands revenue contribution from large corporations; hence, the issue of 
corporate non-compliance has become a major concern. So, this section discusses in 
detail the risks associated with the factors of non-compliance from the internal 
perspective of large businesses.   
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Several tax researchers argue that the factors of non-compliance could be categorised 
into three major groups42 as discussed in the Literature Review in Chapter 3. These 
factors are related to the economy, socio-psychological features, and the 
characteristics of the corporation. This section adopts these categories as they facilitate 
the classification of findings and, furthermore, this makes it easier to compare the 
findings with those of past.   
TABLE 5-1 OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE FACTOR THEMES AND SUB-THEMES 
Table 5-1 above shows the factors that intrinsically influence large business 
compliance. This table corresponds with themes and sub-themes that are elaborated in 
Chapter 4 which discusses our methodology. They are discussed in this section to 
provide a clearer picture of the compliance drivers from the corporation perspective. 
Meanwhile, the findings discussed in this section are the factors that are considered 
                                                          
42
 The three groups comprise the economic, psychological and sociological factors, and the internal 
corporate characteristics factor. 
Compliance Drivers Themes Sub-Themes 
Corporate factors Economic factors Cost-benefit driven decisions 
Compensation of manager  
Detection probability and 
penalty 
Risk appetite 
Uncertainty 
Socio-psychological 
factors 
Individual - personal norms 
and social norms 
Corporate social norms- 
reputation 
Fairness and trust in 
government 
Corporate 
characteristics 
Tax risk management 
Ownership structure and 
business size  
Financial constraints 
Use of a tax advisor 
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relevant by key informants in Indonesia. Therefore, a different result may emerge if the 
research were conducted in another country. 
5.2.1 Economic factors 
The taxpayer is assumed to be a rational creature that is driven by logical decisions 
based on cost-benefit considerations. The economic factors imply that the compliance 
is achieved by means of fraud detection and the authorities’ application of severe 
penalties for non-compliance. Table 5-1 suggests that, according to the participants, 
five factors related to the economics factor were perceived as significant in influencing 
large business compliance. Interestingly, the cost-benefit decision and the risk appetite 
were the most common responses from the interviewees. This is consistent with the 
underlying notion of economic factors which assumes that a large business is a rational 
actor that makes judicious decisions. 
5.2.1.1 Cost-benefit driven decisions 
All participant categories tax officer, tax manager and tax advisor believed that the 
decisions made by corporations were based on cost-benefit considerations. This was 
evident when a company conducted transactions in such a way that taxes could be 
avoided and profits maximised, although this could attract the attention of authorities.  
A manager from the oil and gas industry pointed out that the priority was the interests 
of his company; when conducting transactions that were questionable in terms of tax 
avoidance, his company attempted as much as possible to maintain corporate 
compliance. 
Because, there is a possibility of different interpretation regarding 
grey area in a regulation and in anticipating the DGT’s viewpoint 
that stance in their position, so we changed the transaction 
scheme… So, we decided to utilise the overseas entity… this 
transaction is commercially more profitable and ascertain legal 
certainty for both of us and the buyer. However, this treatment 
made the transaction become untaxable and the domestic authority 
losing their revenue (TM06). 
Accordingly, a higher compliance cost is an issue for large businesses although Susila 
and Pope (2013) argued that the compliance costs of large companies in Indonesia are 
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low compared to those of other countries. However, the advancement of technology 
and the changes in the business environment have forced the tax authorities to catch 
up by developing a more sophisticated system to protect their interests as well. As 
stated by one of the top executives, the burden to comply was more expensive at the 
moment. 
The compliance cost is getting higher because we want to comply, 
and we want to follow the requirement…. whether we like it or not, 
we must be ready to anticipate the ever-changing regulations and 
upgrading the system to follow compliance requirement is not 
cheap (TM04). 
At the other end of the spectrum, tax officials apparently considered that corporate 
taxpayers’ efforts to create efficient tax savings to maximise their profits sometimes 
crossed the line. It has become widespread practice for large businesses to exploit 
loopholes in regulations in order to optimise tax savings on the premise that they were 
not violating the prevailing law. A high-ranking tax office official confirmed such 
behaviour: "Even though there is no exact data to show, I guess they used the 
loopholes to avoid taxes” (TO16).  
Further, a tax auditor explained how a company could create tax savings through an 
aggressive tax planning scheme and how they dodged paying taxes. He admitted later 
that actions such as hiding sales turnover that was masked by the tax planning scheme 
had become more sophisticated and more difficult to detect during the audit. “For 
example, a legal entity who creates fictitious costs by concealing turnovers and using 
aggressive transfer pricing schemes whilst this scheme is hard for us to detect and 
counter” (TO08). 
Also, several officials paid closer attention to the dubious tax planning that was carried 
out by taxpayers, and they noticed that it was uncommon for the taxpayer to opt for 
lower profitability when tax planning. One official stated that taxpayers attempted in 
every way to act in their own interests regardless of stringent standards and 
regulations.  
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Typical audit finding for large business is the non-deductible 
depreciation expenses. Second, the issue of company’s expense 
whether it allowed for deductible or not because many expenses 
cannot be deductible due to the tax regulation, but it could be 
deductible commercially… Third, the issue of valuation (TO01).  
Regarding tax planning, many tax advisors believed that tax planning schemes were 
part of regular business operations. They argued that applying tax planning in order to 
optimise the profit of a corporation was legally acceptable. It was performed in line 
with regulations, so they were not breaking the law. Aside from the moral obligation 
issue, another tax advisor believed that the problem of losing tax revenue could not be 
imputed to the tax planning practice but rather to the shortcomings of the law itself. 
Tax planning is a common thing to do because it is a part of 
business planning… Perhaps the problem is something wrong with 
the regulation that causing loopholes that eventually being 
exploited by taxpayers. So, why should taxpayers take the blame? ... 
I think there is a leniency or weaknesses in the regulation and that 
is being exploited by taxpayers, but that type of tax planning is 
acceptable for me (TA01). 
On the issue of cost efficiency in business, several tax practitioners perceived a 
corporation as a rational economic animal that always calculated its actions based on 
the cost-benefit consideration, regardless of the fact that the tax was more than merely 
a payment to his country. As pointed out by a senior practitioner, large corporations 
have calculated the consequences of every action undertaken, including how to 
weather the subsequent risks. "Of course, large companies came with long experiences; 
they calculated the tax effect of every transaction they made including if it results in 
dispute. They knew what to do; they knew the risks” (TA02). Further, an overpayment 
of tax seemed to be a failure on the part of a tax manager responsible for handling so-
called efficient tax saving. A partner of another of the big five tax firms expressed his 
idea on this issue.  
The company always tried to comply… But, all tax payments are 
costs. It is understandable that a company want to maximise their 
tax savings because tax payment is considered as costs. They comply 
with the stressing of no excessive payment or underpayment. It will 
be a failure for a manager to excessive tax. But, it is also a failure if 
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the company was audited and conceded many findings and the 
manager cannot manage it (TA14). 
Interestingly, this advisor distinguished between a ‘safe’ tax planning scheme as 
opposed to an aggressive one. His phrase, ‘doing it and having good sleep’, gives an 
insight into the moral compass that should guide any tax planning scheme.     
In short, if your tax planning scheme makes you sleep tight, it 
means safe and acceptable. However, if you feel inconvenient with 
the scheme, there is a possibility that you run into something that 
unacceptable although no rules are being violated (TA14). 
Aside from the moral obligation that should not be overlooked, the consequences of 
aggressive tax planning need to be addressed. For example, if tax authorities challenge 
a dubious scheme and the matter is brought to court, the company may incur a 
massive amount of legal and other costs even if it thought that it was acting 
appropriately and not violating any laws or regulations. 
I always say to my client, “if you are being more aggressive in your 
tax planning by creating transactions or setting schemes whereas 
the anti-avoidance rules still unregulated, perhaps you achieved 
your goal to create more tax savings. However, the consequence is 
you will have massive costs for  tax dispute and the outcome also is 
uncertainty state. Well, maybe you could win your case, but you will 
suffer in every step of the dispute settlement process” (TA04). 
The response from the advisor with more than fifteen years of experience indicated 
that the practice of tax planning was widespread. Nonetheless, the fine line between 
what is regarded as an acceptable practice and what is not depends on personal 
understanding or even the individual’s moral standards. The issue here is the absence 
of a system to gauge what is healthy tax planning with the inclusion of the moral 
standard. 
The abovementioned findings suggest that the cost-benefit factor is an aspect that 
influences a company’s decision. Further, some participants viewed a company as a 
rational economic animal that always calculated its actions based on the factors of cost 
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and benefits. Hence, the cost-benefit factor determines the way in which a company 
designs and implements its tax planning scheme.  
5.2.1.2 Compensation of manager  
According to some literature, another factor affecting non-compliance is the 
compensation of managers. The manager is responsible for minimising the tax burden 
and is encouraged by the incentives s/he will receive by reducing the company’s 
effective tax rate, thereby achieving higher profitability (Crocker & Slemrod, 2005). The 
prospect of receiving a larger annual bonus may tempt tax managers to seek any means 
of reducing the tax burden, and this potentially could lower the corporate tax 
compliance (Philips, 2003; Powers, Robinson, & Stomberg, 2013). 
Regarding information about tax savings performance and manager compensation, 
participants were not asked explicitly during the interview about the relationship 
between their received compensation and their company’s tax savings performance. 
Instead, the question related to their company’s compensation system and how it 
worked. Most of the participants expressed that there was almost no correlation 
between the company’s performance and the size of bonus received. Some tax 
managers pointed out that the scheme of compensation was prearranged according to 
a specific formula and was therefore not directly related to the level of profitability. A 
tax manager involved in the plantation industry stated:  "There is a formulated 
calculation for the bonus, and the Tax Department does not have a special treatment 
in term of bonus” (TM01). Another manager agreed with this statement. “There are 
several parameters used in our company for bonus arrangement” (TM12). 
Another interviewee from a mining company expressed a similar opinion: that the 
bonus was not related to business profitability. Instead, the cash flow factor would 
determine the bonus amount. “Yes, at a certain level, the bonus was not associated 
with the profitability but rather to the operating cash flow” (TM10). 
The other factors that influence the amount of bonus were the prearranged contracts 
between companies and their employees where the employees received a bonus 
amount according to a specific formula. In the case of the oil and gas company, a 
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government agency was also involved as an external supervisory entity assisting with 
the formula for the compensation. “In the oil and gas industry, the arrangement is a bit 
unique; all expenses must be approved by a committee (SKKMigas43) including bonus. 
So, even though the company had satisfactory performance, the bonus payout must be 
approved by SKKMigas” (TM02). 
Another manager from a pharmaceutical company pointed out that the function of the 
tax department in her company was frequently considered as only an additional 
function, and it made the issue of profitability unrelated to the bonus received, 
regardless of the magnitude of tax savings she made. “Tax and accounting are regarded 
as the supporting back office, the amount of bonus is unrelated to the profitability, 
unlike the marketing division that receiving bonus based on the percentage of sales” 
(TM09).  
However, several managers refuted the argument for a strong connection between 
their bonus and the level of profitability, as voiced by a plantation company manager: 
“Indeed, there is a relationship between profitability and bonus, but it is not 
significant” (TM01). Meanwhile, another manager admitted that to some extent the 
company’s performance had a direct influence on the size of the annual bonus. “Yes, 
profitability did affect the bonus, only slightly for monthly income but not for the 
annual ones” (TM13). 
Hence, given that in most companies a formula was applied when determining 
bonuses, tax managers of companies had no incentive for maximising the company’s 
profits by means of a tax scheme that would reduce their tax obligations. “Yes, we 
received a rise, but the amount is not significant. If the profit increased by a 100 
percent, but our bonus rise is far from 100 percent” (TM05).  
To conclude, many participants suggested that the issue of a manager’s bonus was not 
directly related to the businesses’ profitability performance; instead, the position of tax 
division as only the supporting part and the fact that there was a prearranged formula 
                                                          
43
 The SKK Migas is a supervisory institution established by the Indonesian government. The 
Institution focuses on the management of upstream oil and gas business activities. The SKK Migas 
services includes State approvals for development plans, work programs, and budget, as well as to 
appointment of sellers of State oil and gas entitlements, and signing cooperation contracts 
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that determined the manager’s bonus. This is an interesting finding since several of 
the studies mentioned in Chapter 3 have stated otherwise. The fact that the finding 
has different results with previous studies should be taken cautiously as many factors 
might affect the accuracy of interviewees’ response.  
5.2.1.3 Detection probability and penalty 
Another potential cost of non-compliance is the detection by the authorities of fraud, 
and the subsequent severe penalty that will be imposed. It is assumed that the 
possibility of detection and the heavy penalty for fraud will deter taxpayers from 
engaging in non-compliant behaviour. However, according to several tax advisors, 
many large corporations in Indonesia neglected tax as a crucial factor to be considered 
in their business operations and gave no thought to any possibility of being caught by 
the audit detection system. They realised that tax was a crucial consideration only after 
they had been audited and were stunned by the amount they were required to pay. A 
partner in a large tax firm confirmed that small and medium-sized businesses tended 
to have this problem. However, it also occurred in large businesses despite the fact 
that they had more substantial resources. “To some companies, tax is not a priority as 
long as they are safe from the penalties. At the time they were annoyed with penalties, 
felt the severity of it then tax became relevant, and they changed afterwards” (TA10). 
Moreover, this negligence was evident when large businesses set up departments and 
personnel functions. The tax function was likely to be regarded as a menial job and was 
often the responsibility of the accounts department as just an additional task. As 
described by a senior tax advisor: "The factor of tax is not decisive when a company 
initiated a long-term investment in Indonesia” (TA08). 
Eventually, many large companies now are realising the importance 
of taxation. It means, they did not do it in the past. Tax section was 
only a small element in the accounting department, and even not a 
single person was appointed to be in charge to handle the tax 
matters. Until at the time when they got audited and, bam! ... They 
were hit by a massive assessment. (TA06). 
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Interestingly, despite the potentially severe consequences of an unfavourable audit, 
large corporations seem to be unconcerned by some of the penalties imposed for non-
compliance such as the fines for late tax returns. A manager in a large palm oil 
corporation explained this. “I consider this non-compliance as a minor, for example, if 
being late to lodge the VAT return then the penalty is IDR 500,000 (AUD 50) and two 
percent penalty per month for the underpayment. It is not such a big deal” (TM01). 
Further, a senior advisor concurred with this manager’s view, arguing that the small 
penalty imposed for late lodgement of tax returns undermined their duty to lodge their 
tax returns promptly. He believed that the fines were too small to deter large 
businesses from non-complaint behaviour. 
Some of tax penalties are not too heavy for the large-scale 
corporation. For example, the penalty of VAT late lodgement is only 
IDR 500 thousand (AUD50). It is ineffective to force them to 
comply. Therefore, if there is something more profitable, 
alternatively they prefer to pay the penalty because it is not 
significant. (TA13). 
The abovementioned findings indicate that the severity of the audit results made the 
taxpayers realise the importance of taxation. The post-audit consequences have forced 
companies to change their views about taxation and make improvements in order to 
ensure compliance. However, in some large businesses, the factor of tax was not 
considered as critical for the MNC when making a long-term investment in Indonesia. 
As the underestimation of taxation was became an issue, this research also found that 
some of the penalties imposed were considered insignificant, particularly those for the 
late lodgement of either VAT returns or income tax returns. Moreover, several large 
businesses were not concerned about non-compliance as they were confident of the 
low probability that an audit would detect irregularities. Further, several participants 
argued that the seriousness of a large business in perceiving the importance of tax 
matters can be seen in their establishment of a tax function department in their 
organisation.  
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5.2.1.4 Risk appetite 
Another factor that affects compliance is the level of a corporation’s risk appetite. 
Intuitively, the level of risk appetite plays a vital role in large business compliance. So, 
in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the taxpayers’ perceptions, 
participants were further asked their opinion about the propensity of a business to 
take more risks. Some advisors stated that the size of the business to some extent did 
encourage them to take more risks. If companies ingratiated themselves with people in 
the inner circles of government or influential government personnel, they were more 
likely to have a higher level of risk-taking. Conversely, those companies that tended to 
keep their distance from influential figures tended to have less risk-taking behaviour.  
One partner stated: "Large taxpayers who lacked deep connection to the power centre, 
would thinking that their position is more vulnerable, they are facing higher tax risks” 
(TA01). Further, he observed that there was indeed a correlation between the size of a 
company and its connection to influential people, and this type of corporation was 
confident that given its closeness to influential people, somehow the tax risks would be 
manageable. “There is a possibility in Indonesia when corporations are getting larger, 
their status is getting closer to the power centre, and perhaps the issue of ignoring 
taxes is a kind of manageable risks” (TA01). Later, he gave an example of how a large 
business exerted its influence on the government by adopted a Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) program or by the local customary approach, both of which at 
some point were regarded as being more important than their tax obligations. “The 
mining companies prioritise in doing a kind of services like the CSR, maintaining a 
good relationship to the authorities and so forth, but I do not see it with taxes” (TA01). 
Given this typical connection between large businesses and high-ranking officials, it is 
unsurprising to find that some businesses can maintain their usual practices and 
survive despite being caught up in tax fraud cases. Moreover, another partner 
illustrated the behaviour of a disreputable business.  
They have two reactions, to attack or to run. This type of company 
usually has strong connection with the government leaders such as 
the general or influential people in politics. Using their connection, 
in a way they strike back the DGT or they just run away or attempt 
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to negotiate under the table. It is actually happened even there is no 
evidence (TA09). 
Interestingly, many of the participants who were advisors or tax officials noted that the 
large businesses had good overall compliance although the compliance generally 
referred to administrative compliance. In other words, regarding the punctuality of 
payment and lodgement, many large businesses did it in a timely manner. One tax 
auditor shared his experiences on this issue: "Particularly in the LTO1, most of the 
taxpayers are comply in term of reporting, and payment and it was what I saw during 
the examination” (TO02). Another official made a comparison between the large 
business and the small business; in his opinion, the large business had better 
administrative compliance. 
The taxpayers in the LTO2 are more compliant than other taxpayers 
in other tax offices. Because most of the companies here are stable 
and have been established a long time ago and they know precisely 
the mechanism of taxation and how to administer their financial 
report accordingly (TO09). 
Some advisors also agreed that in terms of administrative compliance, large businesses 
were more compliant. A senior tax advisor shared his experiences on this issue. “Our 
clients are mostly large taxpayers and foreign investment companies, and their 
administrative compliance was around 90 percent – 95 percent.... So, in terms of 
administrative compliance, they have a high-level of compliance” (TA05). 
Meanwhile, another advisor responded that many large businesses complied to some 
degree not only in terms of administrative compliance but also regarding technical 
compliance: "For large companies, they complied with both technical and 
administrative compliance. The evidence is the insignificant audit findings” (TA12). On 
the other hand, he also suggested that the compliance level of large businesses is still 
debatable. However, in a more neutral tone, another advisor suggested that each large 
company has its own culture and level of risk-taking, and these factors did influence its 
compliance. “Some large companies are perhaps unethically doing overly aggressive 
tax planning, but some others conduct strict good governance for its tax matters, and 
it happens everywhere” (TA01). 
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The above findings demonstrate that the risk-taking of a company is affected by its 
size or by its closeness to the influential people in the country. Interestingly, there was 
a lower level of risk-taking when the company kept its distance from high-ranking 
officials. However, several participants assumed that large businesses had better 
administrative compliance compared to the small and medium-sized enterprises.   
5.2.1.5 Uncertainty 
In this section, uncertainty refers to the underlying economic model that in general 
guides people to make rational decisions in order to avoid uncertainty, particularly in 
regard to the things that are beyond their control. In this situation, the taxpayer tends 
to wait for enquiries from the authority, for example, in a matter concerning a specific 
transaction arrangement. Participants were asked about the risk of uncertainty in 
terms of regulations, as mentioned in subsection 5.3.2. One participant responded that 
he had to be extra cautious about the correct interpretation of the laws since this kind 
of situation occurred frequently and he preferred to wait for clarification from the 
DGT. “This thing made us extra careful in applying tax rules. Sometimes, the unknown 
risks made the company dealt with a high-risk exposure so, it is better just to wait for 
enquiries from the DGT.” (TM04) 
On a broader spectrum, the uncertainty that occurs in Indonesia was not caused only 
by the accuracy of legal interpretations or by the penalties, but also by the inconsistent 
application of laws and regulations by different tax officials in various regions. 
I saw two or three coincidences that have made me not understand 
why there is no uniform treatment from tax office. When dealing 
with the officials in the regional area, they are so creative interfering 
our international transactions which not their authority. It happens 
because the guidance from the head office is unclear. It should be 
stopped. Otherwise, they become more creative in meddling beyond 
their authorities. (TM04). 
Taxpayers tend to comply and, yet some findings occurred because 
of misunderstanding or misperception of regulations by the officials 
despite taxpayers solidly understanding the laws as well as 
regulations. (TO09). 
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To conclude, uncertainty occurs due to the inconsistent application of the laws and 
regulations by the tax officials. Hence, the taxpayer tended to wait for enquiries from 
the authority which, to some extent, could affect his/her overall compliance. 
5.2.2 Socio-psychological aspects 
Since the corporation is a unit that comprises a group of people, it is argued that 
human behaviour has a profound impact on the corporation, in particular on the work 
environment. Recent literature indicates that sociological and psychological elements 
significantly influence the decision about whether or not to comply, and to what 
extent (Koester, Shevlin, & Wangerin, 2014; Olsen & Stekelberg, 2015). This suggests 
that taxpayer actions are not driven solely by the cost-benefit factor.  
Table 5-2 below indicates that the three socio-psychological elements that emerged 
from interviews were perceived as having a large and significant influence on large 
business compliance. The key informants perceived these elements as comprising 
personal norms, social norms, and fairness of and trust in government. It is 
acknowledged that the fairness of, and trust in, government are related to the other 
factor being considered in this thesis: the ambiguity of regulations as discussed in 
subsection 5.3.1.  
TABLE 5-2 SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR THEMES AND SUB-THEMES 
5.2.2.1 Individual- personal norms and social norms 
The moral standards of a manager are a crucial factor that influences corporate tax 
compliance (Law & Mills, 2017). This standard is determined by the individual’s 
personal norms and by the internalisation of social norms (Wenzel, 2004). Moreover, 
personal norms can influence large business compliance since a corporation as an 
entity cannot decide whether to comply or not comply – this requires input from 
Themes Sub-Themes 
Socio-psychological 
Aspects 
Individual- personal norms and social norms 
Corporate social norms- reputation 
Fairness and trust to government 
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managers.  It is argued that the attitude of company managers has a significant impact 
on the business compliance as their standards and values play a part in their business 
activities and decision making. The characteristics of the people behind the 
corporation, according to some scholars, drive their business behaviour. Moreover, 
social norms could be attributed to the moral standards of the taxpayer community as 
a whole.  Bobek et al. (2013) argued that social norms affect the compliance since they 
concern various influences that determine people’s activities, such as the norms or the 
values of family, ethnicity, religion or country, and these norms in turn may ensure 
that an individual act appropriately.  
There were some interesting responses from participants regarding the behaviour of 
top management and their attitudes based on their origins or their cultures. Some 
interviewees also believed that the tax issue was still treated as a low priority. An 
official shared her thoughts on why a company failed to pay taxes. 
They did not want to spend money on someone else, contributing 
to the country in which was not in their favour nor their interest. 
They think if they can avoid, evades or cheats; then the money can 
be poured into other business (TO04). 
Meanwhile, a senior partner concurred that the characteristics of the person behind a 
company indeed influenced the level of compliance. These characteristics were those 
of ignorance and defiance both of which were shaped by an individual’s cultural 
background. 
Well, I see the compliance not from the type of industry, but from 
the attitude of the persons who are there. From my experiences, 
there are two types of people for compliance. First, they do not 
intend to comply, they do not want to pay any taxes, and they do 
not care for the rules. Second, it is plainly because of ignorance 
(TA10). 
The category of personal norms in this section is grouped based on ethnicity -those 
from a Western culture, and those from an Asian one, as they all inherit different 
values from their country of origin. In general, in terms of compliance, the westerners 
were regarded by participants as having a better compliance attitude than the Asians, 
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and the locals were regarded as the least compliant. One participant reasoned that 
his/her cultural background might shape the character of local individuals.  "I think 
the system or the culture from their home-grown did influence on how they comply. It 
is based on my experiences that perhaps cultural factor did have the influence” (TA01). 
Moreover, another advisor suspected that, geographically, the origin of the people in 
management also had an influence on compliance.  
Undoubtedly the culture has an influence, like the way doing their 
business. For example, Europeans or Americans are attached to a 
stricter rule than perhaps Asians who were seeing problem as “what 
is the easiest way instead of the proper way to solve this?” That 
makes the difference. The domestic perhaps try to follow the rules, 
but they are not as strict as their fellow westerners (TA03). 
Meanwhile, another participant described his experiences of working with various 
clients from different backgrounds, and he was able to identify an attitude pattern 
based on his clients’ nationalities.  
In general, there is a behavioural pattern. The Americans are good 
in a sense that they consider that the law is imperative. The recent 
example is when we had a meeting last week for a case for appeal; 
we  reconsidered if the case needed to go for appeal or not. My 
client said that the case should stay forward although they must pay 
later, the rules must be followed. However, for the Asians, it 
depends on what country they are coming from (TA09). 
Further, another advisor also noticed similarities of character among his clients and 
believed that, in the Asian companies, the factor of tradition affected the attitude to 
comply, although profit-making was the priority.  
The Asian companies, Japan, Korea and India, they have typical 
characteristics. It is a matter of tradition and behaviour. The culture 
of each origin has influence. However, after all, it comes down to 
the original issue, about profit, how to make a larger profit with 
fewer expenses (TA02). 
It is worth noting that a sense of nationalism may affect the attitude of citizens as they 
do not want to deviate from what is accepted in their own country.  In terms of tax 
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compliance, a senior auditor recounted his experiences with multiple overseas 
corporations. He observed that taxpayers from different countries had unique 
approaches regarding the issue of transfer pricing transactions.  
Non-compliance comes in many forms, for example, transfer 
pricing. If we are dealing with the Japanese, the Korean, the 
Singaporean or the German, they are likely to withdraw as much 
profit as possible to their home country.  In the past, transfer 
pricing issue was to minimise the amount of tax paid because tax is 
a cost. However, after observation, it is not only about how much 
tax that has been paid, it is also a matter of nationalism because 
their home country also heavily relies on tax revenue (TO05). 
Further, several advisors and tax officials believed that the local people had the least 
awareness of their tax compliance obligations compared with their overseas 
counterparts. One advisor confirmed this: “It can be felt, but it is hard to prove, 
perhaps if the question is altered to what about the sense of nationalism, is it affecting 
local companies to be more compliant than its peers from overseas? The answer is ‘no’ 
(TA02). 
Moreover, many of the respondents had had dealings with local companies, and the 
issue of non-compliance was familiar to them. One section-head official expressed his 
frustration with this defiant behaviour.  
For the Indonesian MNCs, they are not paying taxes because of only 
tax avoidance but also committing evasion, they even cheated in the 
quantities, shamelessly creating fake expense account and it is 
inevitable. Setting up a new conduit company as a shelter even if 
the conduit has no underlying assets or economy. They really have a 
nerve (TO10). 
He further mentioned that this defiance of local companies was tolerated or ignored 
because of their connections with high-profile individuals. Moreover, they had poor 
trust in the government and were somewhat indifferent to their business reputation.  
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It is common for the Indonesian businessman to be involved in the 
government. This will help them in terms of in managing tax 
dodging by unlawful moves, and they do it without any hesitation. 
Well, this kind of situation differs from the developed country 
where the law enforcement is stricter (TO10). 
The responses of the participants showed a shared understanding that taxpayers’ 
attitudes influenced the extent to which their companies would comply. The cultural 
factor comprising thoughts, customs, beliefs and nationalities was regarded by several 
participants as a significant determinant of the personal norms, attitudes, and 
subsequent behaviour of managers when making tax-related decisions.  
5.2.2.2 Corporate social norms- reputation 
A distinct factor that separates individual norms and corporate norms in the research 
on corporate tax compliance is the reputation of the corporation, which is a major 
consideration that determines large business tax planning (Graham et al., 2013). 
Therefore, this section discusses the reputational issue for large business, and some 
valuable insights emerged when the issue of reputation was raised with participants. 
All participants agreed that reputation is a critical concern of large companies; 
however, according to participants, the lengths to which businesses are prepared to go 
in order to safeguard their reputation differ.  
A tax director of a large consumer company expressed her opinion that the reputation 
of her corporation, which is a publicly listed company, is impeccable. "As a public 
company, reputation is everything. No doubt. So, we committed to maintaining our 
names and don’t be ever happened that we are just being well-known because of 
lacking compliance” (TM06). Another manager maintained that the reputation of a 
multi-national company affects not only the parent company but its subsidiaries in 
Indonesia as well, and vice versa. “Reputation is fundamentally essential, especially for 
public listed companies. They will be very concerned when their reputation will 
potentially be spoiled when there is an issue with compliance” (TM02). 
A senior partner voiced his opinion that a multi-national corporation was more likely 
to maintain its excellent reputation, not only because it needs to keep it clean, but also 
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because of the external monitoring by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who 
closely monitor MNC activities. “Usually the MNC has a well-known reputation, their 
reputation is more important than not paying taxes because of mechanism naming and 
shaming and also the NGO who is actively blasting large companies who pay no taxes” 
(TA04). 
Further, large businesses feared that their reputation would be at stake if they were 
exposed to poor publicity. This is also another factor that constrains top management 
to comply with laws. As one tax manager stated: "Do not let it happen one day that this 
company appeared in the newspaper because of the unpaid tax arrears or even their 
directors cheated on tax. This is a large company. They maintain their reputation by 
complying with the law” (TM09). 
When the participants were asked about the role of profitability and the reputation, 
the responses were varied. Some participants indicated that, in the long-run, 
maintaining a clear reputation carries more weight than the pursuit of a short-term 
profit. The manager of a plantation company gave this reason for his company 
choosing good reputation over profit: “We want to maintain our names and our track 
record because any damage to our reputation may disturb our activities in the future” 
(TM13). 
Another manager emphasised the importance of the profit for her company because a 
business with profit is a business that survives. She stated: "Pursuing profit is 
important (for the company), the reputation could be ruled out if the profit is below 
expectation” (TM09). She argued that the principle of maintaining the company as a 
going concern will overrule everything that runs contrary to the principle of business 
sustainability. Another variation of this response came from a manager of a mining 
company for whom reputation and profit were two inseparable conditions. “Both 
reputation and profitability are vital. Reputation supports profitability in the context 
that reputation makes profit sustainable in the long run” (TM10). 
As expressed by a tax consultant, businesses seek ways to maintain a balance between 
reputation and cost savings; although large businesses have their risk appetite, they are 
more logical than the average human being. "Business is always considering efficiency 
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like tax savings, but surely, they do not want to sacrifice their reputation, like do 
something against the law” (TA12). 
The findings discussed above indicate that it is critical for large businesses to maintain 
their reputation, and large businesses fear reputation damage if their misconduct is 
exposed to public scrutiny. Meanwhile, on the issue of profitability, there was a 
different opinion among participants which is intriguing because as an entity that is 
more rational than the average person, a corporation’s compliance could be affected by 
an imbalance between concern for reputation and the company’s profitability. 
5.2.2.3 Fairness and trust in government 
The aspect of fairness is one of the most crucial factors that make a person willing to 
pay taxes and have trust in their government (Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008). As 
mentioned previously, the behaviour of people behind a company determines the level 
of that company’s compliance. Hence, this section discusses how a perceived lack of 
fairness and a feeling of having been mistreated will to some extent affect the 
compliance behaviour. A senior tax advisor shared some of what he had experienced 
during a meeting with a client from a large company whose administration felt that 
horizontal equity 44  and retributive justice 45  were inappropriately applied by the 
authorities.   
I met one of the chairmen of the Japanese company’s association, 
and I concluded that they were frustrated with the practices of 
taxation in Indonesia. In the long term, this will affect their 
behaviour to comply. It is either to discuss further of the problem, 
to fight or to cheat on it (TA11). 
Meanwhile, lack of trust in government caused a company to be very cautious of being 
transparent in terms of disclosing information, instead of being incentivised; the 
openness initiative means more harm for a company. A senior manager of an oil and 
gas company explained why he preferred to keep his distance from authorities. He told 
                                                          
44
 Goet (1978) argued that horizontal equity is the equal treatment of equally circumstanced taxpayers. 
45
 Walsh (2012) states that retributive justice is the perception that the tax authority is fair in applying 
punishments, even at the time when the rules are broken. 
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the interviewer that when asked by a superior executive from his head office in Tokyo 
why his company in Indonesia preferred a passive attitude towards tax administration, 
he “… explained to them that Indonesia had a different culture, if we were more overt 
then it is likely getting busted, being preyed upon” (TM02). 
To conclude, lack of trust and of the perception of being mistreated by the tax 
authority influence the compliance of large businesses. Some managers believed that 
greater openness could do more harm than good, and therefore there was no incentive 
to have greater transparency. Moreover, companies tend to lack trust in the 
government in general, not only in the tax authority. 
5.2.3 Corporate characteristics 
As an entity, a corporation has its own characteristics apart from those of the people 
who direct it. The behaviour of a corporation can be influenced by the quality of its 
internal control, its structure, and its relationship with external parties. Participants 
pointed out several aspects of internal control related to tax risk management that 
affect a business' behaviour. Moreover, the corporate structure and whether it is a 
publicly listed or non-listed company and the ownership status also play a role in 
determining the level of compliance. Further, participants indicated that the use of 
external parties' services and the profitability issue may also be regarded as factors 
influencing the compliance. Table 5-3 shows the factors that affect a large business’ 
compliance. The interviewees perceived these factors to be: tax risk management, 
corporate structure, use of the services of external parties, and profitability.   
TABLE 5-3 CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS THEMES AND ITS SUB-THEMES 
 
Themes Sub-Themes 
Corporate 
Characteristics 
Tax risk management 
Ownership structure and business size 
Financial constraints 
Use of a tax advisor 
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5.2.3.1 Tax risk management 
One issue repeatedly emphasised by the participants was the quality of a company’s 
internal control. Several tax managers believed that their internal control system was 
able to adequately handle any issue related to compliance. One taxpayer explained the 
system applied in his company regarding compliance.  
We have individual guidance for either monthly or annual 
compliance. All procedures are followed, for example, tax 
withholding with its handbook. If there is any doubt or any 
discretion that should be made, there is a person in charge; there is 
a reviewer and all of it is facilitated with guidance and discretions, 
but if the problem is significant then I take it to the board (TM06). 
Another manager pointed out that by following his company's long-term goal, he 
could calculate the potential consequences of business risks.  
We follow the long-term master plan as it must be implemented. 
Then, of course, we calculate the business risk. However, there will 
be a balance between long-term plans and the risk in short-term, 
and as the weigh-in was fit-in, then it will be decided upon the 
corporate action either to be executed or not (TM10). 
Further, he explained how he handled tax risk in his company by correctly balancing 
tax savings with the potential tax penalty that could be incurred following a particular 
transaction. “Tax risk is mainly coming from a transaction that we must manage from 
either business side or the taxation side. Both sides need to be covered. Never let any 
surprises happened such as unanticipated taxes” (TM10). 
Later, two most substantial tax risks were identified from the interviews: transfer 
pricing transactions and the volume of occurring transactions. Further, in detail, a 
manager in a plantation company pointed out transfer pricing transactions posed a 
higher risk since the DGT is escalating their attention on the appropriateness of such 
transactions. “We see that the largest tax exposure faced by the company is highly 
associated with transfer pricing because it refers to a related party and it is 
coincidental since our shareholder is our customer” (TM01). 
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From the other perspective, a manager in the banking industry stated that the sheer 
amount of transactions may potentially contribute to the failure to follow compliance. 
“The possibility of occurring tax risk is the error in the system due to the volume or the 
size of the transaction, so it is possible to generating errors” (TM08). 
Despite the confidence of tax managers that their system is sufficiently reliable to 
handle the compliance issue, several tax advisors had different opinions. Most of these 
advisors believed that the lack of a dedicated unit that specialised in managing taxes 
was part of a significant compliance issue for numerous large businesses. “There are 
not many that have such kind of system, although some few have set up a tax division 
with a segregation of duties such as who oversees complaints or planning” (TA14). 
Another advisor agreed that the lack of a dedicated department for taxation purposes 
was also caused by the management’s attitude in underestimating the importance of 
tax in their company. “Only a few companies have their tax department in Indonesia as 
the others consider it as unimportant and insignificant. These companies are 
underestimating tax matters” (TA08). She then pointed out that this ignorance might 
backfire. “I was surprised because such a large company did not have a tax department 
as they considered it as unimportant. They hired then a second-rate consultant to 
handle their tax matter which may result in significant mistakes” (TA08).   
Her opinion was supported by several other officials and advisors who saw that the 
role of the tax division was made negligible because of cost-saving considerations. This 
type of management viewed tax and accounting as being no more than a cost centre in 
the company, and they were likely to set up a tax division only if they could spare 
money from the budget, or they had to pay a huge number of fines or penalty because 
of their recklessness, as opined by a senior partner. 
The company will not develop a tax department unless they got 
stung from the tax office. If they are never experience it, they feel 
that they are fine, no matter that a person concurrently does many 
jobs because of budget. I often see that an MNCs with trillion 
turnovers, but their tax people are only one or two (TA04). 
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Later, this type of management often combined accounting and taxes under a single 
division, and sometimes an excessive workload was imposed on a single person. "Tax is 
only being attached to a minor section of the accounting department. Even, there is 
not any dedicated person who is specifically in charge of tax, but it is like additional 
works for the accounting staff” (TA06). Also, another advisor opined that the 
underestimation of potential tax risks might be related to the nature of the company, 
that is, whether it is local or multinational.  
When they are a worldwide brand and have an established tax 
system then it is probable that a top-down approach will be adopted 
and the system established accordingly. However, for some 
companies with no global network then they manage taxes 
themselves, and still underdeveloped because they think that their 
tax risk is small, or they do not have resources (TA12). 
Inadequate human resources in terms of experience and training is another factor that 
prevents companies from handling tax risk. One tax manager in the manufacturing 
industry admitted that he could not apply the tax risk protocol because of the lack of 
qualified staff. “We have started risk management since 2014, but there is no guidance 
we can apply because of difficulties like not everybody knows risk management” 
(TM05). 
Meanwhile, many tax officials observed that even when large businesses have a reliable 
internal control system, in general, their internal financial control lack integration 
between accounting and taxes. As stated by one official, most of the internal control of 
the company that she dealt with is concerned with compliance only in accounting 
matters, not taxation. So, the internal control is more likely in place to evaluate 
business performance rather than to handle tax issues. Moreover, another official said 
that many large companies rely on monitoring from external sources such as the tax 
office to determine their compliance. Hence, the alignment of internal control with 
business policy might result in a deviation from the compliance standard based on the 
regulated laws. 
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The internal control is mostly reflecting the business operation if it 
is aligned with the corporate policy. So, the moral is complying with 
with management decision than the tax laws. Further, this decision 
is affected by its tax morale that includes moral hazard, for example 
the corporate policy towards taxes could be unfavourable (TO12). 
In recalling his own experiences, another official illustrated further the situation of 
several large companies’ internal control. “Most of the companies here, although they 
have sufficient internal control, they are still manually operated. Sometimes something 
misses happened. A manual system has vulnerability because of physical weakness or 
caused by human carelessness” (TO01). 
Some large businesses are apparently aware that they have problems in terms of 
underqualified staff or lack of adequate staff to deal with complex taxation issues or 
some weaknesses of their internal control system. This is the point where they ask for 
assistance from external parties, and this is the time when tax advisors step in. As 
stated by a senior advisor; “Some large companies do not have internal control system 
related to taxes, but they are willing be reviewed annually” (TA11). 
Another senior advisor further emphasised that sometimes taxpayers asked for a 
special session of compliance but not limited to tax matters. This additional session 
was considered as a complementary business approach for the purpose of compliance 
integration. “They have additional periodical compliance audit from their head office 
that complementing audit from internal control division. It covers many sides, for 
example, the pollution impact on the environment” (TA14). 
Moreover, another advisor believed that the company’s internal control was the 
management’s responsibility to their stakeholders, indicating that management had 
established appropriate measures for handling business risk including tax risks. 
Internal control will be a priority for the experienced large 
businesses. In the small business, priority for example, perhaps set 
on the turnover but for a large business the weigh is more on the 
control because of its huge responsibility. It is not only tax that 
matters but also the stakeholders (TA02). 
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However, some officials agreed that although the majority of large businesses had an 
adequate internal control, the factor of human resources shortage is a concern. A 
senior auditing supervisor described his experiences. “For the non-compliant 
companies, it depends on the management’s intention that it should be supported by 
sufficient human resources. Sometimes, no one oversees taxation in the company. It 
looks like that the job is like menial for them.” (TO21). He also commented that a 
specific type of business is more prone to non-compliance because of staff shortages. 
“This usually happens in the holding company.  One or two employees are in charge 
not only for the holding but also for their subsidiaries. Consequently, the overload 
causes carelessness.” (TO21). 
Interestingly, another official suspected that to some extent, the internal control of the 
holding company might become a vehicle for management to cover suspicious 
transactions in intra-company transactions. “It is like to makes sure that when there is 
accounting manipulation or tax dodging, then they have uniform treatment from the 
holding to their distant subsidiaries” (TO06). 
Furthermore, when asked about the function of tax risk management, most 
participants admitted that, overall, the internal control of large businesses is better 
than that of the small or medium-sized businesses. The administrative compliance 
record such as timely reporting by big businesses is usually good. However, according 
to several participants, taxpayer’s commitment to comply was sometimes being 
hindered by cost-benefit concerns. In this case, a lack of human resources that should 
be dedicated to managing tax matters and the out-of-date tax management system 
may create problems. Another issue is related to the inter-company transaction that 
according to several advisors and officials that need particular attention. 
For inter-corporate transactions in the global scope within groups 
where the company in Indonesia is only a small part of the global 
production chain, the risk of non-compliance is huge. I say huge 
because taxpayers realised that a single government only can not 
solve the issue of international transfer pricing thereby this 
situation might encourage them to do profit shifting. (TO20) 
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In conclusion, although tax risk management is regarded as vital to maintaining a 
corporation’s compliance, surprisingly, many large businesses did not have sufficient 
resources to support an adequate tax risk management function. The factors of cost-
benefit-driven decisions and the underestimation of the importance of taxes were 
mentioned as the factors contributing to companies’ non-prioritisation of an adequate 
tax risk management function. 
5.2.3.2 Ownership structure and business size 
According to the participants’ responses, the structure of a company will affect its 
compliance. The term ‘structure’ in this section refers to the corporation’s ownership 
structure, that is, whether it is listed or non-listed, and the industry sector to which it 
belongs such as, for example, banking or mining.   
Several participants perceived that, in general, listed companies have better 
compliance than the non-listed company. They observed that large businesses that 
were better regulated tended to be more adapted to the compliance requirements. A 
company that is required to report its activities periodically to the public wants its 
excellent reputation to be maintained. Further, a public company was viewed as having 
a moral obligation towards their various shareholders. A senior partner tax advisor 
stated that there is a compliance gap between a public and a non-public company. 
"From my experience when we handle both listed and the non-listed companies, we 
consider that the listed companies are more compliant. The reason is that they have 
more moral obligation and responsibilities to their stakeholders” (TA13). Another 
advisor added that the factor of reputation becomes a concern for a public company 
engaging in non-compliance.  
It is obvious when the shares owned by the public; then it will hurt 
their reputation if they are not complying. However, for the non-
listed company or the family business perhaps the point is you do 
not need to pay tax if you could apply tricks, and this is a primary 
difference (TA07). 
The factor of being well-regulated was mentioned by another tax advisor who believed 
that a tightly regulated business such as a banking corporation was considered to have 
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better compliance. "Listed companies are more compliant, because they are used to 
make reports to various institutions, not only to the tax office but also to the Otoritas 
Jasa Keuangan (OJK) 46 , so they are accustomed to that kind of compliance 
requirements” (TA12). His opinion was seconded by an official who saw that the rigid 
requirements demanded by government agencies contributed to company awareness 
about the compliance issue, unlike the situation in some local private companies. 
"When a sector is required to provide a more extensive disclosure and stricter 
reporting, then it has a better compliance. However, for the companies connected to 
the power then it would likely to have less compliance” (TO12). 
However, the picture of listed companies was not always rosy; some participants 
argued that even though a listed company should meet tighter regulations, there were 
also issues on how those companies met their obligations. A senior advisor asserted 
that under certain circumstances, a listed company is not guaranteed to be free from 
compliance problems any more than its local family-owned counterpart. “The listed 
companies are more compliant because of their accountability, although we also 
experienced that our clients, the listed companies had issues with their tax obligation” 
(TA14). 
Another advisor argued that not every family business tends to have lower compliance. 
"Once I handled a business family client, but they already had a good system” (TA05). 
Meanwhile, another advisor was rather sceptical that a listed company would be more 
compliant because of the possibility that the major shareholders expected their 
company to deliver profit by any means. 
It is not relevant because it can be seen from two sides. Suppose a 
company goes public then the shareholders demanding to minimise 
any cost and maximise profit. There is no certainty that a listed 
company is more compliant. It is true that being publicly listed 
means they are on the radar and delivers more good governance. 
                                                          
46
 Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK) is the Indonesian Financial Services Authority that oversees the 
financial services industry. The OJK structure resembles that of the FSA in the United Kingdom. Like 
its counterpart, the OJK is a quasi-judicial body responsible for the regulation of the financial services 
industry in Indonesia. Its board is appointed by the MoF, although it operates independently of 
government and it is funded by fees charged to the financial services industry. 
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However, on the other hand, they have a larger responsibility to 
their shareholders (TA01). 
However, many participants agreed that, overall, listed companies tend to have better 
compliance than the non-listed companies, although the details need to be scrutinised 
to determine the level of compliance of each business. One indicator of whether a 
business is ready to comply is their transparency which shows the intention of the 
management to meet the compliance requirements. As stated by one officer, "In 
general, the level of compliance depends on the company’s transparency type just like 
the listed company in which it is easier for collecting information rather than the 
closed private company” (TO03). 
Several participants emphasised that the type of business could be an indicator of 
compliance because the nature of some businesses makes them more likely to be 
compliant. These participants gave the example of the banking industry and mining 
industry, where the latter was considered to have greater non-compliance issues. Some 
participants in the officials’ group argued that an industry that is heavily regulated 
tends to be more compliant. “Between mining and financial sector, the latter has a 
higher compliance because financial sector is supported by the requirement or being 
regulated where the supervision is very tight. Being well-regulated shapes their 
characters” (TO03). 
Another official reasoned that the banking sector had better compliance than the 
mining because sometimes the latter did not lodge periodic tax returns even though 
the mining has made the payment. She continued that the factor of awareness 
distinguishes the level of compliance of both industries. “The banking sector is, on 
average, compliant because they concern about the taxation regulation and then they 
are proactively communicating with us as their Account Representative in case that 
any new rulings are issued. They also clarify to us first, when there are grey areas in the 
regulation” (TO07). 
Apart from banking and mining industries, another official pointed out that the type of 
industry did make a difference in compliance level especially if an industry such as e-
commerce has recently emerged. Such industries pose a more significant compliance 
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risk. “A particular industry is prone to non-compliance like e-commerce. It is a 
vulnerable industry as we do not know much about internet traffic and their turnover 
also has not been reported” (TO04). 
Meanwhile, a tax advisor claimed that in the matter of tax payment, the natural 
resources sector potentially had the most significant risk of non-compliance because 
they had to operate their business with several corrupted parties that required them to 
allocate more budgets. 
The worst is when it comes to paying taxes is the mining sector and 
plantation… the company are involved in so many parties with a 
consequence that, so much money had been extorted under the 
table, so this surely makes the company unwilling to pay taxes 
because they have spent too much (TA07). 
The level of sophistication of the business structure should also be taken into account 
as a risk fact. As business grows, a multinational company needs to be involved in 
intercompany transactions more often. The transfer pricing method is usually applied 
by a business to perform such transactions. Regardless, the method is reasonably 
harmless if applied appropriately. However, several officials suspected that many large 
businesses had to exploit transfer pricing in order to minimise their apparent profit. 
One official pointed out that an affiliated company has the potential to be non-
compliant more so than a non-affiliated company. 
If a company has a more complex structure then they will have 
more intercompany transactions; it means a larger risk for the tax 
avoidance or the tax evasion. This is different with a single 
company, in which it does not have many affiliations, or it only has 
one or two affiliations that are relatively easy to be monitored by 
the tax office. Further, they do not have any transactions that are 
distorted by related parties. Thus, their transaction is based on the 
market operation. It is not like the affiliation transactions. 
Therefore, the more complex of the structure of the company is, the 
tendency is more not to comply. Hence, the more incompliant 
taxpayers are, the more opportunities for them to avoid more taxes 
(TO01). 
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Another tax auditor agreed with this view that transfer pricing was problematic. He 
added that a larger business could be seen as an entity with larger resources. 
By having overseas company and domestic companies make it easier 
to conduct financial engineering, avoiding the taxes. Large 
companies also have sophisticated resources to plot such as banking 
schemes, liabilities dodging or tax treaty shopping. The larger the 
company is then it is more likely to avoid taxes, or more likely to 
undercut their payment using their resources (TO08). 
Another official gave an example of how a large business dodged its taxes. He shared 
his experiences that the most likely case of audit findings in his office were findings 
that related to transfer pricing manipulation, and it occurred in affiliated businesses 
that utilise tax havens, but it never occurred in a sole company. “The most 
straightforward indicator of transfer pricing problem is the net income. For example, a 
company which had a thin net income because the company had affiliated transactions 
in the tax haven countries or in the country where the treaties have many advantages” 
(TO01). 
The abovementioned findings indicate that factors such as the ownership structure 
and business size influence the compliance of large business. In general, the listed 
company is perceived to have better compliance than the non-listed company. 
Secondly, the business industries naturally have different compliance risk exposure. 
Thirdly, the multi-national companies that utilise tax havens were perceived to have a 
higher level of non-compliance.  
5.2.3.3 Financial constraints 
Several participants considered that financial constraints became a factor that 
influences corporate tax compliance. This is in the situation where a business is unable 
to meet its obligation to the government because of financial hardships or global 
financial crisis. An auditor shared his experience when a large business encountered a 
situation where it could not pay the overdue taxes. “There were some types of audit 
finding like the non-compliance caused by tax payment. Taxpayers knew the amount 
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to pay, no dispute about it. The problem was that taxpayer had shortage in cash flow to 
pay taxes” (TO20).  
A tax manager from a mining company also stated that during the business hardships, 
it seemed tolerable to overlook any obligation in order to save the company from not 
being operationally intact. “Everybody is doing tightening in a business hardship, an 
aggressive efficiency to survive. That is the day of survival mode, waiting for the 
changes of situation. Options during the hardship are clear; employees are the last 
option” (TM07). 
This was also confirmed by a high-ranking official who noticed that the non-
compliance level increased if a company was facing a crisis. His responses confirmed 
what has been said by the mining tax manager above, that “non-compliance emerged 
when they encountered hardship in their business so that the tax matters would not be 
prioritised, especially with the tight cash flow” (TO03). 
Secondly, business profitability here refers to a situation where the management 
prefers to do something other than paying corporate taxes. An official observed this 
occurrence at his office where a company preferred to not pay their taxes if they were 
short of cash. Another cause of not paying taxes was provided by another official who 
said that "Because of inefficiency in cash flow, the management delay tax payment 
with the reason of cash flow. They need to use the money; however, tax payment is not 
a priority” (TO06). The aspect of priority is also becoming an issue when management 
uses the money to pay tax or uses it for other business purposes. An advisor argued 
that those companies did not willingly decide not to comply; instead, it was 
impractical at the time because the company was forced by the situation to not 
prioritise tax payment.  
To conclude, it was found that (1) the level of non-compliance is escalated when a 
business facing crisis utilises more aggressive tax planning to increase tax savings, (2) 
keeping the business operational becomes management’s priority rather than fulfilling 
their obligation to the government.  
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5.2.3.4 Use of a tax advisor  
A business usually uses external auditors and external tax advisors as part of its 
governance mechanism to ensure that the business runs on the right path. 
Nevertheless, the roles of tax advisor to some extent are like a double-edged sword in 
that they can help taxpayers to reach full compliance by encouraging them to follow 
the law’s requirement and discouraging a reporting position that would be challenged 
by the authority. Alternatively, they can provide advice that exploits some features of 
the ambiguity in regulations with a taxation scheme such as the aggressive tax 
planning.  
When asked about the role that tax advisors played and their relationship with their 
clients, some tax advisors argued that their job was mainly to assist taxpayers to meet 
their obligations or they played a role as reviewer of the actual taxpayer’s stance on 
specific cases. One advisor asserted that the multinational companies hired tax 
consultants because they wanted to ensure that their tax position was correct. “They 
hired us to ensure that there were no mistakes in their payment. Another reason is 
that they want to make sure that the tax rules have been interpreted correctly and they 
believe that tax consultant will deliver their expectation” (TA14). 
Another advisor added that, mainly, the role of a tax advisor is to help taxpayers to 
comply with the applicable laws, but there is always a possibility that in Indonesia, that 
function can be extended to help taxpayers to streamline their tax burden if it is not 
violating the law. Further, he added that the goal of a tax advisor was likely to depend 
on the intention of his client. An official supported this advisor’s opinion, adding that 
the large business would want its tax advisor’s intention to be aligned with that of the 
company for matters including aggressive tax planning. “It depends whether 
encouragement of the aggressive tax planning was coming from the tax consultant. For 
a small or medium company, the action will be determined by the consultant’s 
behaviour, but for large companies, they do the action” (TO20). 
In conclusion, the use of a tax advisor can have two opposing effects on corporate 
compliance. There is a positive influence on the corporate compliance if the advisor 
encourages the corporation to obey the law and avoid a position that might be 
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questioned by the tax authority. For example, by helping taxpayers to comply with 
applicable laws or to ensure that a tax position is correct under the law. Conversely, 
the influence is negative if the tax advisor seeks to exploit an ambiguity in the law or 
be compromised to follow the demand of their client.  
5.2.4 Summary of corporate factor 
This section presents a summary of the interview findings regarding the corporate 
factor. The themes in this section are arranged based on the factors that are frequently 
discussed in the literature of tax compliance, that is, the economic and the sociological 
factors. The themes are compared with the responses of the participants in regard to 
what they believed were the factors affecting compliance. 
Regarding the corporate factor, the key informant participants were concerned that in 
terms of the economic factors, cost-benefit-driven decisions, manager bonuses, 
probability of detection and penalty, risk appetite and uncertainty were the crucial 
components of the corporate factor that influence compliance. Secondly, in terms of 
socio-psychological aspects, personal norms, social norms, fairness and comprises tax 
risk management, ownership structure and business size, business profitability and the 
use of a tax advisor.  
5.3 Regulation factor 
“The law is a profession of words” (Mellinkoff, 2004, p.vii). Despite all good intentions 
in the making of contracts, statutes and constitutions, the meanings of words are not 
always clear, precise and unequivocal; in fact, some words may lead to various 
interpretations by different parties. This multiple interpretation situation exacerbates 
the problem of regulation complexity that results in uncertainty. It relates to the 
circumstances when a taxpayer is uncertain about the consequences of his action 
because the law is lacking clarity so that taxpayer cannot predict the measure that will 
be taken by the enforcement institution. 
The second issue is that of ambiguity in regulations leading to a lack of clarity 
regarding their interpretation and application (Schane, 2006). This issue of ambiguity 
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was strongly emphasised by participants as a critical factor that hindered taxpayers’ 
compliance. The third issue is regulatory overlap, which involves the problem of 
conflict, lack of coordination, complexity and duplication. The problem of regulatory 
overlap in Indonesia is severe because institutions lack coordination within and 
between them, which is a common occurrence in developing countries. The fourth 
issue is the unfairness in regulation where the design of the regulation is seen as giving 
more advantages to the tax authority (pro-DGT bias) than to taxpayers. Further, the 
regulation is treated more as an instrument ensuring the revenue stream, rather than 
having the function of addressing the problems in the society.       
TABLE 5-4 OVERVIEW OF REGULATION FACTOR THEMES 
Table 5-4 above shows the regulation factors that influence large business compliance. 
This table corresponds with themes and sub-themes that have been elaborated in 
Chapter 4. It is reiterated in this section to provide a clearer picture in terms of the 
regulations being a compliance driver. 
5.3.1 Complexity in regulation  
In this section, the complexity in regulations is related to the circumstances when a 
taxpayer becomes uncertain of the consequences of his action because the law is 
lacking clarity; hence, the taxpayer cannot predict the measure that the enforcement 
institution will take.  Regulation certainty as recognised in the civil law tradition47 can 
be expressed as “a maximum predictability of officials’ behaviour” (Claes & 
Krolikowski, 2009, p.92). The issue of uncertainty arises when a regulation is drafted 
vaguely or ambiguously and when it has retrospective effect.  
                                                          
47
 The law in Indonesia is principally based on a civil law system (the Roman Dutch law) intermixed 
with traditional customary law (Hukum Adat). 
Compliance Drivers Themes 
Regulation factor Complexity in regulation 
Ambiguity in regulation  
Unfairness in regulation 
Regulatory overlap 
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A tax advisor recalled his experiences when a new regulation was issued, and at the 
time, it raised a question for him on how to follow the regulation accordingly. He 
visited a high-rank official later to confirm. “The head of the regional office was said 
that he would provide a confirmation letter, but later he could not guarantee that the 
tax auditor or his successor would have a similar opinion with the content of the letter” 
(TA09). 
The response from the official was therefore obviously causing the taxpayer to hesitate 
before proceeding further, and the absence of associated rulings was not improving the 
situation. Furthermore, a partner in a tax firm confirmed the possibility that the non-
compliance level would increase because of the ambiguities in regulations. He added 
that the problem also stemmed from the unpredictable behaviour of the tax auditor 
even though he had managed the problem previously with the appointed Account 
Representative48 in the form of voluntary adjustment settlement before his clients 
lodged their tax return. It was not a guarantee that further adjustments would not be 
made. “Taxpayers tried to comply by managing their voluntary tax adjustment49 
according to the law at their best, yet when audited they were being corrected on the 
adjustment, perhaps it might be better if the earlier adjustments were not made” 
(TA14).  
At this point, this tax advisor hinted that making a voluntary tax adjustment did not 
protect a taxpayer from a future challenge by the authorities. Therefore, he questioned 
the requirement of adjusting the tax returns. “There is no need to make voluntary tax 
adjustments exactly as the law required because, in the end (in the audit), it will be re-
corrected and be blamed as well” (TA14). Another example of uncertainty is that of a 
coal mining manager who dealt with tax auditors who were considered as acting out of 
line during the examination process.  
 
                                                          
48
 Account Representative (AR) is the official in the DGT who is assigned the task of, for example, 
handling taxpayer questions regarding the tax law.  
49
 Voluntary tax adjustments have no binding effect on the authorities. The DGT may still perform an 
audit and make additional adjustments plus impose a penalty although a taxpayer has made a voluntary 
adjustment and paid additional taxes accordingly (e.g., depreciation expense adjustments.) 
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We have seen the issues in the recent years, that the Contract of 
Works (CoW) which means a signed contract deal with the 
government and the taxpayer, still could be interpreted differently 
by the officials, so that afterwards, in the audit, they issued a bit 
unfair assessment. As the CoW has its privileges50, it should not be 
intervened (TM12). 
Disputes between taxpayers and the tax office sometimes recur; for example, in the 
case of transfer pricing, although the tax payer may win the case in a court of law, the 
same issue may surface during the next tax period. The participant added that this 
occurrence automatically raises questions from the stockholders, especially when it is a 
public company. “Well, it is disappointing when we appealed a transfer pricing dispute 
to the tax court, and we won. Nevertheless, the verdict cannot be referred as a base for 
the tax auditor to not creating corrections for a similar case in the following year” 
(TM12). 
From the abovementioned findings, it can be concluded that the complexity in 
regulations resulted in the unpredictable behaviour of officials. Apart from the 
complexity and obscurity of regulations, the unpredictability was the result of 
inadequate expertise, loosely-applied standards and ineffective oversight by the tax 
authority, or a combination of all these factors. As a consequence, officials’ actions 
were often ad hoc and arbitrary. This unpredictability is a warning to the tax authority 
that there is a human resource problem in dealing with the regulation complexity. 
Hence, taxpayers face unpredictable treatment by officials, and further, may miss the 
fair opportunity to avoid penalty. Therefore, the issue of unpredictability will not be 
resolved until tight procedures and the clarity of standards are established by both 
substantive law and procedural law.  
5.3.2 Ambiguity in regulation  
Several officials, managers and advisors shared a similar opinion that the ambiguity in 
regulation plays a significant role in determining taxpayer’s compliance. A manager 
                                                          
50
 The Contract of Work has a feature of “lex specialis derogate legi generali”. This principle states 
that where two laws govern an analogous situation, then the law that governs a specific subject issue 
(lex specialis) overrules the general one.  
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even pointed out that one of the significant risks associated with compliance is the risk 
of failing to interpret regulations accurately. “One of the largest risks is the risk of 
interpreting the regulation. As the rule exists, there is always a risk of different 
interpretation between the tax office and us” (TM07). 
This opinion was echoed by another tax manager from the banking industry who 
shared his experience of a tax audit, “The biggest correction component is caused by 
the difference of interpretation between the taxpayer and the tax office” (TM08). This 
manager added that “The huge correction happened because of grey areas and 
differences in interpretation” (TM08). The problem of multiple interpretations did not 
concern only the taxpayer, but also the two participant groups of tax advisors and tax 
officials who were recognised as experts in tax matters; they faced the delicate 
situation of transfer pricing transactions, for example. “It generates many debates 
because of the ambiguity in regulation. The government side has a different 
assumption. When the regulation was ambiguous then the assumptions took place. 
The royalty account is an example, theoretically it is deductible, but it was corrected 
with no reason” (TA05). 
A tax manager from a plantation company commented that even for a single 
regulation, there can be different interpretations by government agencies. He cited his 
experience about a governmental regulation on income tax facilities when his company 
tried to apply for that allowance.  
As I recalled my experience, there was a point on the PP 
(Government regulation) No. 1, year 2007 which is superseded by 
the PP No. 62, year 2009 about the word of “integrated company”. 
The words itself have no definition, which causes multiple 
interpretations… if we look at the globalisation nowadays, yes, 
Toyota Japan and Toyota Indonesia are regarded as integrated. 
Another example, the General Motors, they manufactured the 
machine in Korea, chassis in Indonesia, spare-parts in Thailand; it is 
also integrated. However, because of the absence of definition then 
the effect is different interpretation among the government 
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agencies. From the standpoint of BKPM51, Toyota is integrated. The 
DGT takes a position in the middle, it is integrated, but it must be 
by a single entity. The Ministry of Industry is even more amusing; it 
should be by a single entity and should stay in the same enclave. It 
looks like never ending case, so if you notice the income tax 
allowance regulation that has been decreed since 2007, only a few 
who applied and even fewer who had received the facilities (TM01). 
A couple of tax advisors proposed several reasons for the inconsistencies in the 
regulations. These are: a lack of historical knowledge, a too-general law, and a failure 
to choose an appropriate tax system. One partner who is also a keen observer of the tax 
system in Indonesia argued that the regulation-making process is unable to deliver a 
proper regulation.  “Many regulations were made with the gap of lacking historical 
knowledge, so the taxpayer or the agent who knows the paradigm of the old rules 
sometimes feeling that there is a disparity, inequality which result in dispute” (TA11). 
Consequently, it is reasonable that “Current regulations are more prone to multi-
interpretation” (TA11). Meanwhile, another director from a high-ranking tax firm in 
Indonesia asserted that the tax laws created plenty of loopholes because they lacked 
sufficient detail.  
Our regulation is too general, so it leaves many interpretations in 
the field. The interpretation is made by the officials then. In general, 
if we compare it with the US regulation, even Australia’s and the 
Europe’s, their regulation is more detail (TA03).  
The inadequacy of detail as mentioned by TA03 was also supported by another tax firm 
partner, who said that this would open the possibility of bias at the lower level of 
regulation. Furthermore, an inappropriate delegation of authority might result in the 
abuse of power.  
Talking about procedural, the IRS has a thicker book for tax laws, 
compared to ours which is thin and many things are being 
delegated to the regulation at the lower level. This opens 
precedence by the laws to other ways than those in which governed 
                                                          
51
 BKPM is the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board, an agency that manages foreign direct 
investment or domestic direct investment in Indonesia: See http://www.bkpm.go.id/ for more 
information. 
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itself. However, currently the interpretation now tends more to 
revenue target and to the ad hoc mechanism (TA01). 
On the side of the taxpayer, one thing is obvious: the misinterpretation is a burden. 
Asking advice from a tax practitioner is not a guarantee that the issue will be clarified. 
One tax manager from the mining sector illustrated this with his comment about the 
effect of an ambiguous regulation. 
The problem is the existing regulation can be interpreted 
differently, by the tax office and by us. It results in excessive costs. 
To ensure the meaning of a regulation if I think that tax office has a 
different interpretation, I need the opinion from a tax advisor. That 
is a cost. Even, if I hire the advisor then, it may raise a dispute. 
Resolving the dispute needs time and money. This high-cost 
economy is a burden to the taxpayer, an encumbrance, as if there is 
no certainty and this is causing discouragement for people to 
comply (TM07). 
Meanwhile, the interviews with tax officials revealed that the offcials are not unaware 
of the issue of multiple interpretations. In fact, one tax auditor encountered 
complications on how to impose a particular regulation correctly given the dynamic of 
the rules changes; he implied in the interview that the ‘back-up’ provided by the 
related technical directorate was as inadequate. Further, the head of one LTO office 
commented that a different interpretation posed an actual risk for a multinational 
company. He said, “The famous large MNCs, usually they were (perceived as) non-
compliant when they think that the regulation induces to multiple interpretations,  
because they had been wrongly interpreting the rules then it seems that they are not 
complying” (TO03). Nevertheless, some officials viewed this as only a stance on a 
particular regulation which gives either taxpayer or tax office the grounds for 
defending their position. This stance is affirmed by Freedman (2010) who stated that 
there are always grey areas where the tax authority is confident that its position is 
supported by the law. Meanwhile, the taxpayer takes the opposite position but with 
the same confidence.  
The major issue is related to some reporting, for example, there are 
some taxpayers' standpoint that not allowed by existing regulation. 
Meanwhile, the taxpayers have their views about aspects related to 
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the contract, and they felt that they had followed the regulation 
while on our side, it was not followed, and this often resulted in 
dispute (TO11). 
Regulation acts as the foundation for every action conducted by the 
tax officer. The problem is that many things in regulation are still in 
‘the grey areas’. Each party, either tax office or the taxpayer has a 
different position in addressing this 'grey area’ (TO01). 
It becomes evident that every group of the participant were agreed that the ambiguity 
in regulation could create multiple interpretations. The result of this ambiguity does 
not only create disputes between the taxpayer and the tax office but also among 
government institutions. A tax manager was confident that a significant reduction in 
regulation ambiguity would lead to compliance improvement.  
However, sometimes, people do not comply because the regulation 
is unclear. Moreover, that kind of interpretation differences should 
be significantly reduced. So, the taxpayer would be happy because 
the rules are absolute, no ambiguity, no grey area. It will increase 
compliance rate (TM08). 
Therefore, ambiguity in regulations is apparently a vital issue that needs to be rectified. 
The different possible interpretations confused the taxpayers and increased the 
likelihood that they would not comply with the laws. Moreover, the misinterpretation 
created extra costs for taxpayers who need to hire external tax professionals to clarify 
their position. Ambiguity in regulations makes the tax authority less accurate when 
executing what is required by the law. The issue of multiple interpretations creates 
conflicts among government agencies as well as more disputes with taxpayers. 
5.3.3 Unfairness in regulation  
During the interview, several taxpayers and tax advisors complained that when making 
a regulation, the DGT distorted it to better accommodate its own interest, that is, 
achieving its tax revenue targets. The regulation was therefore pro-DGT biased. A 
partner in a tax firm was questioning the neutrality of tax regulations: “The regulations 
which are issued are likely about the budgetary issue, to collect more money rather 
than to regulate a specific subject” (TA01). Another partner asserted that the bias in 
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regulations caused disputes because it is contrary to the taxation principle. “Our tax 
provision is focused on the revenue targets, so many tax regulations deviate from the 
fundamental theories of taxation. Well, this is occasionally causing disputes” (TA13). 
Moreover, from the taxpayer’s perspective, it was not unusual for the DGT to take 
actions outside the law not only in practice but in regulation-making as well, 
disregarding the fairness principle.   
On the one hand, indeed that the regulations are complex in 
Indonesia, on the contrary; honestly, I say that the DGT as a 
regulator is inconsistent in applying the law. Often the DGT creates 
legal breaches or even we may call it a legal abuse. Now, the goal is 
the State account oriented only, to meet their revenue target 
(TM01). 
As said by another tax manager, the neutrality of the DGT in terms of the taxpayer was 
questioned. For example, when dealing with a regulation that has ambiguity, instead of 
providing an equitable solution, the DGT frequently took a pre-determined position 
before the solution was offered. For example, an oil and gas tax manager sensed that 
officials often take a position which is unfavourable to the taxpayers regarding an 
ambiguous regulation. “If there are any differences in interpretation like I said (before) 
about grey areas, it is likely that the DGT (stance) would take side with the tax 
(revenue) targets” (TM06). 
To conclude, the findings of this subsection show that unfairness in regulation 
influences the compliance of taxpayers. If a regulation contains a pro-DGT bias, it will 
negatively influence the taxpayer’s trust. Ideally, a regulation should be neutral, and 
accommodates the interest of both parties: the tax authority and the taxpayer.  
5.3.4 Regulatory overlap 
In this section, we discuss the issue of regulatory overlap which many participants saw 
as an important factor influencing large business compliance. Firstly, the problem of 
overlapping regulations, it was a common hurdle experienced by taxpayers. For 
example, the inconsistency between the governmental regulations and their associated 
laws was not only an issue which occurred in one particular field; in fact, the 
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inconsistency occurred vertically at every level of the law’s hierarchical order, from the 
law passed at the top to the decrees issued by the DGT as the lowest regulatory body. A 
director of tax practitioners from a Tier 1 tax firm shared his opinion on this issue.  
Sometimes when we analyse, the tax law states this, but the MoF 
decrees states differently, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources decrees says far more. Which one then should we comply 
with? If we refer to a DGT’s circular letter, this is the DGT stance 
towards the existing regulation. But this letter conflicted or 
different with its related regulation, so what should we adhere to? 
(TA09).   
Overlapping of regulations is not uncommon, and conflict occurs because regulations 
state different things in regard to the same issue. Moreover, a regulation might not be 
valid if it regulates beyond its mandated authority. One tax manager for mining 
companies gave a clearer picture in the following statement:  
An example is The Governmental Regulation (PP) Number 74. The 
law states that the Notice of Tax Assessment (SKP) is issued only by 
the tax auditor or data novum52, surprisingly that the PP No. 74 
states that the SKP also can be issued by other people than the 
auditor. No such things are regulated in the law, this is deviating 
and causing uncertainty, this is very dangerous for taxpayers. 
(TM06) 
One tax advisor confirmed the tax manager’s opinion regarding problematic 
regulations, stating:   
Frankly speaking, the current regulations are causing more 
confusion and even chaos. One example is PP Number 74 Year 2011, 
primarily related to the article about interest compensations, in 
which according to the practitioners and the taxpayers is deviated 
from the norms that have been set up in the law of KUP53. My 
colleagues also share the same opinion. It is not about the language 
in the regulation that is confusing, but this is just inconsistent with 
the norms of the legislation (TA14). 
                                                          
52
 Data novum is a legal term in Indonesia referring to new data that emerged after a legal process has 
been completed or decided. 
53
 The KUP is the other names of The Law of General Provisions and Taxation Procedures (Law 
Number 6 of 1983).  
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The information above gives some examples of how tax regulations may contradict 
each other, and not only in regard to taxation.  The problem of overlap also occurs 
between the taxes regulations and the regulations pertaining to other institutions. 
Several tax advisors and taxpayers complained of this situation that existed, for 
example, between the DGT and other agencies or between the central bank and the 
OJK. The overlap issue also applied to the accounting standards. A consumer goods 
manager mentioned that the risk of overlap was an external risk beyond her control. 
“There is a regulation overlap between the OJK and the taxation. It creates compliance 
risks for us. I can contain the internal risks but not the external risks” (TM04). Another 
manager pointed out the issue of conflicting regulations between the tax and the 
accounting standards, resulting in headaches for taxpayers, not only because of the 
contradiction but also because of the poor quality of the regulations which made them 
hard to follow. “Many regulations were issued which even contradicted with other 
regulation, for example, some regulations are conflicted with the PSAK54. Then, when 
it has been regulated, it is causing dilemma to the taxpayer” (TM01).   
The overlapping forced taxpayers to carefully prioritise the rules that need to be 
followed and, in many cases, the tax regulation was not prioritised. A tax auditor 
recounted his experiences when his team examined several banking corporations.  
The type of findings that we found in the banking is findings mostly 
caused by the differences in compliance requirements between the 
DGT and the Central Bank. The taxpayers missed the requirements 
from the DGT because they prefer to comply with the Central Bank 
(TO17).    
Meanwhile, the conflicting regulations also exist as in the case of the tax audit of 
mining companies. It was common for the resultant findings to not be accepted by the 
audited taxpayer because this entity’s works were based on a Contract of Work (CoW) 
instead of the tax auditor references, the prevailing laws. “The findings are always 
caused by the disagreements of the CoW for the taxpayers in mining (industries). 
Which law should be used, the general laws or the nailed down contracts?” (TO17). 
                                                          
54
 PSAK is the Indonesian version of general accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The GAAP 
consists of a collection of commonly-followed accounting standards and rules for financial reporting. It 
is a combination of standards set by a policy boards and the accepted ways of recording and reporting 
accounting information. A company must follow GAAP when they arrange their financial statements.  
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Often, the differences resulted in dispute between the taxpayers and the tax office with 
the final settlement being decided in the courts where most of the time the verdict 
favoured the taxpayers. Consequently, the government had a double defeat, losing the 
case and having to pay compensation to the taxpayer. 
The second type of overlap problem is the issue of poor coordination. It is no secret 
that a lack of coordination among institutions is pervasive in Indonesia. It has been 
longstanding practice in Indonesia for many agencies to operate in isolation with their 
main concern being their own interests. Even the regular coordination meetings are 
frequently nothing but a formality. The statement below confirms the coordination 
problem between two ministerial departments that resulted in regulation loopholes 
and created confusion for the taxpayers. 
It is not because we do not want to comply but because the 
regulation cannot be applied, it is non-synchronous. I give you an 
example, the reclamation cost; it is a tax deductible with some 
approvals. Getting approval from the ESDM55, no problem, because 
it is regulated there, but approval from the DGT?  We seek all 
procedures, no DGT’s regulation for such thing. So, how could we 
claim this reclamation cost then? (TA09).  
The loopholes in the regulations give taxpayers the opportunity to choose which 
regulation to follow although it may result in a higher compliance cost. In other words, 
there were risks and opportunities, in terms of either an increase of tax savings because 
of non-detection or greater expenses because of the imposed sanctions. 
The current example is we are enforcing compliance with the cost of 
PPAP write-off56. Inside this cost, perhaps there are promotional 
expenses that we require them to adhere to the filling of a 
nominative list of the taxpayer identification number (TIN). Well, 
they did not fill it because they argued that that thing not required 
by the Central Bank rules, so they hold that stance (TO15). 
                                                          
55
 The ESDM is The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of Indonesia. 
56
 The PPAP is the provision for loan losses in banking industry. It is a set-up allowance in the bank to 
cover potential loan losses, for example, bad debts or customer defaults.  
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Another example of a loophole concerns the accounting standards. Since the full 
adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2012 by the 
Institute of Indonesia Chartered Accountants (the official accountant profession in 
Indonesia), the gap between tax accounting regulations and the GAAP has widened in 
regard to what needs to be regulated. According to Mulyadi et al. (2012), there was no 
regulation or adjustment made in response to the IFRS. “The IFRS arrangement has 
many divergences with the tax rules. Perhaps the tax rules with the applied GAAP is 
relatively convergent, maybe about 95 percent is converging already. However, in terms 
of the IFRS, none of the tax legislation to date has accommodated the IFRS 
arrangement57  (TO01). 
The lapse between Mulyadi et al.’s (2012) publication and the time of interviews in 2015 
indicated that the authority was unprepared to anticipate the dynamics of business; in 
this case, it is an example of regulatory overlap that occurs between tax regulation and 
the accounting standards.  
Thus, it can be concluded from the findings that regulatory overlap creates a waste of 
resources and occurs because of the inconsistency among the laws that having overlap 
rules regarding similar issues. The inconsistency occurs either vertically with its sub-
regulations or horizontally with the other laws. Secondly, it occurs because there is 
poor coordination among agencies. Therefore, these findings confirmed Aagaard’s 
(2011) assertion that regulatory overlap is caused by the existing conflicts, redundant 
duplications, lack of coordination, and unnecessary complexities. 
5.3.5 Summary of regulation factor 
This section presents the summary of the analysis from the interviews as presented in 
Section 5.2, the regulation factor. The themes emerged based on the perspective of the 
participants regarding the issues that they considered were the most essential in 
influencing compliance. It is worth noting that many participants from three groups 
                                                          
57
 GAAP or generally accepted accounting principles is collection of commonly-followed accounting 
principles, standards and procedures for financial reporting.  
IFRS or International Financial Reporting Standards is a set of accounting standards in which 
developed by the International Accounting Standards Boards (IASB).  
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(tax officials, tax managers and tax advisors) considered that weaknesses in the 
regulations are a significant factor that affects compliance. The ambiguity and 
uncertainty contained in regulations, regulatory overlap, and unfairness in regulations 
are the main issues discussed in section 5.2. Section 5.3 dealt with the corporate factor, 
considered by many participants as having a significant and sometimes vital influence 
on large businesses’ tax compliance in Indonesia. 
5.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the findings of this thesis to answer the first research question: 
What are the factors that influence large business taxpayers’ compliance risks from the 
perspectives of the tax officials, the tax managers, and the independent tax advisors? The 
research question was addressed by interviewing 48 participants in total which were 
grouped separately according to their job function: tax manager, tax official or tax 
advisor. The inclusion of a variety of parties as key informants was done to provide a 
broader and richer perspective of the topics under discussion during the interviews.  
The findings showed that many participants considered that the improvement of 
regulations is one issue that requires serious and immediate attention. Authorities 
have been alerted to the shortcomings in the legislation that need to be addressed in 
order to improve the level of compliance. The flaws that must be tackled include the 
ambiguity and unfairness in regulations, uncertainty, and regulatory overlap. 
Furthermore, the findings showed that many participants believed that the economic 
factors, sociological aspects and corporate characteristics also influence large 
businesses compliance. The participants believed that some improvements to 
corporate characteristics would contribute to better compliance behaviour. In this 
regard, the authority’s direct interference is needed to create a supporting compliance 
atmosphere for a business to behave as required. Factors such as probability of 
detection, penalties, perception of fairness, and trust in government are some that can 
be addressed immediately by the government in order to create better compliance. 
Other considerations such as cost-benefit driven decisions, personal norms, social 
norms and ownership structure are features of corporations that need to be carefully 
monitored in anticipation of potential defiant behaviour.   
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CHAPTER 6  
THE TAX AUTHORITY’S RESPONSES TO LARGE BUSINESS  
COMPLIANCE RISKS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter elaborated on the findings related to the first research question 
of this thesis, that is, the factors that influence the Indonesian large business non-
compliance risks from the perspectives of tax officials, tax advisors, and tax managers. 
This chapter elaborates on and discusses the second research questions of the thesis: 
How does the tax authority manage large business taxpayers’ compliance risks according 
to the factors identified by addressing the previous research question? 
Section 6.2 discusses the DGT’s current capacity to respond which hinders compliance, 
an issue that requires the authority to manage non-compliance. This section examines 
three fundamental issues that prevent the DGT from functioning efficiently.  These 
issues are human resources (6.2.1), data access (6.2.2), and administration (6.2.3). 
Section 6.3 discusses how the DGT manages the issue of non-compliance. Section 6.4 
presents the opinions of the participants regarding responsive regulation as a solution 
to deal with non-compliance. Section 6.5 summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
6.2 The DGT’s current capacity to respond 
Prior to addressing the second research question stated in Section 6.1, it is essential to 
acknowledge the challenges encountered by the revenue institutions. This requires 
obtaining a thorough overview of the management of non-compliance by the 
institution because the problems of non-compliance exist in all countries regardless of 
the way it is manifested. Unfortunately, tax authorities in developing countries face 
more considerable challenges when compared to their counterparts in developed 
countries as pointed out by Baurer (2005)58, and Indonesia apparently is no exception.  
                                                          
58
 See Chapter 3 Section 3.6 for detailed information. 
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Regardless of the administrative reform that has been undertaken by the DGT in the 
last sixteen years, still, there are three issues identified by participants as the factors 
that prevent the institution from effectively managing large business compliance risks. 
Table 6-1 shows three significant themes associated with the issue of institutional 
capacity. The issues of human resources, poor data management and poor internal 
coordination were significant contributing causes of non-compliance that were noted 
by interviewees.  
TABLE 6-1 OVERVIEW OF THE DGT'S CURRENT CAPACITY TO RESPOND AND ITS THEMES 
 
6.2.1 Human resources issue  
6.2.1.1 Integrity and corruption 
Many taxpayers and tax advisors admitted that since the administration reform 
launched in 2002 known as the DGT’s Modernisation, the positive result such as the 
employees having greater integrity and being less corrupt indicated that reform was 
on its way. Even so, corruption has not been entirely eradicated. An advisor compared 
the situation before and after the commencement of modernisation. “Since the 
modernisation commenced, the corruptive behaviour is significantly declined. It is 
very different now than years ago before modernisation, but the fact is, there will 
always be crooks” (TA04). 
Another advisor even praised the current integrity situation, and she emphasised that 
the factor of lacking integrity happens elsewhere. “I am not too disturbed by their 
integrities, only one or two crooks are out there, and I do not want to be unfair and 
generalise my perception about the DGT because of them. It depends on each officer's 
own moral standard” (TA08). 
Drivers Themes 
The institutional capacity Human resources issue 
Poor data management 
Poor internal coordination 
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A tax manager also testified to the changes that occurred in the DGT. “At the moment, 
the corrupt officers are not as many as before, but they still exist.” (TM09). Moreover, 
regarding those few who were alleged to be corrupt officials, some tax advisors 
suspected that tax auditors were at the top of the list.  
In the last five years, the phenomenon of corruption that 
committed by tax officials still exists although, regarding quantity, 
those illegal actions were declining. Most likely, tax auditors are 
suspected as the culprit of this misbehaviour (TA06). 
However, many tax advisors also believed that the current officers feel a stronger sense 
of embarrassment, for example, if they were acting inappropriately by, for example, 
asking the taxpayer for a bribe. Interestingly, despite the progress that has been made 
in administrative reform regarding integrity improvement, two participants, a taxpayer 
and a tax advisor, believed that the professional quality has deteriorated. “I believe the 
current tax officers have more integrity. It is much better than five years ago. However, 
it does not mean that by having higher integrity then whatever they do is correct. That 
is a different issue.” (TA13). 
From the above findings, it can be concluded that the overall integrity is currently 
better than that in the era of pra-modernisation although some corrupt officials are 
still in the organisation, and it has a negative impact on compliance. The interviewee 
data indicated that professionalism of officilas has also declined. The reason for this 
decline in the professionalism of DGT officials is discussed in the following sub-
section.  
6.2.1.2 Lack of professionalism  
The decline of the tax officials’ professionalism had been noted by several taxpayers 
and tax advisors. At least three attitude issues are involved here: too afraid to decide, 
abuse of power and a biased interpretation of the law. An advisor stated that “The 
strange thing is when the integrity is getting better, yet their professionalism 
decreased because they were too afraid to make mistakes” (TA01). Another advisor 
pointed out that the problem was not only about making a decision but also the issue 
of shifting their actual responsibility to other parties. “Now the officers are too afraid 
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to take a decision. They tend to shift their problem to somebody else, and this is 
unhealthy circumstances.” (TA11).  
Several taxpayers and tax advisors noticed that some officers also had issues with their 
responsibility. They suspected that some officers abused their power to achieve their 
aims. One tax manager felt that the auditor was more untrustworthy than the other 
personnel in the workplace such as the Account Representative (AR). 
There are two different views on this. First, the AR already had 
excellent service in the session of regulation dissemination. They 
invited us, and we had plenty discussions there. On the other hand, 
at the time of the audit, I saw no cooperative attitude; the auditor 
was more like abusing their power. We had to do whatever they 
said. What I want to say is dealing with the auditor is entirely 
different (TM04). 
Another senior advisor shared his experience that sometimes the threat to audit had 
been used by some officers to intimidate taxpayer to follow their intention instead of 
working through a constructive discussion. 
They said, ‘If you do not lodge the revised returns immediately, we 
will audit you, the instruction letter to audit is ready’. The point is 
they were intimidating rather than persuading us into the 
discussion which is more preferable. I can make my client pay taxes 
by that discussion, but instead, sometimes the threat just happened 
(TA04). 
Along with the abuse of power, the less-than-professional behaviour of the auditor 
also led to bias concerning the interpretation of laws and regulations. The tax manager 
of an international bank described his experience when his company was audited. 
“The rules are clear, but they confused us with the intriguing process. Perhaps if the 
rules are unclear, in the grey area, then it would be understandable, but in this case, 
the rules are clear. They just made it up, and they lost our respect eventually because 
they were unfair” (TM08). 
Another tax manager also shared his concern on this matter that the auditors’ 
competence in interpreting laws requires immediate improvement, and he added that 
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the custom of having adjustments made by the auditor, regardless of the effort by the 
taxpayer in following the rules, was somewhat misplaced. “There is no problem with 
their integrity. The problem is lack of professionalism. For example, the auditor must 
produce corrections. So, some corrections were forced to be there; they made it up” 
(TM13). 
Many participants were aware that the lack of professional attitude is likely not 
inherent to the officials’ behaviour but arises from external pressure. Several tax 
advisors and taxpayers pointed out that the revenue target was probably the primary 
cause of the poor professionalism of officials. Tax auditors regarded the revenue target 
that that was imposed on officials as a burden created by misguided policy applied by 
the DGT’s top level management.  
If an auditor was not burdened with the revenue target as an 
indicator of his/her performance, then he could focus on his job 
professionally, following his intellectuality, his knowledgeability 
and that is what distinguishes between the professional auditors 
from the rest (TA06). 
The auditors were not unaware of this target burden. However, it seems that they were 
powerless to refuse the massive pressure from the office that determined their career 
path. As stated by one advisor, “If you were talking with an auditor from the heart, 
s/he will say that it should not happen, but because of the pressure, then s/he just 
shrugged and let you appeal his/her audit” (TA11).  
The short-term interest to meet the revenue target by utilising all possible means to 
achieve the tax authority’s goals created confusion and uncertainty among taxpayers 
and deviated from the real purpose of the audit itself. “Regarding the tax revenue 
target, the tax audit becomes a tool to collect additional money instead of a tool to test 
taxpayer compliance. It is a contradiction; testing compliance means if there is any 
indication of non-compliance then it will be reflected in the Notice of Tax Assessment 
issuance” (TA14).   
Several participants claimed that as a consequence of this pressure, the quality of some 
audit findings was unreliable. The auditors were aware of this situation, but they 
preferred to remain indifferent. “They admitted that they were burdened with those 
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revenue target pressure. Even, when it makes them indifferent as long as their mission 
is completed, they did not care whether it was right or wrong.” (TA13). Some tax 
managers even took some audit findings less seriously.  
In the past, the audit assessment brought us goosebumps because it 
was tough to take responsibility for it in front of the BOD. They 
would ask, ‘Why don’t you mitigate those risks’? However, at the 
moment, although the audit assessment was significant, we were a 
bit relaxed because those corrections were not robust. It means the 
assessment in the past is more qualified (TM06). 
Another tax manager gave the evidence of the low-quality audit findings produced by 
tax auditors. He pointed out that taxpayers had won many cases in the tax court 
concerning the dispute between the taxpayer and the authority because of such 
findings. In addition, the low-quality findings would divert the already limited 
resources of the DGT to pointless battles in the court.   
When the budget target is set too high, then there are excessive 
attempts than it should be in the field, like the unnecessary audit 
findings that happened because the auditor had the pressure to 
meet revenue target. The findings sometimes were quite significant 
in numbers even though most of them ruled out by the tax court. It 
seems that the DGT is not optimal to utilise their resources because 
they spent so much time in the tax court for those invalid 
assessment (TM10). 
In conclusion, the participants believed that the lack of professionalism was due to 
three contributing factors: the abuse of power, a biased interpretation of the law, and 
the pressure of having to meet the revenue target. The combination of these three 
factors was perceived by participants as a critical issue that should be rectified by the 
DGT. 
6.2.1.3 Lack of adequate human resources 
Another issue influencing the effectiveness and efficiency of the DGT is its lack of 
adequate human resources. The term ‘adequate’ in this subsection is related to the 
number of personnel, their overall competence and their management. As asserted by 
Baurer (2005), the imbalance between the organisation’s requirements and the 
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situation of personnel is a classic problem of the tax authority in developing countries.  
Some high-ranking officials recognised that compared to the large businesses’ 
employees, overall, the DGT personnel were considered not only as less competent 
than their counterparts in the private sector, but also lacking in number.  
We lack resources to enforce the law, not only about the quantity 
but also the quality. We are behind in terms of aggressive tax 
planning knowledgeability. Therefore, perhaps we caught the 
perpetrator in the two or three years after the event happened if 
only, we can detect the violation (TO12). 
Moreover, he continued that because of this lack of competence, it was difficult for the 
tax authority to apprehend the actual scale of large business compliance. Another 
official gave an example of a competency that a large taxpayer office should have: the 
skills required for transfer pricing.  
With regards to transfer pricing, unfortunately, our human 
resources are less knowledgeable. Even with much training, still 
many were reluctant to apply it because of its complexities. Transfer 
pricing is not as simple as depreciation calculation or other simple 
accounting transactions. Transfer pricing deals with accounting, 
comparison, and sophisticated analysis. Not everybody wants to do 
it even whenever he has the skills (TO01). 
Regarding the issue of incompetence, some tax auditors posted at the Large Taxpayer 
Office admitted in the interview that they could not detect an attempted violation by 
taxpayers during the course of their work.  “I never find it, and I do not know how to 
handle it because I never find it” (TO09). Another tax auditor gave a similar response 
although his statement did not reflect the typical situation.59 “In case of tax avoidance 
or tax planning, I never find it because those we audit mainly are mining companies in 
this office, the methods like transfer pricing are uncommon” (TO02). 
Another issue of the administration function is the poor human resource management 
even though most of the newly-recruited officials were regarded as the best possible 
                                                          
59
 Many cases show that the practice of transfer pricing abuse is common in the mining industry and 
even a team from The World Bank issued a specific guidance about it. “Transfer Pricing in Mining 
with a Focus on Africa: A Reference Guide for Practitioners.” (2017). 
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resource compared to those in other government agencies. A tax manager who 
previously worked at the DGT gave his opinion of this phenomenon. “The problem is 
the career system management within the DGT although many employees that were 
recruited were initially, really qualified. The current system cannot empower the 
employees to be ready for any future assignment. Moreover, the system fails to ensure 
personnel’s capabilities” (TM07). 
This manager’s statement confirmed Baurer’s (2005) claim that the absence of a 
promotional merit system based on a professional evaluation, and the political 
interference in personnel promotion, robbed several employees of any enthusiasm for 
their work. Further, one official observed that the poor competence of an auditor 
might be caused by the irregular pattern of the auditor rotation system without 
respect to specialisation.  He then compared his colleague’s capability with that of a 
large business’ employee. 
Tax managers mastered their tax matter because it is their 
speciality. It is a different situation with the tax auditor who needs 
to handle various industries. It can be banking this time, mining 
another time, heavy equipment, rental business and so on.  Of 
course, they the tax managers are more knowledgeable because they 
focus on mining business if their business is mining all the time for 
more than ten years or more (TO17). 
To conclude, the findings for the issue of lack of adequate human resources indicate 
that the factors of poor competence, shortage of staff and poor management are three 
most crucial issues when addressing non-compliance. The findings confirmed Baurer’s 
(2005) claim that there was an imbalance between the organisation’s requirements 
and the resources needed to meet them. 
6.2.2 Poor data management 
The issues of a lack of reliable data and an unintegrated information system resulting 
in poor data management60 were significant obstacles identified by tax officials. They 
                                                          
60
 Data management in this subsection means the process whereby data is acquired, validated, stored, 
protected, and processed. Data accessibility, reliability, and timeliness are warranted to satisfy the 
needs of the end users.  
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alleged that the issue of data availability was a crucial factor impeding any 
improvement in taxpayer compliance. As stated by a high-ranking official, poor data 
availability increases the improbability of improving compliance.  
How can the tax authority here in Indonesia manage taxpayers to 
comply? The only way is the data availability. The data issue is one 
of the most substantial problems in our institution. Despite the laws 
stated that every institution out there must share their data to us, to 
the DGT, yet to this day, the process of data transfer from their 
institution to us is not running smoothly (TO16). 
Interviewees suspected that the lack of available and reliable data was due to the 
reluctance of domestic agencies and organisations to share their information; 
moreover, even though the law demands it, no penalties are imposed for this 
reluctance.  Moreover, the tax auditors’s tasks are hampered by lengthy procedures and 
slow-working bureaucracies, as one official expressed in the statement quoted below.  
In Indonesia, we have difficulties in requesting information from 
the bank. The bureaucracy chain is too long. Meanwhile, in India, 
for example, when the tax authority in India issued a tax audit 
notification, then its audit supervisor could directly access taxpayer 
banking information, seised it if necessary and partly paid the tax 
arrears from taxpayer’s account even when the audit process is still 
ongoing (TO11). 
The lack of access to data and the consequences were confirmed by a partner who 
briefly explained that adequate data was required in order for the auditor to conduct a 
thorough audit. He further claimed that the laws need to be revised: “One of the keys 
is to ease the data accessibility by changing the provision of the law” (TA14).  In 
addition, a senior auditor stated that one of the major obstacles regarding data 
availability was posed by banks; he explained further that the rigidity of banking 
secrecy in Indonesia is not new, and that a relaxation of the banking secrecy 
regulations should ease the burden for auditors.  
The most effective way is by tapping the inaccessible data such as 
the banking data for the audit purposes. Once they are opened, it 
saves us many troubles. Data access means transparency, and it 
makes it difficult for taxpayers to hide their suspicious banking 
activities. (TO21) 
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Another senior tax auditor mentioned that the issue of the quality of the data might 
cost the tax office in terms of the correct level of compliance.  
Our problem is the data quality. It is our weakness. As a tax auditor, 
we rely heavily on data and information. To ensure that a taxpayer 
is conducting either tax avoidance or tax evasion, we need to know 
the modus of the action. For example, a company set up an SPV 
(special purpose vehicle) in a tax haven country like the British 
Virgin Island. Then this SPV created transactions with our auditee, 
so there was a potential gain or loss due to this transaction. 
Moreover, we barely knew who the beneficial owner of this SPV is, 
and this is our limitation to find out the real owner because it is 
probable that the related transactions occurred there. However, we 
cannot make sure of it instead of only guessing (TO18).  
The next concern was the current DGT’s information system that was perceived as 
being unable to provide adequate services with respect to improving taxpayer 
compliance. One tax auditor complained that the computer system in his office was 
outdated and could not keep up with other related technological developments. “Some 
taxpayers have implemented a computerised system that is quite sophisticated, in 
contrast with our system that is lagging behind. The challenges in the future are not 
easy, such as the application of the cloud system.” (TO08). Another official admitted 
that the system was unreliable when it came to monitoring taxpayer activities. This 
situation gave taxpayers the opportunity to cheat on their tax with only a minimal risk 
of discovery. The head of a large taxpayer office highlighted that, without a proper 
system and rigid enforcement, better compliance will be out of reach.  
If we want to administer taxpayers thoroughly as requested by the 
laws, then the appropriate system must be established. Then, after 
the system is established, we should seriously enforce the law, 
severely. If the DGT cannot hold the system and the law 
enforcement itself unreliable, then the noncompliance is getting 
larger (TO03). 
The unfavourable situation regarding the DGT’s access to and management of data 
was not unnoticed by some taxpayers. This situation encourages some taxpayers to 
deploy sophisticated, aggressive tax planning schemes because they are confident that 
the DGT will be unable to track down their wrongdoings although there is a 
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mechanism of information exchange (EOI) among tax authorities in various countries 
to handle this issue.  
It is one thing that I am worried to see; some taxpayers remain 
confident that the EOI mechanism cannot run smoothly, so they are 
encouraged to have aggressive tax planning schemes in which even 
their tax advisor cannot explain it or provide satisfactory responses 
for that schemes. It is one significant non-compliance risk (TO20).   
The abovementioned findings indicate that poor data management has dire 
consequences on the effectiveness of the DGT’s response to non-compliance. 
Moreover, the reluctance of other government agencies to share their data, the issue of 
data quality, an unreliable information system and lack of enforcement of rules were 
seen as the major impediments to a more effective data management situation. 
6.2.3 Poor internal coordination 
In managing taxpayer non-compliance, ideally the tax authority should be supported 
by a sound administrative system. However, in most cases, this does not happen in a 
developing country. Hence, a weak administration leads to taxpayers being less 
compliant than is desirable. Many participants pointed out that the internal 
organisation problem prevented the tax authority from having a sound administrative 
system. One notable issue was related to the poor coordination among tax offices. One 
official believed that this coordination problem was a result of the tax authority’s 
broad span of control which led to the many units having diverse perceptions of a 
particular policy. 
There are 331 tax offices around Indonesia from the ones that 
located in remote areas to the central office, and poor coordination 
always been a big problem, it caused uncertainty to taxpayers. If 
every unit had the same perception and committed to supporting 
each other even though it is not in their interest, then the DGT’s 
performance will be improved as well as taxpayers’ compliance 
(TO06). 
Further, one advisor pointed out that the poor coordination among units is possibly 
causing tax office to have difficulties in tracking the actual value of a specific 
transaction by a taxpayer. The reluctance to share specific information among units 
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because of sectoral ego may cost the DGT great deal of its tax revenue. Moreover, this 
type of embezzlement by taxpayer takes time to be uncovered. “The concern now is 
the tax evasion. Suppose it should be paid in ten, yet it is paid in two. It is hard to be 
traced; this is one of the DGT’s weaknesses because of the sectoral ego.” (TA07).  
Therefore, the issue of wide span of control as the result of geographically dispersed 
tax offices across Indonesia and the reluctance to share information were considered 
as two factors that cause the internal coordination problems in the DGT. 
6.3 Managing non-compliance 
Improving compliance by effectively managing non-compliance is one of the primary 
responsibilities of a tax authority. The OECD (2001) suggested that a systematic design 
and an effective compliance strategy should be adopted in order to achieve compliance 
improvement. Subsequently, understanding the causes of non-compliance risks has 
made tax authority not only aware of the exposure but has also enabled it to formulate 
an appropriate approach to managing the risks. Hence, the ability to detect non-
compliance as a preventive measure, and managing non-compliance as a remedial 
measure, is necessary for the tax authority.  
This section discusses the findings related to the current situation regarding the ability 
of the DGT to detect and manage non-compliance. Table 6-2 below summarises the 
number of responses from participants about the related themes. This section will be 
followed by Section 6.4 (Perception on responsive regulation) in which is integral to 
answering the second research question. 
TABLE 6-2 OVERVIEW OF THE DRIVERS OF MANAGING NON-COMPLIANCE AND ITS THEMES 
 
 
 
Drivers Themes 
Managing noncompliance Detecting noncompliance 
Managing noncompliance 
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6.3.1 Detecting noncompliance 
Several participants were pessimistic about the ability of the DGT to detect large 
business’ non-compliance actions. Surprisingly, many of them were DGT personnel 
who were unsure whether they could immediately recognise tax fraud during the 
audit. They pointed out that poor access to reliable information, discussed in Section 
6.2, prevented them from carrying out valid detection. “Currently, the measure for 
detection is not so compelling because we conduct an audit based on the given data by 
taxpayers. Meanwhile, the external party data like the data from other government 
agencies are difficult to obtain” (TO14). 
Another senior auditor complained that the removal of the auditor’s authority to 
collect taxpayer data directly at the taxpayer’s premises made the validity of the data 
provided by the taxpayer somewhat questionable.  
The audit examination required quite a long time to conclude.  It is 
easier in the past because we had the power conducting spot audit 
to collect evidence directly. However, now, we can only ask the 
taxpayer to provide us with the data needed which sometimes we 
doubt the validity of it (TO21). 
A high-ranking official further added that the exchange of information as a 
mechanism to obtain detailed international transaction information is inefficient, 
especially since large businesses frequently conducted activities in tax haven countries. 
The poor internal channelling transmission of data also caused the quality of the 
existing information to be somewhat unreliable. 
When a taxpayer is creating dubious financial engineering to 
maximise their profit by various means such as creating 
international transactions that are beyond our reach, then it is a 
problem. It is a difficult problem because if we want to know their 
motive or schemes, we need to ask cross-border clarification for the 
taxpayer activities. It takes a long time because it is beyond our 
jurisdiction, and it is not easy to obtain such information (TO03).   
Another issue regarding detection is related to the revenue target, which poses the 
problem of a conflict of interests.  A tax advisor, who was independent of the tax 
authority, revealed that, according to her experience, some information would most 
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likely be denied by officials. She stated the possibility that a tax office already knew 
about the fraud yet preferred to ignore it because they did not want to be burdened 
with extra work, and besides, they had already reached their yearly revenue target. “It 
could be that the tax office already knew, but they just overlooked it because they had 
reached their revenue target in that year” (TA06). 
Thus, it can be concluded from the above findings that adequate and reliable 
information, the ineffective mechanism of information exchange, and the revenue 
target were the main factors preventing the DGT from detecting large businesses’ non-
compliance activities. 
6.3.2 Managing non-compliance  
The participants identified that, currently, the DGT managed large business non-
compliance by means of persuasion or by law enforcement61. Persuasion was the soft-
measure, whereas the hard-measure involved audit and investigation. One official 
explained how the DGT handles any non-compliance.  
Well, regarding dealing with taxpayer non-compliance. We as the 
tax authority in Indonesia have multiple steps. The first step is the 
persuasive way, by sending the clarification letter or the reprimand 
letter to taxpayers in case that there was unreported data in their 
return. If they did not follow, then this level can be escalated into a 
tax audit, or if necessary it can turn into the investigation for a tax 
crime (TO16). 
His opinion was confirmed by his superior that there were certain levels of action 
taken to address the fraud, from enquiring into the details of the fraud during a 
counselling session until the final measure was taken – that of investigation. 
Interestingly, this official emphasised the potential money that could be recouped 
rather than the severity of the non-compliance.   
In short, there are two main things that we do. Firstly, we do 
monitoring, and secondly, we do law enforcement. When we 
oversee taxpayers, in the meantime, we also ensure that they follow 
                                                          
61
 It is worth noting that this subsection discusses the current efforts by the DGT as the Indonesian tax 
authority in managing non-compliance that has occurred based on the responses from the participants.  
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the prevailing laws. We assertively give them a reminder or a 
clarification letter when we find something unusual. Secondly, we 
enforced the law according to the industrial sector. Apart from the 
routine audit, we need to conduct a risk analysis to see whether the 
proposed audit is revenue gain potential or not. (TO03) 
In detail, another tax official explained that the DGT acted differently if the non-
compliance was considered to be an instance of tax avoidance or tax evasion. 
However, he argued that the priority of the DGT was to collect the tax money even 
when a misdemeanour had occurred. 
Regarding aggressive tax planning, it is anticipated by clarification 
or examination, by the audit. However, when the violation happens 
in the form of tax evasion then it has become a tax crime, illegal 
conduct, then we will have an investigation, this is the last step to 
send the perpetrator to the jail because our primary goal is 
collecting tax money. Thus, the anticipation measure is clarification 
which could be escalated to the audit, and the last step is the 
investigation. Those are the efforts of the DGT to enforce the law. 
(TO18) 
Contrary to the perception of the DGT’s poor anticipation and detection of non-
compliance, as discussed in Section 6.3.1, one official perceived that his effort in 
monitoring his taxpayer was considered as good enough in his office in the LTO 2 
since every Account Representative (AR) dealt exclusively only with a limited number 
of taxpayers. However, the situation was different in other tax offices.  
I think our supervision is sufficient enough for large taxpayers in 
this office. Each AR is in charge at maximum ten taxpayers. It was a 
different situation when I worked at the Medium Tax Office as one 
AR was responsible for 30 to 50 taxpayers. The more taxpayers that 
need to be monitored then the monitoring quality will decline 
(TO15). 
He then added that even though the team in his office had a risk management 
approach to deal with non-compliance attempts, he preferred to choose a more 
traditional approach, and scrutinise every single taxpayer regardless of whether or not 
the taxpayer was a complier. He did this because of the revenue target.  
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In current situation when the mandate of tax revenue target is so 
enormous, we do not view whether the taxpayer is already 
complying, half-complying or not complying. Every one of them 
who lodges their return received the same treatment. We will 
compare all their reports with our data, so for complying taxpayers, 
we cannot set them aside, because the head office and regional 
office always keep asking about what we have done with those 
taxpayers (TO15). 
One tax auditor revealed that his office had introduced an innovation by purchasing 
an additional companies information from a private company62 to help the auditors 
deal with the transfer pricing issue. “In our office, we need a comparable data as a tool 
for transfer pricing audit effectiveness, and our office provided by buying us [an 
information] database. It is available now, and gives us more access to enquire for data 
comparability” (TO14).  
This is intriguing since the problem of inadequate information was handled separately 
by a single tax office rather than by the DGT as the parent organisation.  This event is 
evidence of the administrative weaknesses discussed in the Section 6.2.3. 
However, despite the inefficiency in managing non-compliance, some advisors 
acknowledged that it was impossible to expect full compliance outcome if the efforts 
were solely the responsibility of the DGT without the assistance of other government 
agencies. He believed that the current mechanism to counter taxpayer non-
compliance to some extent was adequate. “I think their mechanism starting from 
clarification, counselling until the audit is quite useful. Of course, not all of them 
would comply, and the noncompliance itself can be ranged from the little ignorance 
until the real big offender” (TA05). 
One official stated that non-compliance attempts were always made by taxpayers from 
time to time despite the countermeasures taken by the tax authority: “It is hard for us 
to prevent a taxpayer for not trying doing noncompliance breaches. Once we uncover 
their tricks, they always find another way” (TO05).  
                                                          
62
 One example of such provider is Orbis. See https://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb for more information. 
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The abovementioned findings address the second research question: How does the tax 
authority manage large business taxpayers’ compliance risks according to the factors 
identified by addressing the previous research question? According to the interviewees’ 
responses, it can be concluded that the DGT manages the risk of large business 
compliance by sending letters requesting clarification or by conducting counselling 
sessions with taxpayers as part of the taxpayer monitoring program. Next, the law 
enforcement approach is taken if the former approach is unsuccessful, escalating the 
outcome to a tax audit or even tax investigation if a tax crime has occurred. 
6.4 Perception of responsive regulation 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, tax administration in a developing 
country like Indonesia has various constraints that might result in a lower compliance 
outcome. Despite those limitations, ideally, a tax administration is always seeking and 
implementing the best approach to meet its ultimate goals: collecting taxes in 
conjunction with improving taxpayers’ compliance. This implies that a systematic 
design should be adopted by a tax administration to improve taxpayer compliance 
(OECD, 2001). 
The responsive regulation as the alternative approach to improve taxpayer compliance 
has become a new standard for tax administration mainly in developed countries. The 
OECD (2004) and the EC (2006) proposed a compliance risk management strategy 
based on responsive regulation as an approach to tax administration. The main reason 
for this suggestion is to emphasise the importance of understanding taxpayer 
behaviour in order to provide the most efficient and effective type of treatment.   
Therefore, during the interviews, the key participants were asked about responsive 
regulation in order to obtain their opinion of the compliance risk management (CRM) 
approach. One of the critical features of the CRM is that taxpayers are treated 
according to their level of compliance. In this way, the tax authority can mobilise its 
resources and prioritise enforcement when dealing with the most blatant and severe 
cases of non-compliance. This is a more efficient approach in developing countries 
where budget constraints hamper the efficiency of the tax administration (Braithwaite, 
2006).  
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Many participants agreed that responsive regulation might have a positive impact on 
the efforts to improve large business compliance in Indonesia. It seems that the group 
tax manager was the one who was enthusiastic about putting the concept into practice. 
The tax manager of a mining company argued that, indeed, the most compliant 
companies deserved to be rewarded for their efforts to comply with the laws and 
regulations.   
It means that a company who has proper taxation management will 
surely pay attention to the aspect of compliance; comply with the 
rules and no intention of committing any fraud. When a company 
complies, and the tax office recognised it then giving a reward or an 
appreciation, it is fair to them (TM12). 
However, although many tax managers agreed, they appeared to be extra cautious 
about the notion of reward. A manager of an oil company warned that the rewards had 
to be fair, while another manager in the oil and gas industry doubted whether the 
authority had a genuine willingness to give the rewards such as, for example, a tax 
refund.  
Perhaps the idea is correct. However, if the taxpayer made mistakes, 
the tax office will punish taxpayers severely even though the tax 
office gave the rewards like tax refund in advance. It shows the 
unwillingness to give the reward, as the auditor expects to have a 
significant correction when the taxpayer who received that tax 
refund in advance would be audited afterwards (TM06). 
An interesting point made by a tax manager who said that even though he agreed with 
the concept, he emphasised that rewards should be unnecessary since compliance is 
an obligation. Moreover, he agreed that no leniency should be shown to those who are 
defiant. “Compliance must be followed because that is the implication of the law. No 
need for rewards but just honour them with respect and otherwise send the fear 
message to those who are not complying. There is a saying in Japanese tax offices: 
respect among the honest, fear among the dishonest” (TM07).  
Several tax officials were agreed with the concept; however, it seems that they were 
extra careful when stated their mind. A senior auditor concurred with the idea that, “It 
is unwise to have the same treatment for those who comply and those who do not” 
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(TO21). Another tax auditor added that, “There should be criteria that categorise 
taxpayers as compliant taxpayers in order to qualify for the rewards” (TO18). Also, the 
reason for discrimination in the treatment of taxpayers was clearly expressed by the 
head of section: to make the non-compliant become compliant. 
To be specific, we should scrutinise causes of noncompliance. So, if 
there is a taxpayer that does not comply, then he will not 
immediately get a penalty. We need to find out the cause of 
noncompliance, a repeated mistake or a repeated intention for not 
complying. If it is just negligence then no need for a penalty, only 
warning. So, the treatment will be different from the compliant and 
the noncompliant. However, again, we need to be careful in 
scrutinising noncompliance, classifying it and then how to treat it. 
The goal is to make the non-compliant, compliant (TO12).  
However, although they agreed with responsive regulation, some officials pointed out 
that the internal weaknesses of the DGT may potentially hamper the application of 
responsive regulation. “There is a shortcoming from the DGT in detecting if a taxpayer 
was complying or not” (TO11). Another official added that, “No data can ensure 
substantively that a taxpayer does have technical compliance” (TO16).  
Those tax advisors who agreed with the notion of responsive regulation gave various 
reasons for their agreement. For example, one partner emphasised the issue of 
fairness: “I agree, and my concern is about the issue of fairness here, how come a 
compliant taxpayer and those who are outside of the system, are receiving similar 
treatment. That is unfair” (TA01). Another tax advisor pointed out that without 
discrimination in treatment, taxpayers would not be motivated to fulfil their 
obligation (TA03). His opinion was also confirmed by another tax advisor who stated 
that the compliant taxpayer deserved to be treated differently from the non-compliant 
one. 
There is a need for the DGT to differentiate its treatment. When a 
taxpayer complied and paid much money, later s/he will question 
the received benefit. Therefore, a particular treatment should be 
provided in the form of services or facilities. Otherwise, s/he will 
think that it is useless to pay so much if the treatment is similar for 
all (TA07). 
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Some participants were somewhat sceptical about the concept. One of the main 
reasons was their perception of tax as an obligatory duty to the nation which did not 
warrant a reward. For instance, one official expressed her views about the concept of 
equal or different treatment. “It should be equal treatment. So, either taxpayer who 
comply or do not comply, they are equal” (TO13). Another official added that complier 
reward was unnecessary.  
Tax is an obligation. Thus, taxpayers must comply with what has 
been set without any promise of rewards. The consequence of 
breaking the obligation is receiving punishment. They know the 
consequences if, for example, they are late to pay or late to report 
and we also have explained that they can be punished if violating 
the laws (TO07). 
However, despite those who disagreed with the notion of responsive regulation, many 
who concurred with the idea also emphasised that the precondition requirements 
should be met by the DGT before adopting it in practical policy. Some issues needed 
to be addressed before applying the policy. A tax manager pointed out the importance 
of correctly measuring technical compliance.  
Measuring technical compliance is somewhat tricky. It cannot be 
determined by the amount of tax payment only. The measurement 
should be precise and could be quantified. It is better not to apply 
responsive regulation if the measurement is still unclear (TM01). 
The issue of measurement criteria was also raised by another manager who pointed 
out that risk-based management could be a way out for the DGT when deciding their 
separate treatments. “The rating for tax compliance should be created. Who has the 
lowest risk could receive the rewards, and the DGT needs to be more focused on 
transactions with high impact on the revenue” (TM10). This manager’s opinion was in 
line with the opinion of a high-ranking official that sorting taxpayers according to 
their compliance can only be done with a reliable system. “The point is we need to 
have a robust system to oversee taxpayers along with vigorous law enforcement in 
which those two will direct taxpayers; then we can sort them into very compliant, 
middle compliant and low compliant taxpayers” (TO03). 
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Besides the criteria and the system that need to be established to categorise taxpayers, 
some participants also highlighted the importance of the DGT reviewing its policy on 
the rewards and punishment scheme. A senior tax advisor stated that an optimal 
combination of the rewards and punishment is needed instead of focusing only on the 
penalty because, to earn taxpayer trust, it was vital to stress the aspect of fairness.  
There is an approach of stick-and-carrot, and an optimal 
combination between the stick and the carrot should be formulated 
beforehand. Currently, the penalty is already quite a lot, from the 
fines until prosecution, but not the carrot. In the past, there was 
special treatment for the golden taxpayers so that they could receive 
a tax refund in advance, but currently, it does not happen anymore; 
even when there is one then the terms are made to be complicated 
(TA14). 
Another tax advisor emphasised that to earn taxpayer trust, it was essential to create 
an atmosphere that was conducive to voluntary compliance. She gave an example that 
the regulations that discourage taxpayer’s motivation for self-compliance such as 
making a self-correction should be adjusted accordingly. 
The law needs to be changed. An example is the customs duty. 
When an importer wants to make a self-correction to the imported 
goods, the penalty could be up to 1000 percent. Consequently, they 
prefer to ignore self-correction than confessing that they made 
mistakes with the expectation that they will not be caught. In terms 
of an audit, the penalty for an audit is 48 percent, meanwhile, for a 
self-correction; the penalty could be up to 150 percent. So that there 
is no need to make a self-correction, it is better to wait for an audit 
if they get audited. Therefore, many taxpayers prefer to ignore self-
correction although they knew it is wrong (TA08). 
Meanwhile, it needs to be reiterated that the DGT has applied some responsive 
regulation in practice for administrative compliance although several managers and 
advisors questioned the consistency of its application. “The law states that a taxpayer 
who met requirements could have tax refund in advance, but it did not run well. The 
DGT itself is who reluctant to apply it even though the law regulates it. The DGT is not 
ready; perhaps the first step is fixing the problem in the DGT” (TA12). 
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The issue of consistency in the application was also highlighted by a tax manager who 
perceived that somehow the DGT’s policy was established in the interests of its leader 
rather instead with respect to the mandate of the law. “The issue is in the application, 
its consistency to assure the taxpayer of the benefit as a compliant taxpayer because 
currently it is not guaranteed that taxpayer will receive the benefits that they once had 
received since the changes in the DGT’s top leader means the policy changes as well” 
(TM02). 
Another tax advisor also questioned the seriousness of the institution in respecting the 
rights of the taxpayer because, due to the revenue target, it seems that the DGT 
repeatedly made it difficult for a taxpayer to claim his rights, reducing the taxpayers’ 
willingness to comply, and subsequently leading to a lack of trust. 
If a taxpayer complies then when he claims his rights, please process 
it smoothly. This service will make them comply. I have a client who 
had difficulties in claiming his rights-his tax refund, although he 
had met the requirements. Although the regulation remains 
unchanged but in practice, it was not smoothly executed; they made 
it more complicated because of the revenue target (TA03). 
A senior partner also restated the importance of protecting the rights of the taxpayer. 
Given the uncertainty and the pressure of the revenue target, the ‘honest’ taxpayers 
rather than those who are ‘dishonest ’can become the victims. “The honest taxpayers 
are confused where to ask and complain because the tax supervisory committee is not 
effectively running. They are afraid if they spoke any louder, then they would have 
harder repression. There is nobody who can protect the taxpayers’ rights” (TA04). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that many participants agreed that if the concept of 
responsive regulation is to be applied, several problems need to be resolved by the 
DGT before the program is implemented. The issue of fairness regarding reward and 
punishment, the problem of consistency in application, and the need for a reliable 
rating system to measure compliance correctly are some of the vital issues that should 
be rectified by the tax authority.  
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6.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter explains and discusses findings regarding the causes of the DGT’s current 
situation and its related themes, thereby addressing the second research question: 
How does the tax authority manage large business taxpayers’ compliance risks according 
to the factors identified by addressing the previous research question? The findings in 
this chapter demonstrate that the DGT manages the issue of non-compliance by two 
means of approaches: persuasion and law enforcement whereby the handling of the 
problem is carried out in stages.  
The findings in this chapter also indicate that three fundamental factors prevent the 
DGT from effectively managing non-compliance: human resources problem, lack of 
access to data and inherent administrative weaknesses. Firstly, the human resource 
problem includes the issue of integrity and corruption. However, the overall integrity 
of tax officials is improving, and the level of corruption is not as severe, although many 
participants believed that the lelvel of professionalism has declined. The interviewees 
believed that the lack of professionalism could be attributed to the abuse of power, the 
biased intepretation of the law, and the pressure of having to meet the revenue target. 
The issues of incompetence and staff shortages also exacerbated the human resources 
problem. Secondly, the findings show that lack of access to adequate and reliable data 
prevented optimal compliance, as did the poor enforcement of regulations and lack of 
cooperation among other government agencies. Thirdly, the administrative 
weaknesses were caused by poor coordination, the unreliable information system and 
poor human resource management. Also, several participants believed that the 
inaccessibility of data prevented the DGT from detecting taxpayer non-compliance. 
Furthermore, the concept of responsive regulation with the incorporation of 
compliance risk management as the alternative approach to enhance taxpayer 
compliance is regarded as feasible by many participants. However, the DGT should 
address some of precondition requirements before launching the program; these 
include the issue of fairness, the problem of consistency and the implementation of a 
reliable rating system to measure accurately the level of compliance.   
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CHAPTER 7  
DISCUSSION 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters discussed the results of the qualitative analysis relevant to 
the research questions of this thesis. This chapter elaborates upon these results that 
emerged from the collected data and its policy implications. In detail, this chapter 
analyses and discusses the findings presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 that are 
centred on five themes: (1) corporate factors; (2) regulation factors; (3) The DGT’s 
current capacity to respond; (4) managing non-compliance, and (5) perceptions of 
responsive regulation. 
7.2 Corporate factors 
This section discusses findings regarding corporate factors. Three specific findings and 
their components will be discussed in this section: (1) economic factors that consist of 
cost-benefit-driven decisions, compensation of manager, detection probability and 
penalties, risk appetite, and uncertainty, (2) socio-psychological aspects which consist 
of personal norms, social norms and fairness and trust, (3) corporate characteristics 
that consist of tax risk management, ownership structure and business size, business 
profitability and the use of tax advisors. The findings of this thesis regarding the 
regulation factor are discussed and compared with those in the research literature.63 
7.2.1 Economic factors 
The findings indicate that regarding economic factors, participants considered that 
there were five significant related issues, namely: (1) cost-benefit-driven decisions, (2) 
compensation of manager, (3) probability of detection and penalty, (4) risk appetite 
and (5) uncertainty.64 This is consistent with past research where the taxpayer was 
assumed to be a rational creature whose decision to comply is influenced by cost-
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 The OECD (2004, p.40) shows that the factors influencing the compliance behaviour of business 
could be categorised into five main factors, namely: business profile, industry, sociological, economic 
and psychological factors.   
64
 Recall Section 5.2.1 for detail. 
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benefit considerations (Becker, 1967; Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974). 
Taxpayers choose to comply after calculating whether they will be financially better off 
by taking such action regarding their tax liabilities.  The other variables such as the 
probability of detection and penalty are consistent with past research (Alm & McKee, 
1992; Li, 2010; Torgler, 2007). For instance, the magnitude of a possible penalty affects 
the taxpayer’s decision to either comply or not comply with tax requirements. 
Interestingly, none of the participants mentioned that the tax rate is a factor that 
influences compliance, although some literature has stated otherwise (Loo, 2006; 
Torgler, 2007; Li, 2010). For example, Downs and Stetson (2014) argued that taxpayers 
are more willing to be non-compliant in a situation where the increase in tax rate 
means that the evasion of tax is more profitable. Quite possibly, participants did not 
consider the tax rate factor as influencing tax compliance or otherwise, since the 
Indonesian statutory tax rate is among the lowest among the other members of G20. 65 
A detailed discussion of the economic factors is presented below in subsections 7.2.1.1 
to 7.2.1.5. 
7.2.1.1 Cost-benefit driven decisions 
The participants view large business as a rational economic animal, the actions of 
which are always determined by the cost-benefit factor as shown by the findings in 
subsection 5.2.1.1. Hence, this factor is significant particularly in terms of the way in 
which a large business conducts its tax planning, regardless of whether the strategy is 
likely to attract the attention of the tax authority. The findings are supported by the 
literature suggesting that the taxpayer is a logical entity that seeks to maximise its 
utility (Becker, 1967; Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974; Kinsley, 1992). One 
consideration that determines cost-benefit-driven decisions is the cost of compliance, 
since an increase in this cost may potentially affect a corporation’s compliance. 
Although, in Indonesia, the cost of corporate tax compliance is comparatively low 
(Susila & Pope, 2013). However, in the current situation where many large businesses 
conduct their activities on a global scale, the tax authority may tighten its grip in order 
to protect its own interests as well as curb non-compliance, as the burden of 
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 Currently, the statutory corporate income tax rate in Indonesia is 25 percent and it is expected to 
decrease to 18 percent in 2020 (Devereux et al., 2016).   
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compliance cost would be higher66. To some extent, this would increase the risk of 
non-compliance by large business and could lead to more aggressive tax planning 
schemes.   
7.2.1.2 Compensation of manager 
The findings in relation of compensation of manager show that for the tax manager 
group of participants, the issue of manager’s compensation was considered as 
somewhat unrelated to performance in terms of the business’ profitability.67 The 
reason given for this was that in a large business, the tax department is seen to play a 
non-critical role, merely supporting the administration. Moreover, in Indonesia a pre-
calculated bonus offered to a manager the previous year (presumably for cost-saving) 
is not a factor that significantly influences compliance. This finding is somewhat 
inconsistent with the claim that compensation-based packages are strongly related 
with tax avoidance (Taylor & Richardson, 2014; Crocker & Slemrod, 2005). Taylor and 
Richardson (2014), for example, in their empirical research of the dataset of 200 listed 
Australian companies from 2006 to 2010, found that the expertise of the executive, the 
bonus-based performance and the international status of the company are three 
factors that influence non-compliance. Arguably, these three factors encourage tax 
managers to seek ways to lower their effective tax rates, thereby increasing the risk of 
non-compliance (Phillips, 2003; Rego & Wilson, 2012; Powers, Robinson, & Stomberg, 
2013). However, it is worth noting that a corporation’s formulation and calculation of 
compensation could become a determining factor that affects compliance. Further, it is 
important to consider that the corporate culture in Indonesia and other developing 
countries may be quite different from that in developed countries. Moreover, the 
findings presented in this subsection provide new insights on the factor of manager 
compensation as a significant determinant of non-compliance. However, the finding 
should be taken cautiously as there are many factors that may affect the accuracy of 
the participants’ answers in relation to this sensitive issue. Hence, a further 
investigation may be needed to ensure the validity of the mentioned finding.   
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 The study of Susila & Pope did not include the latest development regarding how the tax compliance 
cost was measured. See Evans et al., (2016) whose study suggests that three broad drivers of tax 
compliance costs are perceived by taxpayers: the complexity and uncertainty of tax rules, the 
administrative compliance requirements imposed by tax authorities, and international exposure. 
67
 Recall subsection 5.2.1.2 for detail. 
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7.2.1.3 Detection probabilities and penalty 
The related findings indicate that the severity of the audit results made taxpayers 
aware of their compliance status. First, the penalties imposed as a result of their 
ignorance made some post-audited companies change their attitude and make some 
improvements concerning compliance 68 . This is consistent with past research 
suggesting that the rigour of assessment during the audit may influence the taxpayer’s 
compliance level (Strumpel, 1969) and the audit as a deterrence tool would influence 
taxpayer compliance (Dubin et al., 1990; Alm et al., 2012).  
Secondly, it was also found that not every penalty has an equally effective deterrent 
effect, and taxpayers tended to ignore the penalty if they perceived it to be relatively 
harmless to the company. The penalty for late lodgement of the VAT return or the 
income tax return, for example, was regarded as inconsequential for many taxpayers 
and they tended to ignore it in regard to the lateness, although it would affect their 
compliance on the criteria of filing a tax return. This finding regarding the 
ineffectiveness of a penalty is consistent with past research which indicated that the 
severity of a penalty would affect compliance (Beck & Jung; 1989; Kirchler et al., 2014). 
Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that a severe penalty may be a deterrent and, 
moreover, penalties imposed on the tax managers would be more effective in reducing 
tax evasion than those imposed on the business (Crocker & Slemrod, 2005).  
Finally, it was found that there was a low probability that a taxpayer would be audited. 
This encouraged taxpayers with a greater propensity for risk-taking to be non-
compliant because they knew that the probability of being caught and audited was 
small. Moreover, it is a fact that the DGT’s overall audit productivity has been low. For 
instance, in 2004 there were more than 40.000 unfinished audit cases and 
approximately of 65 percent of audits were tax refund audits (Rizal, 2011), suggesting 
that resources should be allocated to field audits and more productive cases (Le 
Borgne et al., 2008). Furthermore, the DGT in the past has had a limited number of tax 
auditors, accounting for only around seven percent of total staff, far below the 
international benchmark 30 percent of the total staff required for revenue 
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 Recall Sub-section 5.2.1.3 for more detail. 
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administration (Gallagher, 2005). The finding regarding the low probability of 
detection is consistent with the findings of Chen and Chu (2005) and Morse et al. 
(2009) who found that a taxpayer might consider tax evasion if there was only a small 
risk of detection.   
7.2.1.4 Risk appetite 
The findings indicate that the factor related to business size and its closeness to 
someone influential might affect the risk appetite level.69 Moreover, it was also found 
that the risk appetite was lower if the company kept its distance from a government 
official. These findings are consistent with those of Skinner and Slemrod (1985) that 
taxpayers can have different risk appetite, which in this case was influenced by the 
size of the business, and subsequently, minor changes in risk appetite may have a 
profound effect on the compliance.  
The COSO (2011) supported this view by stating that many large businesses have a 
formalised risk appetite as part of their risk management strategy. Having a 
formalised risk appetite measure implies that the compliance of a business is likely to 
become non-compliance in an attempt to minimise its tax inefficiencies. As argued by 
Deloitte (2008, p.10), “tax inefficiencies or missed opportunities [are] resulting from 
low-risk appetite.”  
Further, regarding risk appetite, the role of the business owner is crucial since the risk 
acceptance level is affected at least by two factors: his/her share of ownership in the 
business and an internal personal factor such as the unwillingness to be in conflict 
with the tax authority (Blakelock & Whitney, 2015). On the other hand, the business 
owner may be willing to take more risks if s/he has a close relationship with one or 
more high-ranking officials in the country. Moreover, the reputation factor may also 
influence the attitude of large business toward compliance and may decrease their 
level of risk appetite. 
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7.2.1.5 Uncertainty 
The findings related to the factor of uncertainty show that uncertainty occurs because 
of the issue of having a correct interpretation of the law and because there is 
inconsistency and lack of standardization in the way that officers in different areas 
treat similar issues.70 This finding is aligned with that of the empirical research 
conducted by Casey and Scholz (1991) and Taylor and Richardson (2013): that 
uncertainty affects compliance since the taxpayers are unlikely to have full knowledge 
of the interpretation of the law and, as a result, this situation of uncertainty would 
affect compliance behaviour. This implies that taxpayers maintain a favourable tax 
position based on their understanding of the law, and they wait for an investigation by 
the tax authority even though they know either consciously or subconsciously that 
their precarious tax position is likely to be challenged. Secondly, the non-standardised 
treatment given to taxpayers by tax officials across the region for a similar issue makes 
the taxpayers uncertain about the correct tax position. As shown by the finding in this 
subsection, this occurs because of the lack of professionalism of tax officers when 
managing particular issues, it most likely occurs because of the pressure of meeting a 
revenue target.  
7.3.2 Socio-psychological aspects 
This section discusses the non-economic factors that affect corporate tax compliance. 
The factors discussed are personal norms, social norms, fairness, and trust in 
government. As a fictitious entity, the behaviour of a corporation is most likely 
influenced by the attitude of its managers. Hence, the compliance of a company is 
decided by their managers (Joulfaian, 2000; Koester et al., 2013; Olsen & Stakelberg, 
2015). Each manager brings his/her personal norms and social norms to the 
corporation and the combination of these sets the tone of corporate compliance. 
Further, since a corporation is an organisation comprised of people, it is worth noting 
that of the interaction among managers would determine the behaviour of the 
corporation (Ariel, 2012). Therefore, the managers’ personal norms, social norms, sense 
of fairness, and trust in government are individual characteristics that will drive the 
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behaviour of their corporation (Chyz, 2013; Chyz et al., 2014; Law & Mills, 2017; Olsen & 
Stekelberg, 2015; Koester et al., 2014; Gaertner, 2014). 
7.3.2.1 Individual - personal norms and social norms 
The findings indicate that the personal attitude of managers influence how the 
corporation will comply.71 The personal attitudes resulting from thoughts, customs, 
beliefs and nationality were regarded by participants as the factors that shaped the 
manager’s norms. This is consistent with the study of Law and Mills (2017) which 
found that one of the critical determinants of corporate tax behaviour is personal 
norms. Further, Bobek et al., (2007) showed in their empirical research that one of two 
significant factors that influence tax compliance in Australia, the USA and Singapore 
was the taxpayers’ attitudes. Some researchers also found that cultural differences 
affected their tax morale (Torgler, 2007; Bobek et al., 2013; Blanthorne & Kaplan, 2008; 
Wenzel, 2005). Also, Traxler (2010) argued that the attitude of one individual can be 
affected by others, so it was an interdependent situation. Further, personal norms and 
social norms were intertwined with values derived from ethnicity or country, and they 
were affecting compliance in a complicated way (Bobek et al., 2013). The arguments of 
Traxler (2010) and Bobek et al. (2013) are consistent with the finding in this thesis that 
the attitude of the individual towards taxes was influenced by his/her colleagues who 
shared similar nationalities; consequently, different nationalities may have different 
opinions about tax compliance. Surprisingly, many participants believed that local 
companies were less compliant that overseas companies.  This confirms what Wenzel 
(2005) noted: that ethics and social norms affect tax compliance.  
7.3.2.2 Corporate norms - reputation 
The findings in relation of corporate reputation demonstrate that reputation is a 
fundamental element of a large business that needs to be maintained.72 It is consistent 
with the result of some empirical research that the large multinationals ought to 
maintain their reputation (Cooper, 1994; Oats & Tuck, 2008; Toumi, 2009; Mulligan & 
                                                          
71
 Recall Sub-section 5.2.2.1 for more detail regarding the findings of individual- personal and social 
norms. 
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 Recall Sub-section 5.2.2.2 for more detail regarding the findings that related to corporate social 
norms- reputation. 
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Oats, 2009). For example, a firm’s stock value could decrease if its non-compliance is 
made public with the revelation of unethical conduct of non-compliance such as 
engaging tax shelters (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009). Moreover, some managers believe 
that by maintaining a good reputation, they are perceived as acting in the interests of 
shareholders (Erle, 2008). Graham et al. (2013) argued that reputation is a deciding 
factor for managers when implementing a tax planning strategy, since failure would 
incur the cost of a loss of reputation for the firms. Hence, reputational cost is 
frequently suggested as a crucial factor that limits the deliberation of tax avoidance 
(Gallemore et al., 2014). Lavermicocca (2011) found that there was a consensus among 
large businesses that non-compliant tax behaviour will negatively impact on their 
reputation. 
Another finding in this subsection indicates that large businesses feared that their 
reputation would be damaged if their misconduct were exposed to the public. This 
finding is consistent with Williams (2007) and Erle (2008) who pointed out that 
corporate reputation was at stake due to an ethical issue if corporate compliance came 
under public scrutiny or became the subject of legal action. Further, Ford (2005) 
claimed that large businesses have more to fear than do the individuals regarding 
reputational cost. One interview participant (TA04) mentioned that the mechanism of 
naming and shaming was effective as a deterrent for a corporation as its staff would be 
more mindful of their conduct. Hence, the effect of reputation damage is much more 
pronounced for a corporation for which reputation is a significant asset, than it is for 
the individual (Ford, 2005). 
Interestingly, participants expressed disparate opinions regarding the issue of 
reputation and the business profitability. Some tax managers highlighted that the 
importance of reputation was more important than business profitability. However, 
several other managers stated otherwise. It is worth noting that the issue here is how 
to strike a balance between a reduced tax burden and reputational costs.  Loretz and 
Moore (2013) argued that managers should balance the benefits of a tax savings scheme 
against the loss of reputational costs. Further, there would be pressure from the 
respective industry if these managers attempted to deviate too much from what their 
peers did in relation to their tax planning. Therefore, although large businesses are 
expected to be effective in optimising their tax affairs, the interdependence among 
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peers would constrain their tax planning because of the reputational costs. However, it 
is also worth noting that the manager’s attitude toward the reputation risks would 
determine the tax planning approach. Therefore, a more risk-taking manager may seek 
tax savings more aggressively at the expense of reputational costs (Lavermicocca, 
2009). 
7.3.2.3 Fairness and trust in government 
The findings indicate that the factor of fairness and trust in government influence 
large businesses’ compliance.73 Several tax researchers have demonstrated that the 
anticipation of being mistreated by the tax authority had an adverse influence on 
compliance (Slemrod, 1992; Wenzel, 2002; Murphy 2004b; Slemrod, 2007; Schweitzer & 
Gibson, 2008). Although past research has predominantly focused on the individual 
taxpayer, the insights of the results are arguably applicable to corporate tax 
compliance since the corporation is an entity that comprises individuals, and the 
behaviour of people within a corporation affects corporate compliance. Also, there are 
several fairness considerations74 that may affect corporate tax compliance if it were 
conducted properly. Hence, taxpayers are more inclined to comply with tax rules when 
they perceive that the tax system is fair (Slemrod, 2007; Schweitzer & Gibson, 2008). 
The findings of subsection 5.2.2.3 also show that the factor of lack of trust applies not 
only to the tax authority as the tax collector, but also refers to lack of trust in the 
government. This is consistent with past research (Torgler, 2003; Torgler, 2008; Alm et 
al., 2006; Kirchler et al., 2008; Bird, 2008; Cheema, 2010) which found that, in general, 
the level of trust in the government and its officials affects the level of compliance. The 
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 Recall Sub-section 5.2.2.3 for more information regarding the findings related to fairness and trust in 
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 Several fairness aspects have been found important for tax compliance. They are: 
(1) Distributive justice: the feeling that society does not have sufficient allocation of goods 
compared to the tax that one must pay (Wenzel, 2002; Verboon & Van Dijke, 2007). 
(2) Retributive justice: the perception that tax authority imposes the appropriate sanctions in the 
case of rules-breaking (Wenzel, 2002; Walsh, 2012). 
(3) Procedural justice: the perceived fairness that refers to the fairness of the procedures and 
treatment receives from the authority (Wenzel, 2002; Murphy et al. 2009). 
(4) Horizontal equity: refers to the equal treatment of a taxpayer relative to other taxpayers in a 
similar circumstance (Goetz, 1978; Kinsey & Grasmick, 1993). 
(5) Vertical equity: refers to the fairness of the burden of taxes for certain social strata relative to 
other strata (Kinsey & Grasmick, 1993; Wenzel, 2002). 
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trust between the taxpayer and the government not only shapes a sound tax system 
(Bird, 2008), but also influences the taxpayer’s willingness to pay taxes (Alm et al., 
2006). Further, taxpayers view this relationship as a form of exchange since this 
relationship between government and the taxpayers is such dynamic interaction which 
means an increase in trust may cause an increase of perceived power and 
consequently, an inclination to comply. Moreover, the changes in the level of trust 
might influence the legitimacy of the government in collecting taxes (Turner, 2005) 
and as a result, a low trust in the government and tax authority increases the level of 
tax evasion (Richardson, 2008; Kirchler et al., 2008). 
7.3.3 Corporate characteristics 
7.3.3.1 Tax risk management 
The findings indicate that many participants agreed that a robust internal control or 
an established tax risk management strategy played a vital role in ensuring 
compliance, although it was found that many large businesses in Indonesia did not 
support an adequate and firm internal control of tax-related matters in their 
business.75 This is consistent with the assertion made by Chen and Chu (2005) that a 
business with a robust internal control tended to have lower corporate tax evasion. 
Moreover, tax compliance in a large business could depend on internal control and the 
strength of employees’ collaboration since not all tax decisions are made by those who 
are responsible (van Dijk & Siglé, 2016). Secondly, despite the surprising finding that 
many large businesses in Indonesia did not establish a sound tax risk management 
system, this phenomenon occurred in other countries as well. Segal, Segal and Maroun 
(2017) found that several large businesses in South Africa had knowledge of the sound 
tax risk management practices, but they were not correctly implementing these 
practices in their business. Further, a survey by KPMG in 2007 found that 31 percent of 
the tax manager respondents in the US did not consider that tax risk management was 
a top priority strategy, while 60 percent of them responded that they did not have a 
documented tax risk management strategy (Lavermicocca, 2012). In Australia, 
Lavermicocca (2011) found that although her participants were aware that tax risk 
management (TRM) was an emerging issue and that the ATO had stated the 
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importance of a tax risk management arrangement, only half of them had a formalised 
and documented TRM system.  
The findings presented in this subsection also indicate that the factor of cost-benefit 
consideration contributed to the low priority given to establishing a robust internal tax 
control strategy in the company. This aligns with the findings of Erle (2008): that many 
companies still viewed tax as being only a cost factor, and that managers on behalf of 
shareholders must minimise the cost although at some point a relative balance is 
needed between the level of accepted risks and the level of aggressive tax planning. As 
part of the corporate governance system, the role of tax risk management has become 
much more important these days with the tightening of regulations especially those 
with a strong focus on reliable internal control. The short-term vision of management 
who think that tax is only a cost factor needs to shift to a longer-term perspective, by 
adding the value of the company’s sustainability by maintaining its reputation and at 
the same time, strategically minimising the effective tax rate. As a result, annual 
reports will reflect the quality of management and the public will later evaluate this 
quality. Otherwise, the failure of management to identify significant tax risks and its 
failure to develop an appropriate strategy to anticipate and deal with potential 
problems may cost the company more than tax payment.  
7.3.3.2 Ownership structure and business size 
The findings in relation with the factor of ownership structure and business size show 
that the listed companies were perceived by participants as having better tax 
compliance than do the non-listed companies.76 This finding is consistent with past 
research which found that the ownership structure to some extent influences 
corporate tax compliance (Hanlon et al., 2005; Desai & Dhamapala, 2006; Slemrod, 
2007; Chen et al., 2010; McGuire et al., 2012; Badertscher et al., 2013). The empirical 
research by Hanlon et al. (2005) in the United States indicated that there was a 
relationship between corporation characteristics and non-compliance. Moreover, tax 
non-compliance was influenced by the company status as either a multinational or a 
domestic company, and whether it was a publicly listed company. In numerical terms, 
Slemrod (2007) showed that on average, in the United States, the non-listed 
                                                          
76
 Recall Sub-section 5.2.3.2 for more detail regarding the findings. 
179 
 
 
companies had deficiency rates of 17.1 percent compared with 12.5 percent for listed 
companies. This is consistent with Cloyd (1995) and Cloyd et al. (1996) who claimed 
that the factor of lacking incentives for less-constrained financial reporting made the 
non-listed companies more tax aggressive. Therefore, as asserted by Hanlon et al. 
(2005), the non-listed company could be associated with potentially higher risks of 
non-compliance because of lacking the incentive to report its financial status publicly.  
Second, the findings indicate that the industrial sector to which a particular company 
belongs is another factor that does influence non-compliance. This supports past 
research demonstrating that, in the United States, there is a relationship between a 
certain industrial sector and its non-compliance rates (Hanlon et al., 2005). Giles 
(2000, p.264) stated that “there is a significant variation in the probabilities of 
compliance avoidance and evasion across different industrial sectors of the economy” 
after he examined the cases audited in New Zealand from 1993 to 1995. Further, Sapici 
et al. (2014) support the argument that there is a relationship between the business 
sectors and corporate taxpayer non-compliance in Malaysia. However, the findings of 
the relationship between non-compliance and the industrial sector should be treated 
with caution since there is no consensus in past research about the type of industry 
that is riskier than others. Moreover, although several other factors influence corporate 
compliance and may be more significant than the industry-type factor, it is worth 
noting that the IMF recommends that the industrial sector is a factor to be considered 
when identifying risks and establishing a compliance-risk-recognition system for a tax 
administration (Russel, 2010). In addition, the findings presented in this subsection 
demonstrate that the banking sector has better compliance than the mining sector, 
providing new insights and warranting further research.77 
Last, the findings in this subsection show that the multinational corporation that 
utilises tax havens was perceived to have a higher level of non-compliance. This 
supports past research indicating that the factors of multi-nationality and tax haven 
utilisation are significantly associated with corporate tax non-compliance (Slemrod, 
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2001; Rego, 2003; Beuselinck et al., 2005; Hanlon et al, 2005; Desai et al., 2006; Dyreng 
et al., 2008; Lisowsky, 2010; Taylor and Richardson, 2012). The multinational 
companies use global tax planning schemes to minimise their effective tax rates and 
frequently take full advantage of the low tax rate jurisdictions (Slemrod, 2001). Rego 
(2003) supports this claim by showing that the multinational corporations in the 
United States have more ability to avoid taxes than the domestic-only corporations, 
providing evidence that the US multinational corporations have lower worldwide 
effective tax rates. Hanlon et al. (2005) claim that foreign-controlled firms have more 
than double the tax avoidance activities of the domestic-controlled firms. Moreover, a 
tax haven is frequently utilised to reallocate the domestic taxable income and to 
minimise a foreign-source income with the final objective of reducing the tax paid at 
the domestic level (Desai et al., 2006). Moreover, Lisowsky (2010) shows that the 
likelihood of a company using a tax haven is positively related to the presence of its 
subsidiaries at the tax haven location. Therefore, it is worth highlighting that the 
manipulation of transfer pricing transactions by a multinational corporation that owns 
subsidiaries in tax haven countries signifies the intention to avoid taxes either legally 
or illegally, and this factor is very likely to be red-flagged by the tax authority.  
7.3.3.3 Business profitability 
The findings described in subsection 5.2.3.3 indicate that the factor of financial 
constraints faced by a large business affects its corporate compliance. This supports 
the past research finding that the company with financial constraints tends to have 
lower effective tax rates (Edward et al., 2016; Law & Mills, 2015; Dyreng & Markle, 2016; 
Akamah et al., 2016). Edward et al. (2016) argued that due to financial constraints, 
managers tend to focus more on generating additional cash flows, and are less 
concerned about reporting their current earnings. Further, a more aggressive tax 
planning is applied by utilising deferred-based strategies to increase tax savings. Law 
and Mills (2015) indicated that financially constrained companies are using more 
negative words in their financial reports and they reported higher unrecognised tax 
benefits while utilising more tax haven operations with the objective of having lower 
effective tax rates. Dyreng and Markle (2016) found that in the US, financially 
constrained multinationals shifted less income to their affiliated companies overseas 
than did their unconstrained peers. Therefore, there is a positive association between 
181 
 
 
the current financial constraints and the more laborious attempts to pursue tax 
aggressiveness (Akamah et al., 2016). It was also found that this positive association 
becomes insignificant if the management has corporate general counsel in their 
organisation structure and has a debt-based bonus system. Further, the financial 
constraints may come as the result of corporate financial hardships or global financial 
distress, both of which influence corporate tax compliance (Richardson, Taylor & 
Lanis, 2015). It is worth noting that, to date, the study of financial constraints as a 
factor that affects compliance is still limited in the area of tax compliance; hence, the 
findings of this subsection that: (1) the level of non-compliance is escalated when a 
company facing a crisis utilises more tax aggressiveness to increase tax savings, and (2) 
maintaining operations becomes the management’s priority rather than fulfilling the 
obligation to the government, provide additional insights in the research of financial 
constraints as the influencing factor of corporate tax compliance in developing 
countries.  
7.3.3.4 Use of a tax advisor 
The findings indicate that the use of an external tax advisor may have either a positive 
or a negative effect on corporate tax compliance.78 This is consistent with past research 
findings that a tax advisor may help taxpayers to exploit any ambiguities in the law or 
alternatively encourage taxpayers to fully obey the law by avoiding reporting positions 
that are likely to be challenged by the authorities (Klepper & Nagin, 1989; Spilker et al. 
1999; Tan, 2011; Wurth & Braithwaite, 2016). In the case of Indonesia, Susila & Pope 
(2012) state that tax advisors are used by the large businesses because the policy of 
using an external advisor comes from the taxpayers’ headquarters (52.47%) and, 
secondly, corporations rely on tax advisor services mostly at the time of tax audits, tax 
objections and tax appeals. of the researchers reported that the retail and wholesale 
trading sectors are those that tend to use the tax advisor services compared to other 
sectors. Moreover, the company’s maturity level has a negative correlation with the use 
of a tax advisor.  
Regarding the exploitation of ambiguities in the law, a study conducted by Spilker et 
al. (1999) provided evidence that the external tax practitioners exploit specific tax rules 
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to achieve client-preferred results in planning decision contexts. This study further 
distinguished the various levels of aggressiveness in interpreting ambiguity: a more 
conservative approach is applied in the planning decision context, whereas a more 
aggressive approach is taken in regard to compliance. Wurth and Braithwaite (2016, 
p.13) confirmed the findings of this previous study and added that “tax practitioners in 
the aggressive group were distinguished by an increased propensity to compromise 
their preparation ethics and exploit the opportunity afforded by ambiguity within their 
clients; tax affairs”. It appears that the external tax advisors provide advice regarding 
tax law ambiguity according to their clients’ risk-taking propensities and they are 
afraid to lose their clients if they cannot meet their clients’ demands (Tan, 2011). 
Further, Tan (2011) argued that the larger advisory firms tend to have larger companies 
as clients; because such companies tend to have more complex transactions, tax 
advisors need to offer more alternatives for avoiding taxes. Therefore, past research 
findings are consistent with the finding of this study: that the propensity to use a more 
aggressive tax planning strategy was initiated by large companies, and the objective of 
the tax advisors is to comply as much as possible with the wishes of their clients.   
7.2 Regulation factor 
This section discusses findings regarding the regulation factor; four specific findings 
will be discussed: (1) complexity in regulation, (2) ambiguity in regulation, (3) 
regulatory overlap, and (4) unfairness in regulation. The findings here will be 
compared with those of past research studies. 
7.2.1 Complexity in regulation 
The findings show that the complexity of a regulation may result in tax officials taking 
unpredictable actions.79 The unpredictability is a result of the combination of the lack 
of clarity in the regulation, insufficient expertise, a loosely-applied standard, and the 
tax authority’s inadequate and inefficient oversight. This is consistent with past 
research indicating that the government should address the issue of regulation 
complexity since it results in uncertainty and negatively influences taxpayers’ 
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compliance (OECD, 2004; Baurer, 2005; Osofsky, 2011; Kirchler, 2007). The certainty in 
regulation as opposed to uncertainty is recognised in the civil law tradition80 as “a 
maximum predictability of officials’ behaviour” (Claes & Krolikowski, 2009, p.92). The 
issue of uncertainty emerges when the regulation is vaguely crafted or ambiguously 
drafted or when it is issued with a retroactive effect, and this uncertainty exacerbates 
the complexity of the regulation. Moreover, the factor of regulation complexity may 
lead to increased opportunities for taxpayers to engage in non-compliant behaviour 
(Cuccia & Carnes, 2001; OECD, 2004). The gravity of this complicated situation is 
evident in taxpayers’ reduced trust in the government (Braithwaite, 2003); at the same 
time, the tax authority finds itself in the situation where it has to accurately interpret 
and execute the law accurately (Kirchler, 2007);  in turn, this may decrease the level of 
voluntary compliance. Hence, the complexity and ambiguity of a tax regulation has a 
negative impact on corporate tax compliance and this will continue unless the 
underlying cause of the problem is addressed, and uncertainty is eliminated.   
7.2.2 Ambiguity in regulation 
The findings indicate that the issue of ambiguity in regulation makes the authority less 
accurate in executing of what required by the law as well as it makes taxpayer fails to 
meet on what the laws required.81 This is consistent with past research showing that 
the ambiguity and complexity of laws have a negative impact on tax compliance (Agha 
& Haughton, 1996; Erle, 2008; Kirchler, 2007; Cuccia & Carnes, 2001; Sandmo, 2005). 
Ambiguity in the law occurs when there is lack of clarity or when there is uncertainty 
regarding the meaning or application of a term (Schane, 2006). The ambiguity in 
regulation creates uncertainty in taxpayers, and it has become a challenge for 
corporate governance systems to ensure full compliance with all legal requirements 
(Erle, 2008). For example, ambiguity in regulation may cause a misinterpretation, and 
as a result, taxpayers have difficulties in understanding it fully, leading to a situation of 
unintentional non-compliance (Agha & Haughton, 1996). The ambiguity in the tax 
laws makes it difficult for the authority to execute what is required by the law 
precisely; meanwhile, from the perspective of taxpayers, ambiguity might be regarded 
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as the opportunity to reduce tax payment (Kirchler, 2007). Interestingly, experts or 
external tax advisors might encourage non-compliance regarding ambiguous income 
sources (Klepper, Mazur & Nagin, 1991). The tax advisors might exploit the ambiguity 
to the advantage of their clients as they have more flexibility and capability in 
interpreting the law (Tan, 2011). Therefore, the ambiguity negatively affects corporate 
tax compliance with three consequences: (1) an increase in the ambiguity may decrease 
expected government revenues; (2) an increase in the ambiguity may decrease 
taxpayers’ expected liability; and (3) an increase in the ambiguity may negatively affect 
social welfare because of the shortage of government funds. 
In Indonesia, the issue of ambiguity in regulation is more complicated because of 
factors such as the inherent characteristics of the law, one of which is the language.  
The characteristics of the Indonesian language complicate the process of phrasing a 
law as the language has no tenses and many derivational affixes - either suffixes or 
prefixes – with which to form a word (Uliniansyah, Ishizaki & Uchiyama, 2004). This 
factor creates confusion and uncertainty for the taxpayer when trying to interpret the 
law accurately and acting upon it appropriately. Apart from the language, a more 
extensive problem that produces multiple interpretations is caused by the fact that the 
tax legislation in Indonesia is somewhat vague. As stated by some of the interviewees, 
the tax law in Indonesia was ‘thin’ and too general. For example, the income tax 
legislation in Australia is more than 8000 pages in length (Wallis, 2006) and is more 
detailed in comparison with the Indonesian tax legislation which is contained within 
fewer than 100 pages. This simplicity causes a problem as the law excessively delegates 
power to its subordinate regulations. Consequently, laws may be challenged, 
particularly if an agent has a personal agenda. Moreover, the issue of regulations’ 
binding power may arise because of the ‘sectoral ego’82 of institutions.  As a result, 
other agencies may be reluctant to obey the issued regulations because of inter-agency 
rivalry. Hence, loopholes and contradictions in regulations are evidence of the 
ambiguity problem; furthermore, the level of trust in government to some extent is 
influenced by the clarity of the tax laws. Therefore, badly-designed regulations with 
many confusing rules or many conflicting interpretations will exacerbate the 
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inclination to compliance. Evidently, a synergy between the tax official, the tax experts 
and the professional drafter of legislation will provide real benefits.   
7.2.3 Regulatory overlap  
The findings demonstrate that regulatory overlap creates a waste of resources and 
occurs because of conflicting regulations and lack of coordination.83 The result of this 
overlap is confusion and uncertainty among taxpayers that in turn affects their tax 
compliance. This finding is consistent with the past research finding that regulatory 
overlap creates a waste of resources (Ahdieh, 2006; Aagaard, 2011; Li, 2015; Middleton, 
2015). In general, the issue of regulatory overlap is caused by four major issues: conflict, 
complexity, duplication and lack of coordination (Aagaard, 2011). In the case of 
Indonesia, the inconsistency of the laws with overlapping regulations produced either 
conflicting regulations or duplicated rules. The lack of coordination among agencies 
exacerbated the overlap situation since every agency has its own agenda and even the 
regular coordination meetings are frequently nothing but a formality. As a result, the 
regulatory overlap that occurs among various agencies or between the central and the 
local governments causes confusion and uncertainty for business (O’Callaghan, 2010). 
Further, this regulatory overlap is adding more challenges to the regulatory 
frameworks in Indonesia because, as indicated by the report of the World Justice 
Project (2014), the functioning of courts, where the court is perceived to be 
independent and segregated from the government interference is still far from ideal, 
since it is still affected by powerful private interests. Therefore, the issue of regulatory 
overlap with respect to tax compliance has several implications as follows: (1) 
interagency regulatory overlap in the enforcement scheme may have different 
consequences for the regulators and the taxpayers; (2) the superior agency should 
police and coordinate the activities of regulatory agencies and curb any potential 
overlap issues; (3) certain regulations that pose problems need to be clarified or 
modified and (4) in order to produce an efficient and effective regulation, the 
regulatory framework should be tailored to specific legal and institutional standards.    
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7.2.3 Unfairness in regulation  
The findings indicate that the unfairness in regulation influences tax compliance and it 
is a factor that prevents the tax authority from earning taxpayers’ trust as the 
regulation is perceived as favouring the interests of the DGT.84 This is consistent with 
previous research that found unfairness in regulations may undermine trust in 
government (Guerrero, 2011; OECD 2004; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; De Mello, 2008; 
Mascagni et al., 2014; van der Hel-van Dijk-van Dijk & Siglé, 2015).  The OECD (2004) 
claimed that an escalating risk of non-compliance is the result of unfairness in 
regulations and the inappropriate way in which they are applied. Several elements of 
fairness are identified as fundamental factors influencing compliance. Factors such as 
distributive justice, procedural justice, retributive justice, horizontal equity, and 
vertical equity have been considered as crucial aspects of equity that shape compliance 
(van der Hel-van Dijk-van Dijk & Siglé, 2015). Moreover, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) 
argue that the taxpayers’ perceptions of unfairness in regulations undermine their 
compliance with the law. Interestingly, in an experiment using newspaper stories, 
Nadler (2002) found that the exposure of unfairness in one set of laws such as the tax 
laws increased the willingness to violate other unrelated laws. Therefore, taxpayers 
might comply with tax laws or decisions by the tax authority when these have been 
established after deliberations that are perceived as procedurally just and not unfair, 
even when the outcomes are unfavourable to them.  
Next, taxpayers’ trust in government may further diminish as the unfairness continues. 
An ideal regulation is one that is neutral, fair, and accommodates both the taxpayer 
and the tax authority. Furthermore, regulatory quality and the conduct of the law also 
have a positive effect on trust in the government (De Mello, 2008). In developing 
countries, poor trust in the authority and the inconsistent application of regulations 
are two problems in a vicious cycle as they produce low compliance because they 
generate confusion and uncertainty (Mascagni et al., 2014). This confirmed the World 
Bank concern that the public perception of the tax authority never been regarded high 
if the situation surrounding taxpayer compliance issue was not fully anticipated, in 
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contrast, it may undermine the legitimacy of the government if wrongly anticipated 
(Guerrero, 2011).  
7.4 The DGT’s current capacity to respond 
Section 7.4 discusses findings regarding the DGT as the institution that has the 
capacity to respond to the corporate tax compliance issue. There are three themes that 
will be further elaborated in relation to the previous studies: (1) human resources issue, 
(2) lack of access to data, and (3) administrative weaknesses.   
7.4.1 Human resources issue 
The findings reported in subsection 6.2.1 indicate that there are at least three major 
issues in the DGT that are related to the human resources problem. The problems are 
(1) corruption and lack of integrity; (2) lack of professionalism; and (3) lack of sufficient 
human resources. 
7.4.1.1 Integrity and corruption 
The findings indicate that, although the overall integrity of tax officials is better now 
than it was in the pre-modernisation era, the issue of corruption still exists.85 There are 
many studies that have investigated the relationship between corruption and tax 
compliance (e.g. Flatters & Macleod, 1995; Picur & Riahi-Belkaoui, 2006; Bird et al., 
2008; McKerchar & Evans 2009; Bird & de Jantscher, 1992; Rosid et al., 2016). These 
previous studies in general, argue that corruption has a negative impact on tax 
compliance, which is consistent with the findings reported in this subsection. 
However, it is worth noting that many participants agreed that the integrity of the 
DGT’s officials was much improved since the era of pre-administration reform in 2002. 
Nevertheless, the improved integrity of the DGT’s officials does not seem to have had 
an impact on compliance since the overall level of corruption in the other institutions 
outside of the DGT remains high. The latest data from Transparency International 
shows that Indonesia is the ninetieth least corrupt nation out of 175 countries.86 The 
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study by Rosid et al. (2016) provides sound evidence that corruption has a negative 
impact on tax compliance in Indonesia. Therefore, the work of alleviating corruption 
should be aligned with that of other government institutions. Otherwise, a higher 
continuous compliance level with a better voluntary compliance is merely an illusion. 
7.4.1.2 Lack of professionalism 
The findings indicate that DGT officials lack professionalism due to the combination of 
three major factors: power abuse, bias when interpreting the law, and the pressure of 
achieving the revenue target.87 This is consistent with the previous research finding 
that the professionalism of tax officials responsible for law enforcement can 
significantly reduce non-compliance (Baer & Silvani, 1997; Braithwaite & Wirth, 2001; 
Lushi, 2016; Höglund & Nöjd, 2014). This lack of professionalism is considered to be 
one of the major obstacles facing tax administration in developing countries that needs 
to be addressed in order to increase voluntary compliance (Baer & Silvani, 1997). 
Further, Braithwaite and Wirth (2001) suggest that the tax administration should 
monitor taxpayers’ reactions to the professionalism of its tax officials in order to ensure 
appropriate procedural justice. The way in which officials communicate with taxpayers 
also needs attention since unprofessionalism in communication will harm the public’s 
perception of the organisation and psychologically disturb taxpayers (Höglund & Nöjd, 
2014), and it may convey the impression to taxpayers that officials are abusing their 
power. In addition, in the case of Indonesia, there is the unique situation where the 
revenue target is alleged to be one of the obstacles to professionalism. The 
achievement of the revenue target by the end of the financial year is used as a crucial 
performance indicator against which an official is evaluated (Widihartanto & 
Braithwaite, 2016). Achieving it could mean promotion and failing it could mean 
otherwise. As indicated by the findings, the pressure to achieve the revenue target 
causes officials to behave unprofessionally, abuse their power, or make a biased 
interpretation of the law in order to boost their performance. Therefore, the tax 
authority administration needs to carefully address the officials’ lack of 
professionalism as the root of the problem may have nothing to do with the officials’ 
personal capability. 
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7.4.1.3 Lack of adequate human resources 
The findings show that the DGT has inadequate human resources in terms of both 
quantity and competence.88 This supports past research showing that the discrepancy 
between the reality and what the organisation needs is a classic problem of tax 
authorities in developing countries (Baurer, 2005; Gallagher, 2005; Baer & Silvani, 1997; 
Muhammadi, Ahmed & Habib, 2016; Widihartanto & Braithwaite, 2016). In regard to 
the number of staff, Gallagher (2005) argues that the optimal proportion is about one 
tax officer per 1,000 people. Considering Indonesia’s population size, Indonesia has 
consistently failed to meet the optimal proportion since 1963 with 0.04, 0.12 in 1982, 
0.14 in the mid-1990s (Korte, 2013) and the latest ratio in 2016 remains unchanged at 
0.1417 (37.000 tax officers) for a population of about 261.1 million people (DGT, 2016). 
Figure 7-1 below illustrates the population to staff ratio of selected countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region in 2011. This figure demonstrates that the number of tax officers in 
Indonesia is far from ideal even when compared with its neighbouring ASEAN 
countries where only Myanmar and the Philippines have a worse ratio. Moreover, as 
shown in Figure 7-1, Australia and New Zealand have closer to the ideal ratio in terms 
of the optimal proportion. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7-1 RATIO OF POPULATION TO TAX OFFICERS, 2011 
Source: Modified from the Araki and Claus (2014) 
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In regard to the competence of officials, a study undertaken by Muhamaddi et al. 
(2016) demonstrates that the DGT’s auditors lack the competence to deal with transfer 
pricing cases. They argue that this incompetence is the result of the DGT’s policy to 
not have dedicated auditors to handle transfer pricing cases. Moreover, the rigid 
mechanism of rotation of staff is blamed as the cause of this incompetence since the 
most knowledgeable person does not always work on the transfer pricing case, and it 
takes a long time to train a new auditor to handle transfer pricing cases. Further, the 
issue of incompetence due to a lack of knowledge, as indicated in the findings of 
subsection 6.2.1.3, apparently prevents the organisation from determining the actual 
scale of large business compliance. One participant who was a high-ranking tax official 
admitted that the auditors’ lack of technical skills was a huge problem in the 
organisation. This assertion seemed to be supported by the findings since some 
interviewees, who were the auditors in a large taxpayer office, surprisingly, also 
admitted that they had never found any issue related to tax planning or tax avoidance 
during audit. Hence, these findings confirmed Baurier’s (2005) assertion that a typical 
characteristic of tax administration in developing countries is that the number of staff 
and their skills level were inadequate for the requirements of their organisation, and 
staff lacked specialised knowledge of a particular tax-related area. However, it should 
be noted that a similar situation where there is a mismatch in tax skills and knowledge 
among tax officers, tax advisors and tax managers may exist as well in developed 
countries although the severity is lower than a developing one. 
7.4.2 Poor data management 
The findings show that the factor of poor data management has dire consequences on 
the DGT’s capacity to handle tax non-compliance.89 Some scholars recognise that poor 
data availability and its ineffective management is one of the fundamental challenges 
of tax administration in developing countries (Tanzi & Zee, 2000; Baer & Silvani, 1997; 
Torgler, 2003; Kidd & Crandall, 2006). As asserted by Tanzi & Zee (2000), many 
developing countries face formidable challenges when attempting to establish an 
efficient and effective tax system and one of the major impediments is the paucity of 
qualified data management experts to support the operations of the tax 
administration. Moreover, poor data management prevents the control of non-
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compliance and leads to poor coordination between the taxation agency and other 
agencies (Baer & Silvani, 1997). For example, poor communication and poor data 
exchange prevents the agency from establishing an effective tax administration (Kidd 
& Crandall, 2006).  
The DGT has recognised this problem and has started to align the audit with its related 
risks. They commenced the program of mapping, profiling and benchmarking to assess 
the financial ratios of more than 30 business sectors in order to determine the fair tax 
share of a particular company relative to its counterparts. If there is an unreasonable 
discrepancy, a further investigation is carried out. By integrating these data in the 
data-matching information system, the DGT has attempted to minimise tax evasion 
and make it easier to detect tax manipulation. However, the overall progress of an 
integrated computerised tax system was halted after the PINTAR 90  project was 
postponed as the DGT had problems in fulfilling prerequisites determined by the 
international donors (Korte, 2013).  Besides, the obstacles were also produced by 
factors external to the DGT, such as the difficulty of accessing banking data because of 
bank secrecy laws and the reluctance of other domestic agencies to share their data. 
Meanwhile, domestic sources of information are becoming a vital part of tax 
administration, and the national legislation plays a role in ensuring its effectiveness 
(McCracken, 2002). Therefore, poor data management is a symptom of fundamental 
deficiencies in the tax administration system, and it hampers the effectiveness of the 
revenue institution to respond to tax non-compliance. Therefore, this concern should 
be addressed by the government in order to improve fiscal performance. 
7.4.3 Poor internal coordination  
The related findings indicate that poor internal coordination is considered to be one of 
the major problems of the DGT, hampering its administrative competence.91  Previous 
studies have reported similar findings: that a competent administration plays a vital 
role in the success of tax administration; moreover, it has become a significant issue in 
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developing countries (World Bank, 1999; Shaw, Slemrod & Whiting, 2010; Kidd & 
Crandall, 2006; Tanzi & Zee, 2000, Baer & Silvani, 1997). A competent administration 
obviously plays a significant role in determining the success of the tax authority’s 
operations. However, the issue of a competent administration has been mostly 
overlooked in terms of tax policy formulation in many countries, especially in the 
developing ones (Shaw et al. 2010). Further, the World Bank (1999) explicitly stated 
that developing countries have a severe issue with appropriate and effective tax 
administration and, therefore, it is imperative that the dynamics of tax administration 
be thoroughly understood by the relevant decision-maker (Bird, 2004). 
Regarding the finding presented in this subsection, the challenge of internal 
coordination cannot be underestimated since the geographically-dispersed nature of 
many tax offices across Indonesia constitutes a major obstacle. Second, the strong 
pressure to achieve the revenue target and the ‘sectoral ego’ among tax offices has led 
to the reluctance to share information perhaps at the cost of not achieving the overall 
goal of the organisation. Nevertheless, the issue of poor internal coordination 
confirmed Baurer’s (2005) observation that the poor coordination among internal units 
and other related government agencies is a glaring issue for tax administration in 
developing countries. 
7.5 Managing non-compliance 
The findings show that the DGT manages large business non-compliance by means of 
two general approaches: persuasiveness and law enforcement.92 This is in-line with the 
DGT’s 2015-2019 strategic map where the DGT has identified two strategic objectives 
regarding tax compliance: ‘better services’ and ‘effective enforcement’ (DGT, 2016). The 
‘better services’ refers to the DGT’s aim to improve its service excellence, the 
effectiveness of public relations, and the dissemination of targeted information. 
Meanwhile, the ‘effective enforcement’ refers to the improvement of the taxpayer 
monitoring program, the tax audit process, and law enforcement.  
However, it is worth noting here that, to date, the DGT does not have a specific 
program tailored to anticipate large business non-compliance as other countries have. 
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 See Section 6.3 related to the findings of managing non-compliance for more information. 
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The abovementioned approach is a generic treatment of non-compliance regardless of 
the type of taxpayer - whether it is an individual, small firm or large business. Further, 
the DGT does not have a formalised strategy regarding compliance risk management 
for the taxpayer. The lack of a comprehensive, risk-based management approach 
prevents the DGT from effectively allocating resources and treating taxpayers 
appropriately according to their risks. Consequently, several important decisions were 
made subjectively rather than being based on a systematic approach. The lack of an 
efficient approach has led to a poor understanding of the true nature of taxpayer 
compliance behaviour.  However, a tighter control over large taxpayers actually began 
with the start of the modernisation program in 2002. The initiative of large tax offices 
with the aim of increasing revenue by tightening the control over large taxpayers and 
tax officials alike (Brondolo et al., 2008) could be considered as a part of the 
anticipation measure that would maintain large business tax compliance.   
Nevertheless, recognising the urgency of the situation, the DGT included the initiative 
of compliance risk management (CRM) program in its 2015-2019 strategic maps (DGT, 
2016). The pilot test of the risk engine of CRM was commenced in 2015 with the aim of 
collecting taxes fairly based on a risk-based compliance model approach. The expected 
outcome was a mapping of the effective taxpayers’ compliance according to their risk 
and their fiscal importance. Further, the accurate anticipation of and the appropriate 
response to non-compliance risks were also expected outcomes. 
The OECD (2009) documented the experiences of eight countries in dealing with large 
business compliance. The report demonstrates that overall, there are several key issues 
and activities required to improve large business compliance: (1) strategies and 
programs to build a better relationship with taxpayer, (2) commencement of real-time 
management approach, (3) the importance of corporate governance, (3) an 
enhancement of the organisation capacity, (4) performance measures, (5) effective rule 
and policy, (6) adequate information and technology.  
Therefore, given the current capability of the DGT and with regard to the factors that 
influence large business compliance, it is obvious that the authority should address 
several fundamental problems before applying an effective measure to address large 
business non-compliance based on the ‘best practice’. A more detailed discussion of 
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the policy implication for the management of large business compliance is presented 
in Section 7.7. 
7.6 Responsive regulation as an alternative 
The findings indicate that cooperative compliance based on the concept of responsive 
regulation is perceived by many participants as applicable to the policy formulation of 
the DGT to handle the compliance problem of large business.93 The adoption of the 
responsive regulation principle for compliance risk management has become a new 
means by which tax administration can improve compliance, particularly in the 
developed countries (OECD, 2004; EC, 2006). One of the main reasons for the 
adoption is the importance of understanding taxpayer behaviour. This measure is able 
to provide the most effective response to taxpayers according to their level of 
compliance given their available resources (EC, 2006).  
The DGT, on the other hand, focuses on the conventional command and control 
approach, using penalties and tax audits either to deter non-compliance or to enforce 
compliance (Arnold, 2012).  This conventional method with its emphasis on coercion 
has been criticised for its ineffectiveness as it should be combined with other measures 
in order to improve compliance (Braithwaite, 2002). Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) 
propose the concept of responsive regulation that focuses on persuasion rather than 
enforcement as a means of managing compliance risks and improving voluntary 
compliance.94 The OECD (2001) suggests that a systematic design should be adopted 
by tax administration with the incorporation of risk management based on responsive 
regulation to enhance voluntary compliance as this design is more effective than 
relying solely on deterrence. Further, Braithwaite (2006) argues that this approach is 
more attractive for developing economies which tend to have more limited resources. 
Hence, McKerchar and Evans (2009) suggest that a synchronised and coordinated plan 
with multiple intact policy instruments and supported by a robust policy regulation 
policy are necessary for the developing countries in managing their compliance 
strategy.  
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 See Section 6.4 for more detail regarding the findings. 
94
 See Section 3.4 for the details of the concept regarding responsive regulation. 
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However, the implementation of a new policy requires an understanding of the local 
context. Learning from the officials, taxpayers and advisors could produce knowledge 
on how policy should be adapted in different circumstances. Therefore, as indicated in 
section 6.4, several participants argued that the DGT should first meet the 
prerequisites condition before implementing the new policy. Next, several issues must 
be rectified in order to have a better outcome. The issue of fairness and trust, 
respecting the taxpayer’s rights, consistency of application, compliance measurement, 
and a rewards and punishments scheme are some of the emerging issues that should 
initially be considered by the DGT.95   
Besides learning, the rigidity of the DGT’s administration structure could be an 
obstacle to the implementation of a new policy. Rigidity means that the practices of tax 
administration are not adjusted to support ‘regulatory innovation’ (Black, Lodge & 
Thatcher, 2005) and experimentation (Dorf & Sabel, 1998). Secondly, the revenue 
target that is governing the tax system in Indonesia may place constraints as this 
overarching issue has become entrenched in the mindset of the tax officials (Lerche, 
1980). Several participants confirmed that the factor of revenue target had 
compromised the officials’ professionalism when discharging their duties, and has 
consequences for the perception of fairness and trust, two crucial factors required in 
order for responsive regulation to be effective. 
Therefore, compliance risk management based on the responsive regulation concept is 
regarded by many scholars as a better approach for tax administration to enhance 
compliance. Several countries that have applied this concept are evidence of its value. 
However, the terms and prerequisite conditions should be met before carefully 
introducing a new policy into the existing system. 
7.7 Research questions reviewed 
Having discussed the findings regarding the factors that influence large business 
compliance and the responses from the related tax authority, this section discusses the 
answer to the research questions proposed in this thesis: 
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 See section 6.4 for details of the issues that need to be rectified. 
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RQ1: What are the factors that influence large business taxpayers’ compliance risks 
from the perspectives of the tax officials, the tax managers, and the independent tax 
advisers? 
RQ2:  How does the tax authority manage large business taxpayers’ compliance risks 
according to the factors identified by addressing the previous research question? 
7.8.1 The factors that influence large business tax compliance in Indonesia 
This study demonstrates that the findings regarding the corporate factor consist of 
three major compliance risk factors: economic factor, sociological considerations, and 
corporate characteristics (as indicated in Section 5.2).  
First, the economic factor was affected by five aspects that influence corporate tax 
compliance. They were: cost-benefit-driven decision, bonus for manager, probability of 
detection and penalties, risk appetite and uncertainty. The cost-benefit-driven decision 
was most likely to affect the large businesses’ decision regarding the formulation of a 
tax planning method since the corporation is seen as a rational economic animal that 
always makes thorough calculations. Participants considered that of the bonus offered 
to a manager was a factor that only slightly affects corporate tax compliance in 
Indonesia. The probability of detection and penalties that is generally regarded as a 
significant factor influencing compliance, surprisingly to some extent was not viewed 
by some large businesses as a factor that can make them more compliant. Regarding 
risk appetite, the level of a corporation’s risk appetite was determined by the size of 
the company and its closeness to one or more influential persons in the country. 
Meanwhile, uncertainty is created when the taxpayer receives non-standardized 
treatment from tax officials.  
Secondly, three sociological aspects influence the level of compliance. They are: 
personal norms, social norms, and the aspect of fairness and trust to government. 
Personal norms are considered to have an influence on corporate tax compliance since 
the personal norms of the firm’s manager would influence his/her company, and the 
cultural factor comprising thoughts, customs, beliefs and nationalities was found to 
influence corporate tax compliance. Here, social norms are related to the issue of 
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corporate reputation, and it was found that corporate reputation was a priority and 
had to be maintained. However, the consideration of business profitability might cause 
some large businesses to overlook the reputation issue. The aspect of fairness and trust 
in the government was found to affect compliance if the taxpayer felt mistreated by the 
authority, and this would influence the taxpayer’s willingness to pay taxes.  
Finally, four corporate characteristics were considered to have an influence on 
compliance.  They were: tax risk management, ownership structure and business size, 
business profitability and the use of a tax advisor. The importance of having a good tax 
risk management strategy to ensure corporate tax compliance was acknowledged by 
participants, yet it was found that many large businesses did not support an adequate 
tax risk management function in their corporation’s tax department. Regarding the 
ownership structure and business size, it was found that the listed companies were 
perceived as having better compliance than the non-listed companies. Moreover, the 
nature of a business and the complexities of the business structure were also perceived 
as having an influence on corporate tax compliance. Business profitability affects the 
corporate tax compliance at the time of adversity and in the situation where the 
company opted in using their money for something else rather than paying taxes 
because of profitability consideration. Meanwhile, the use of a tax advisor can have 
either a positive or a negative effect on compliance depending on the type of service or 
advice that is being delivered, and on the tax advisor’s integrity. 
The findings show that the weaknesses in regulations were considered as significant 
risks that influence compliance (as described in Section 5.3). Specifically, the 
weaknesses in regulation were caused by three major issues: the ambiguity in the 
wording of regulations, the uncertainty produced by regulations, and the regulatory 
overlap.  
First, the issue of ambiguity in regulations leads to multiple interpretations which may 
cause disputes between the taxpayer and the tax authority and, moreover, may lead to 
a conflict among government agencies. Consequently, the tax authority will be less 
accurate when executing what is required by law.  
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Second, uncertainty is related to the unpredictable behaviour of officials and is related 
to the issue of the clarity of regulations. Unpredictable behaviour is the result of 
insufficient expertise, loosely-applied standards and ineffective oversight, or a 
combination of these factors so that the actions of officials are often ad hoc and 
arbitrary.  
Third, the regulatory overlap is caused by inconsistency among the laws that have 
overlapping regulations regarding the same issue. Further, inconsistency occurs 
vertically which means there is inconsistency or even contradiction between the law 
and its sub-laws, and it also occurs horizontally which means conflicted between the 
laws for a particular object. Also, regulatory overlap is caused by the poor coordination 
among government institutions.  
Lastly, the unfairness inherent in regulations influences taxpayer compliance and is a 
crucial factor as it prevents the DGT from earning the trust of the taxpayer.  
In conclusion, the findings reported in Chapter 5 indicate that there are two dominant 
factors that influence tax non-compliance of large business in Indonesia: the corporate 
factors and the regulation factors.  
7.8.2 The response of the DGT in managing compliance risks of large business 
The finding indicates that the tax authority in Indonesia manages the compliance risks 
of large business by using two approaches: persuasiveness and law enforcement.96  
Persuasiveness is the soft measure applied after the taxpayer has been monitored by 
the Account Representative. Subsequently, a letter asking for clarification is sent to the 
taxpayer, or a counselling97 session with the taxpayer is organised. Normally, law 
                                                          
96
 Recall Section 6.3 for more detail. 
97
 Counselling refers to a practice used by DGT to clarify any discrepancy found in the tax return using 
external data. In this process, it is possible that the taxpayer would agree with the DGT’s findings and 
pay the additional tax owed or defend his position by providing an explanation and evidence with 
regard to the discrepancy. With the latter condition, DGT can accept the taxpayer’s explanation and 
close the case or refuse the taxpayer’s explanation and ask the taxpayer to pay the tax owed. If 
taxpayers refuse to pay the tax owed in this counselling stage, then this process can be escalated into 
auditing or investigation depending on whether or not there is an element of criminal offence in the 
case. 
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enforcement is applied as the hard measure if the first procedure has failed. This hard 
measure involves an audit or an investigation in the case of a tax crime.  
However, it is worth noting here that the DGT’s ability to detect non-compliance is 
strongly related to the effectiveness of the action taken by the organisation in 
managing the issues. The finding presented in sub-section 6.3.1 indicates that the tax 
authority’s inadequate ability to detect non-compliance is caused by the lack of 
sufficient information, the ineffective mechanism of information exchange, and the 
pressure of the revenue target. 
7.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter discussed the findings obtained from the qualitative data analysis 
elaborated in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The findings are related to the existing 
literature and are intended to address the research questions established for this 
thesis.  
In principle, the findings support the existing literature with some exceptions. In 
general, the economic factors, socio-psychological factors and corporate characteristics 
affect large business tax compliance in Indonesia. The regulation factors are presented 
separately in this thesis since several aspects of the laws and regulations are beyond 
the reach of large business and the tax administrators. The complexity, ambiguity and 
unfairness of regulations, together with regulatory overlap, are some of the regulation 
issues that affect large business compliance. Some exceptions related to the factors 
that affect influence compliance are found in this thesis. For example, the 
compensation of the tax manager is not regarded as significantly influencing 
compliance because the role of the tax division in a corporate structure is under-rated. 
Moreover, the issue of a revenue target in Indonesia could be categorized as a new 
perspective of the factor that influences compliance since this issue either directly or 
indirectly affects the quality of treatment of the taxpayer. 
The response of Indonesian authorities when managing the compliance risks 
associated with a large business is evidently far from ideal. The capacity of the DGT to 
detect non-compliance is below average due to inadequate human resources, poor data 
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management and inefficient internal coordination. Moreover, the conventional policy 
that relies heavily on tax audits and sanctions to prevent large business non-
compliance is considered to be ineffective in the current situation considering that 
several other tax administrations have switched their policy into the cooperative 
compliance. However, it is worth noting that there are several prerequisites that 
should be met by the DGT before introducing a new policy into their operations.   
Chapter 8 which follows includes the summary of this thesis and its key findings, 
policy recommendations, its contribution to the literature, its limitations, and future 
research directions for the study of tax compliance. 
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CHAPTER 8  
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter has seven sections which conclude the thesis. Section 8.2 provides the 
summary of the study and its major findings. Section 8.3 discusses the contribution of 
the thesis to the literature, while section 8.4 offers policy recommendations to the 
Indonesian government based on the findings of this study. The limitations of this 
study are acknowledged in section 8.5, followed by suggestions for potential future 
directions of compliance study.    
8.2 Summary of the study 
This study investigated the factors that influence large business tax compliance risks 
from the perspectives of tax officials, tax managers and tax advisors. This study also 
investigated the response of the Indonesian tax authority in managing those 
compliance risks. For this purpose, this study began with an overview of the tax 
administration situation in developing countries and the challenges faced by those 
countries in managing taxpayers’ compliance. The situation in Indonesia where large 
businesses are registered and required to fulfil their tax obligation is presented in 
Chapter 2. This provides the contextual background and description of the 
contemporary tax collection situation in Indonesia. The chapter also discusses the 
compliance issues, in particular the issue of tax avoidance by large businesses. 
It was found in Chapter 3 that the tax compliance behaviour of large businesses is 
complex and involves multi-disciplinary subjects; therefore, an understanding of the 
concept of tax compliance that includes tax avoidance and tax risk is necessary since 
there is no single accepted definition for those concepts. For this reason, it was 
considered essential to determine the concepts of relevance to this study that were 
offered in the body of literature. It was concluded that tax compliance could be 
categorised according to the conceptual and practical definitions. The conceptual 
definition emphasises the willingness of taxpayers to comply voluntarily, while the 
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practical one focuses on the administrative fulfilment of taxpayer obligations. In terms 
of tax avoidance, it was implied that the avoidance situation occurs when taxpayers are 
taking advantage of loopholes in the tax law where the degree of the avoidance severity 
ranges from the legal action to the illegal one. In terms of tax risk, it was concluded 
that both taxpayer and tax authority have their own definition of tax risk. Taxpayers 
tend to view tax risk as the likelihood of an unexpected outcome from a particular tax 
position, while the authority defined tax risk as the likelihood of taxpayers engaging in 
activities that potentially have impacts on the collection of revenue. 
It was recognised in the study that to some extent, corporate and individual 
compliance have many characteristics in common as a corporation is an entity that 
consists of employees and managers who determine the corporation’s behaviour. It 
was acknowledged that there were three categories of factors influencing corporate tax 
compliance: economic factors, socio-psychological factors and corporate 
characteristics. Further, the components98 of each main factor and their relationship 
with corporate taxpayer behaviour were discussed not only to provide an 
understanding of the concept, but also as a basis for the validation of the findings of 
this study.   
The concept of responsive regulation and the CRM were reviewed in Sections 3.4 and 
3.5. It was concluded that, generally, tax compliance could be encouraged by applying 
a soft compliance incentive rather than a deterrence incentive. The responsive 
regulation approach is considered to be a better enforcement strategy as it shifts tax 
enforcement from rigid deterrence to a dynamic framework that accommodates the 
interaction between the tax authority and taxpayers. This approach favours 
cooperation from the taxpayers and is aligned with the objective of the tax authority 
which is to stimulate an optimum level of voluntary compliance, and it is manifested 
as a regulatory pyramid that indicates the responsiveness to persuasion or punishment. 
Meanwhile, the OECD and European Commission suggest that the operations of CRMs 
should be based on the responsive regulation principle, and a five-stage iterative 
process for CRM has been suggested for the systematic management of compliance 
risks by the tax administration.  
                                                          
98
 See section 3.3 for more detail about the factors influencing corporate tax compliance. 
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It was argued that a developing country with limited regulatory capacity might benefit 
from the use of responsive regulation as the flexibility in the approach allows the tax 
administration to focus its enforcement on a specific target with higher revenue 
potential. Despite the criticism of its enforcement consistency, responsive regulation is 
considered to have several advantages over the conventional approach, deterrence, 
which is regarded as ineffective in encouraging voluntary compliance as well as 
incurring higher costs and consuming more resources, things that a developing 
economy lacks.  
Since tax compliance is a social phenomenon that is shaped by many factors, it was 
then reasonable to argue that the adoption of a qualitative approach is the most 
appropriate for acquiring an in-depth understanding of large business tax compliance. 
Chapter 4 discussed in detail the research design and the methodology applied to 
achieve the objectives of the study. Accordingly, semi-structured in-depth interviews 
with purposive sampling were used in this study with 48 participants as key informants 
as part of the data collection process. Those participants were divided into three 
different groups according to their functions namely, tax officials, tax managers and 
tax advisors, and members of each group were further categorised according to their 
various positions within their respective organisations. For data analysis, a thematic 
analysis approach was used to analyse the collected information since this approach 
provides several advantages over other approaches regarding data analysis.99  To 
overcome the issue of reliability and validity for a qualitative study, this study applied 
techniques of data triangulation, member checking and disconfirming evidence. 
Further, the interview data was also validated with relevant archival public records to 
support the statements made by the interviewees. 
In addressing the first research question of the factors that influence large business tax 
compliance, it was found that several factors dynamically do have an influence on large 
corporate taxpayers in Indonesia as presented in Chapter 5. Significant findings are 
summarised in the following table as below. 
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 See Table 4-5 at page 84 for more information. 
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TABLE 8-1 FACTORS INFLUENCING LARGE BUSINESS TAX COMPLIANCE IN INDONESIA 
Category Factors Remarks 
Economic factors Cost-benefit driven 
decisions 
 Large business is viewed as a rational 
economic organism, the actions of which 
are always determined by cost-benefit 
considerations. 
Compensation of 
manager 
 The finding is somewhat inconsistent with 
past studies that bonus-based packages are 
strongly related to tax avoidance.  
 The reason is that the tax department in 
Indonesia has a non-critical role, merely 
supporting the administration while the 
bonus offered is based on a pre-determined 
formula.   
Probability of 
detection and penalty 
 The severity of the audit results as well as 
the penalty imposed makes taxpayers aware 
of their compliance responsibilities.  
 Not every penalty has an equally effective 
deterrent effect. 
 There was a low probability that a taxpayer 
would be known for its tax planning 
misconduct. 
Risk appetite  The business size and its closeness to 
someone influential might affect the risk 
appetite level. 
 The risk was lower if the firm kept its 
distance from the official. 
Uncertainty  This occurs because of the issue of 
misinterpretation and lack of consistent 
treatment from the officials for similar 
issues. 
Socio-Psychological 
factors 
Personal norms  The personal attitudes resulting from 
thoughts, customs, beliefs and nationality 
were regarding shaped the manager’s 
norms.  
Social norms  The firm’s reputation is a fundamental 
element that needs to be maintained. 
 No generally accepted notion regarding the 
issue of the importance of reputation over 
the firm’s profitability. 
Fairness and trust  Fairness and trust in government influence 
compliance where lack of trust applies not 
only to the tax authority but overall to other 
government officials. 
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TABLE 8-2 FACTORS INFLUENCING LARGE BUSINESS TAX COMPLIANCE IN INDONESIA 
Category Factors Remarks 
Corporate 
characteristics 
Tax risk management  A robust TRM strategy played a vital role in 
ensuring compliance. 
 Many large businesses did not support an 
adequate tax-related system in their 
business.  
 A cost-benefit consideration made a robust 
TRM as the low priority. 
Ownership structure 
and business size 
 Listed companies were perceived to some 
extent as having better tax compliance. 
 The industrial sector to which a particular 
company belongs affects compliance. 
 MNCs that utilise tax havens were perceived 
to have a higher level of non-compliance. 
Business profitability  Financial constraints affect compliance. 
 The tax was considered as the least concern 
during times of financial hardship. 
The use of tax advisors  May have two opposing effects on 
compliance - either positive or negative. 
 The large firm may introduce a more 
aggressive tax planning strategy. 
Regulation factors Complexity  May result in tax officials taking 
unpredictable actions. 
 The unpredictability is a result of the 
combination of the lack of clarity in the 
regulation, insufficient expertise, a loosely-
applied standard, and the tax authority’s 
inadequate and inefficient oversight. 
Ambiguity  Makes the authority less accurate in 
executing what is required by the law and 
makes taxpayers not meet what the law 
requires. 
 The tax legislation in Indonesia is somewhat 
vague and contains many loopholes and 
contradictions. 
Unfairness  The pro-DGT biased regulations prevent the 
tax authority from earning trust. 
 Revenue target is viewed as the main source 
of unfairness in regulations. 
Regulatory overlap  It creates a waste of resources. 
 It occurs because of conflicting regulations 
and lack of coordination. 
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In addressing the second research question of this study regarding the response of the 
Indonesian tax authority in managing those compliance risks, it was found that in 
general, the DGT manages the issue of non-compliance using two sequential steps: (1) 
by sending a letter requesting clarification or by arranging a counselling session as part 
of the persuasion process, (2) by tax audit or tax investigation as part of the 
enforcement process.100 However, there are several issues that hamper the DGT’s 
effectiveness in managing large business non-compliance: inadequate human 
resources, lack of access to data and administrative weaknesses as discussed in Section 
7.4.   
Regarding the responsive regulation approach as an alternative policy formulation to 
handle the compliance problem, it was observed that the application of this approach 
might benefit both the tax authority and the taxpayer. However, its implementation 
requires an understanding of the local context as well as the fulfilment of prerequisite 
conditions in order to ensure that the new policy will run smoothly.  
In summary, this study provides evidence of the behaviour of large businesses in 
Indonesia in terms of tax compliance and details the responses of the tax authority in 
managing tax compliance risks. This study has shown the factors presented in Table 8.1 
can have negative influences on the tax compliance of large businesses. This study also 
shows that, to some extent, the response of the tax authority in Indonesia in managing 
the risk of non-compliance is inadequate and has room for improvement. The findings 
of the study are considered relevant to both policymakers and taxpayers.  
8.3 Contributions to literature  
The study has contributed to the body of knowledge on the subject of tax compliance, 
particularly large business behaviour, in a developing country, in a number of aspects 
that include the research method and its findings. 
First, the methodological contribution made by this study is that it employed the 
qualitative interpretative approach as an alternative since tax research literature is 
currently dominated by quantitative empirical research which to some extent leaves 
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 See Section 6.3 for more detail. 
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many puzzles and conflicting evidence. The qualitative study also offers more in-depth 
understanding of the tax compliance phenomenon.  
Second, the research method applied in the study included the perspectives of inter-
related actors who provided valuable information about large business tax compliance. 
These key informants made a significant contribution as past studies, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, have yet to apply this technique for the study of large business 
compliance. The involvement of 48 participants that represented tax officials, tax 
managers, and external tax advisors with various positions and from diverse 
organisations, has enriched the understanding of large business behaviour dynamics 
from many angles, and provided a holistic picture of the problem being addressed.  
Third, this study contributes significant findings to the body of knowledge. Using 
evidence from a developing country, Indonesia, several factors that affect compliance 
as reported in the literature were confirmed as influencing Indonesia’s large 
businesses. Moreover, the documentation on how a tax authority in a developing 
country manages the issue of non-compliance is offered in this study as most of the 
literature on tax authorities’ experiences comprises studies of developed economies. 
Further, this study offers a comprehensive picture of the real issues faced by large 
businesses and tax authorities as a reference to extend existing theories. This study 
also examined the responsive regulation approach as the current best practice in 
managing non-compliance to determine its suitability for a developing country. 
Finally, this study has captured some of the reasons why large firms choose to comply 
or not to comply with taxation laws and regulations. This is especially important in 
developing countries where corporate tax revenue is more critical, and these nations 
have limited capacity to collect substantial revenue from other types of taxation. 
8.4 Policy recommendations 
The findings show that, as summarised earlier in Section 8.2, there are three main 
issues that impede the DGT’s internal capacity as the Indonesian tax authority to 
adequately respond to the issue of large corporate taxpayers’ compliance. The findings 
208 
 
 
relate to human resources, data management and coordination. Hence, this study 
offers several implications and policy recommendations for the DGT. 
Regarding human resources, there are three documented significant problems that 
relate to this issue: integrity and corruption, lack of professionalism and lack of 
adequate human resources. As discussed earlier in subsection 7.4.1, the issue of 
corruption still exists although the overall integrity of tax officials is better than it was 
in the pre-modernisation era. The likelihood of the tax auditor being involved in 
corruption is greater than for any other personnel in the DGT as corruption emerges to 
be more the result of opportunities created by interested parties than something that 
appears by itself. Hence, an effective measure to tackle corruption needs to be 
established as corruption undermines the trust of taxpayers. The concept of neo-
patrimonialism101 is a valuable reference as, to some extent in the Indonesian culture, 
an understanding of the power relation between patron and the institution is crucial 
for any successful institutional changes to occur. Moreover, the use of extensive media 
coverage could prevent the corruption of officials as anti-corruption measures could be 
broadcast and disseminated to taxpayers. However, the improved integrity of the 
DGT’s officials will not have an impact on taxpayers’ compliance if the overall level of 
corruption in other government agencies remains substantial. Therefore, the attempt 
to eliminate corruption should be in tandem with that of other institutions. 
The lack of professionalism due to power abuse, bias when interpreting the law and 
the pressure to achieve the revenue target is mainly caused by the inappropriate 
application of revenue target policy. The revenue target system, which is the 
overarching principle as it governs the tax system in Indonesia, in fact, poses obstacles 
to change. The tax target system that has been entrenched in the mindset of the 
officials needs to be reassessed for its costs and benefits. In the world of tax target 
system where the ultimate goal is the achievement of revenue target rather than the 
improvement of taxpayers’ compliance, the application of this misled policy has 
serious consequences. The determination of tax collected target through a top-down 
process has resulted in the tax auditor who oversees the investigating of tax evasion 
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 Neo-patrimonialism is a term that originated from Shmuel N. Eisenstadt work (1973) to describe a 
system of social hierarchy where the real power does not always lie to those who hold the higher 
position, instead, the real power is owned by the actor whose with ultimate control of networks. 
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also having a target. Aside from the lack of professionalism as mentioned earlier, the 
other implication of the tax target system is the common practice of collecting the 
following year’s taxes in the current fiscal period due to harsher target pressure. 
Conversely, the tax office might face a morally hazardous situation by overlooking 
taxpayers’ non-compliance as it has already achieved its target and takes advantage of 
the situation by using its discretionary power to pursue ‘rent-seeking’ from taxpayers. 
Regarding the inadequate human resources, the DGT faces a complicated situation as 
the organisation is dealing with a shortage of personnel, a lack of competence, and a 
rigid staff rotation mechanism.102 The DGT’s structure under the MoF provides little 
autonomy for the DGT to self-regulate with respect to human resources management. 
Hence, a new arrangement that includes adequate training for the auditing staff, 
allowing specialisation instead of general staff rotation, recruiting new talent that 
focuses on the long-term goal and more importantly, a refinement of the human 
resources management system, are worthy of consideration by policymakers. 
Poor data management can be attributed to poor data availability, ineffective 
management and the absence of a reliable information system. Although the DGT has 
recognised the problem and has taken action to address the issue, the outcomes are 
still below expectations. As an institution that relies on data and information in order 
perform efficiently, the DGT needs to aggressively seek the support of other 
institutions that can provide necessary information such as banking information, for 
example, so as to have a seamless collaboration. Secondly, a ‘de facto’ political will 
from the government is a must as it becomes one of the solutions to this issue since 
legislative adjustments must and can be made. The improvement of the tax audit 
system and the introduction of a single, reliable information system are keys to data 
management refinement in the DGT’s information system and should be prioritised. 
As a chronic problem in developing countries, poor coordination is considered as one 
of the major problems of the DGT that hampers its administrative competence. The 
challenge of geographically-dispersed tax offices across the Indonesian archipelago, the 
pressure to achieve revenue targets and ‘sectoral-ego’ among tax offices have reduced 
                                                          
102
 See subsection 7.4.1.3 for detail of the problems. 
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the cooperation instead of building synergy among units of the DGT.  The issue of this 
administrative incompetence, to some extent, has been overlooked in tax policy 
formulation, and thus, it is imperative that policymakers understand the dynamics of 
tax administrations as each one has its own characteristics. 
As a regulator, the DGT is expected to implement several policies that would improve 
large corporate taxpayers’ compliance, aside from the internal improvements 
suggested above.   
The findings of factors that influence large businesses’ tax compliance would provide a 
valuable contribution to improving taxpayers’ compliance, specifically in Indonesia.  
The DGT should realise that addressing non-compliance can no longer be done 
exclusively through an audit-based approach as the factors underlying taxpayer’s 
compliance behaviour are varied and complex, and unlikely to be resolved by audit 
only. Nevertheless, the tax audit remains a significant tool for handling non-
compliance as it ensures that taxpayers are complying with the laws. In this regard, 
this study has found that the adjustment of audit strategy would have significant 
benefit as the findings pertain to the Indonesian context. By considering the findings 
when establishing an audit strategy policy, it is expected that the accuracy of non-
compliance detection would be improved as it would sort out the large firms according 
to their compliance risks, for example, those with undisclosed high-risk transactions or 
arrangements or abnormally low tax payments in a specific situation. 
However, although the development of a specific standardised tax audit strategy in the 
case of large businesses is necessary, it is recommended that the DGT have a flexible 
policy that encourages voluntary compliance. Acknowledging the significance of large 
businesses’ contribution to State revenue and working together to achieve common 
goals, are two primary examples of compliance strategy that can be applied. The 
introduction of a Taxpayers’ Charter would be a sign of goodwill from the DGT as its 
guidelines would indicate how the DGT interacts with taxpayers. Further, the Charter 
would signify that the taxpayers’ rights and obligations are taken seriously as it guides 
the DGT’s actions. Another strategy is to involve intermediaries such as external 
auditors and tax consultants to maintain taxpayers’ compliance within the acceptable 
level. Appointment of an external tax advisor may have two opposing effects, either to 
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encourage or discourage taxpayers to comply then an appropriate strategy to regulate 
these parties is critical as a safeguard for the DGT to ensure that the tax advisors will 
improve taxpayers’ compliance rather than assist taxpayer’s aggressive tax planning.  
Moreover, the adoption of a responsive regulation approach is desirable as this 
approach emphasises cooperative compliance that encourages voluntary compliance. 
By implementing an approach that involves consulting and collaborating with 
taxpayers when managing their tax risks and minimising compliance costs, it is 
expected that taxpayers’ engagement in voluntary compliance would improve. Further, 
those large firms that have a sound tax risk management system and continuous 
communication of tax-related problems would be perceived as transparent with the 
intention to establish mutual trust. Consequently, a better relationship leads to less 
audit intervention that will save the DGT’s finite resources and improve certainty for 
both taxpayers and the DGT.    
However, it is worth noting that there is no best practice, one-size-fits-all solution, and 
thus a system should be tailored according to the respective tax administration’s 
situation. Aside from the technical aspects of a new policy, an understanding of the 
principles underlying the new policy, the regulatory infrastructures, cultural 
background and institutional arrangements is necessary. Moreover, a consideration of 
the time required, prerequisite conditions, smooth communication and continuous 
dialogues with the participants, and effective strategies to handle not only the 
resistants but also the embedded counterproductive culture within the DGT, are the 
elements that will determine the success of a newly implemented policy.  
In summary, two major issues need to be resolved by the DGT in order to foster large 
business tax compliance in Indonesia; these are (i) an improvement of the DGT’s 
internal capacity to respond to non-compliance, and (ii) a sound strategy to regulate 
large business tax compliance. Further, this study suggests that all stakeholders should 
be informed about the changes that will occur, and the reform of institutions outside 
the DGT might be crucial as the weaknesses of institutions such as the general public 
administration system, parliament and the judiciary might hamper the DGT’s function 
as the State’s revenue collector.     
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8.5 Limitations 
This study was designed to explain the large business tax compliance risk behaviour in 
Indonesia by using a qualitative method approach to capture the phenomenon 
comprehensively as required by the research objectives. However, it should be noted 
that several limitations of this study should be acknowledged. In this regard, the 
findings in the study should be interpreted with caution to ensure the accuracy of 
further research and the correct use of policy formulation. 
The first limitation is related to the determination of the factors that affect large 
business tax compliance. This study was developed based on a number of past studies 
that cover many countries as well as different research methods. There is no a 
generally accepted way to determine the factors that influence compliance, and the 
exact relationship between large businesses tax compliance and their motive to either 
to comply or not comply is also unclear. Therefore, caution should be taken in 
interpreting the findings. Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that this study followed the 
study of van der Hel-van Dijk-van Dijk, and Siglé, (2015) in terms of the categorisation 
of factors in order to maintain the synchronicity and consistency of tax research.  
The second limitation relates to the sample which included tax managers employed by 
large businesses in Indonesia. While to some extent, these participants’ responses were 
valuable indications of their respective organisations’ behaviour, a question such as 
“What makes your company pay taxes?” may elicit a biased response as the 
participants have different behaviour as an individual that affect their perspectives 
accordingly. Moreover, the sample included large corporate taxpayers in Indonesia, so 
the findings cannot be generalised to other countries and contexts.  Other countries 
may have different non-compliance intentions and behavioural characteristics that 
may influence the outcomes, although it is believed to some extent the findings of this 
study are expected to have relevance in other jurisdictions. 
The third limitation is this study’s reliance on interviews as a source of data. As this 
method relies on participant’s responses to the questions, the quality of the answers 
may be affected by the participant’s ability to accurately and honestly recall and 
express experiences, thoughts, opinions or behaviours that, moreover, might also be 
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affected by emotional strain. The boundaries would include the notion that tax is 
regarded as a sensitive issue that may cause discomfort to participants and prevent 
them from answering honestly and accurately. Furthermore, in terms of transforming 
the raw data from the interview into accessible information, the possibility of 
inconsistency, inaccuracy and subconscious bias might occur, and although several 
precautions were taken to minimise the issue, there is potential for disparity between 
the original and the final data.  
The fourth limitation is related to the amount of corporate tax compliance literature 
that is available. As an area of study that has burgeoned in recent years, tax research 
on corporate taxpayers alone has outperformed other tax research areas more than six-
fold (Feller & Schanz, 2014). Therefore, it was not feasible to locate and review every 
available reference due to resource and time constraints. As a consequence, most of 
the literature reviewed in this study was published in English. Hence, relevant works 
published in other languages may have been overlooked, and the effect of this 
omission is unknown.   
Nevertheless, feasible precautions have been taken in the study to minimise the 
identified limitations. In addition, most of the acknowledged limitations are inherent 
to this type of research and are therefore inevitable; these limitations should not lessen 
the value of the study as appropriate measures have been applied to ensure validity 
and reliability. 
8.6 Suggestions for future research 
Tax compliance is a vast topic, and there is no single study that is able to generate a 
comprehensive understanding of every aspect of the issue despite ongoing and ample 
research conducted in recent years. It is especially true in relation to the situation of 
tax administration in developing countries where a significant improvement in 
taxpayer compliance is most needed. Therefore, further studies on the subject of 
corporate tax compliance are necessary to address gaps in the body of knowledge.  
The aim of this study was to investigate the factors that influence large businesses tax 
compliance risks in Indonesia and the responses of the respective tax authority in 
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managing those risks situation. Future research could consider a non-qualitative 
approach to measure and determine the relationship between factors. This would 
enable a more comprehensive comparison of the research outcomes and provide a 
better understanding of large business behaviour toward taxation. For example, studies 
emphasising tax savings restricted to the sector of the economy.  A wider coverage of 
participants or respondents also could be included in future research in order to 
capture the voice of a wider population as this would provide a more complete 
explanation of the large business behaviour phenomenon. 
Future research could also explore the factors that influence large businesses’ tax 
compliance in other developing countries as this study’s findings apply only to the 
Indonesian situation. Most of the previous studies on taxation compliance have been 
conducted in developed countries. The theories that have emerged from these studies 
can be extended and enriched with similar studies in developing countries, thereby 
offering a more comprehensive picture of large business compliance.  
Another improvement could be made by investigating the outcomes achieved by other 
tax authorities in other developing countries when managing large businesses tax 
compliance risks. Further, future research could propose better strategies that are 
more appropriate for developing countries. For instance, the experiences of other 
developing countries in adopting compliance strategies can be compared and adopted 
to generate better strategies. Further taxation studies are also needed to validate the 
findings of this study as they would complement and enrich the understanding of large 
businesses’ behaviour regarding their tax compliance. 
8.7 Concluding remarks 
The study of large businesses’ tax compliance is especially important for Indonesia, 
because of the volume of tax revenue which is collected from large corporate 
taxpayers. A better understanding of large businesses’ behaviour in a developing 
country would contribute not only to the body of knowledge but also more 
importantly to the policymakers in the respective country to improve their strategies 
for large corporate taxpayers. This study investigated the factors influencing large 
businesses’ compliance risks in Indonesia and how the respective tax authority 
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manages these risks. It is anticipated that this study will offer a better understanding 
of the motives and behaviours of large business in regard to taxation, and the parallel 
experiences of the tax authority in a developing country. Moreover, it is expected that 
the findings derived from this study will enable those who are concerned with large 
corporate taxpayers’ compliance to establish sound strategies to anticipate the more 
aggressive attempts by taxpayers to avoid compliance, and to improve voluntary 
compliance with the ultimate objective of improving public welfare.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A  
The hierarchy of rules and regulations in Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
In addition, Presidential Instructions and Decrees, Ministerial Decrees and 
Circulation Letters are recognised as which add further detail to Laws and 
Government Regulation. 
Source: Article 7 of Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Formulation of Law and Regulations 
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Appendix B  
The DGT's organisational structure  
 
 
Source: DGT (2017) p. 34. (Modified) 
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Appendix C  
Interview questions  
 
A. Tax officials 
1. What is your assessment of the large business compliance behaviour? In terms 
of large business tax noncompliance, is there any major issue at stake?  
2. If a company is not complying with the tax law, what are the factors that may 
cause of this noncompliance?  
3. Currently, what is the approach of the Tax Office to anticipating these 
noncompliance risks?  
4. If a taxpayer contravenes the tax law, how does the tax office manage this 
noncompliance taxpayer?  
5. What is your assessment of the responsive regulation approach? 
 
B. Tax managers 
1. What factors do you think are the most significant for your organisation’s 
compliance: 
a. The tax structure, for example, tax rate, audit likelihood and tax sanctions 
or, 
b. The quality of tax administration, for instance, the level of trust and the level 
of service? 
2. To what extent is your company’s reputation significant? Is there any legal issue 
about tax compliance between your company and the tax office?  
3. Who has the final authority to decide tax matters in your company? Does this 
person take full responsibility for any dispute occurring between your business 
and the Tax Office? What is the potential downside if the company is 
unsuccessful in litigation with the Tax Office? 
4. What is your assessment of the responsive regulation approach? 
 
C. Tax advisors 
1. What is your assessment of the large business compliance behaviour? In terms 
of large business tax noncompliance, is there any significant issue at stake?  
2. Are there some factors that may prevent large companies from complying? 
What factor is the greatest risk to tax compliance?  
3. Should the tax authority differentiate its treatment according to a taxpayer’s 
commitment to compliance? For example by imposing stricter penalties to 
those repeatedly committing infringements and otherwise by providing 
incentives to those who always comply with tax regulation.   
4. What should the tax office do to obtain a better compliance by the corporate 
taxpayer? 
5. What is your assessment of the responsive regulation approach? 
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Appendix E  
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Participants Information and Consent Forms (Bahasa Indonesia) 
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No.  Code Participant's Responses Themes Sub Themes
5 TO01
Regulasi adalah basis utama dalam setiap tindakan tiap tax officer ya. Yang menjadi 
permasalahan di sini adalah banyak hal yang sifatnya masih gray area, masih abu-abu Regulation Ambiguity
5 TO01
knowledge yang paling utama jadi kendala. Kalau untuk knowledge di bidang lain tidak 
masalah,  tapi knowledge mengenai international tax, dan TP Institutional Capacity Human resources issue
5 TO01
Semakin kompleks sebuah perusahaan, semakin banyak intercompany transaction, maka 
semakin besar risiko untuk avoidance atau bahkan evasion . Itu berbeda itu kalau dia 
perusahaan tunggal, tidak mempunyai afiliasi yang banyak, atau hanya punya satu atau dua 
afiliasi itu relatif gampang untuk bisa dikontrol oleh kantor pajak. Dan mereka tidak 
mempunyai transaksi yang sifatnya distorted by related parties. Jadi dia adalah market, 
market, market transaction, market based transaction, transaction based on market gitu. Bukan 
seperti transaksi afiliasi. Jadi struktur perusahaan itu semakin dia kompleks, kecenderungan 
Corp Characteristics
Ownership structure & 
business size
5 TO01
Saya hanya bisa membandingkan sebelum ada konsultan dengan sesudah. Kalau sesudah, 
pajaknya semakin turun sementara kondisi ekonomi ini increase, tapi tax nya malah 
decrease,  dan itu terjadi setelah ada konsultan, saya pasti menduga itu adalah ulah konsultan. 
Tapi tidak sertamerta karena itu. Artinya itu adalah indikator, mungkin ini ada istilahnya 
avoidance action yang disarankan oleh konsultan sehingga pajaknya turun. Itu paling yang bisa 
kita deteksi seperti itu. Jadi kami selama ini tidak ada pernah memutuskan, ini karena 
konsultan nih. Kita tidak fokus ke konsultannya, tapi ke wajib pajaknya.
Corp Characteristics Use of tax advisor
5 TO02
Ada beberapa sih wajib pajak yang dari sistem pengendalian internal mereka itu ada, ada 
saya ketemukan dalam datanya ada 1 barangkali yang wajib pajaknya gak, gak ini ya-- 
Sebenarnya menurut mereka patuh dari sisi akuntansi segala macam, tapi dari-- Karena 
kekurangan pengetahuan dari tim manajemennya mereka sehingga ada beberapa yang, yang 
dalam pengisian SPTnya kita, kita karena kita terkait dengan audit makanya ada beberapa yang 
Corp Characteristics TRM
5 TO03
 Tapi ketidakpatuhan dalam konteks ini adalah ketika mereka sendiri terbentur dengan kondisi 
sektor usaha mereka yang sedang carut-marut ini. Ketika carut marut ini sama sibuk kayak gini 
ya--  jadi terkadang kan tax di nomor duakan. Tax di nomor duakan dalam konteks gini 
loh misalnya dia punya uang pas-pasan . Bayar hutang pajak katakanlah gitu bayar utang 
Corp Characteristics Financial constraint
5 TO03
Kalau kita mau mengadministrasikan WP supaya memang dia sesuai dengan UU memang 
harus sistem yang terbangun. Sistem itu bangun, satu sistem yang terbangun kedua adalah 
penegak hukum yang severely, yang serius. Itu dua poin.  Kalau itu masih belum belum tegak 
bener sistemnya belum  realiable dan penegakan hukum juga belum tegak benar itu 
memang jadi tingkat ketidakpatuhan , penyimpangan- - irregulated lah ya irregulated itu 
memungkinkan, poin saya itu. 
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Appendix I  
List of Interviews  
No. Interviewee 
Interview Date 
(dd/mm/yy) 
Duration                (in 
minutes) 
1 TO-01 05/01/15 48:18 
2 TO-02 11/08/15 24:31 
3 TO-03 24/08/15 41:50 
4 TO-04 12/08/15 34:23 
5 TO-05 25/08/15 22:06 
6 TO-06 18/08/15 33:07 
7 TO-07 18/08/15 28:53 
8 TO-08 12/01/15 30:14 
9 TO-09 20/08/15 22:08 
10 TO-10 13/08/15 31:57 
11 TO-11 11/08/15 26:16 
12 TO-12 26/08/15 47:06 
13 TO-13 25/08/15 25:54 
14 TO-14 13/08/15 16:08 
15 TO-15 18/08/15 40:46 
16 TO-16 11/08/15 18:44 
17 TO-17 12/01/15 21:43 
18 TO-18 12/08/15 40:27 
19 TO-19 13/08/15 21:27 
20 TO-20 05/01/15 43:24 
21 TO-21 12/08/15 31:15 
22 TA-01 08/10/15 42:49 
23 TA-02 08/09/15 01:12:27 
24 TA-03 04/10/15 42:45 
25 TA-04 08/10/15 39:27 
26 TA-05 02/10/15 26:51 
27 TA-06 07/10/15 01:16:54 
28 TA-07 21/09/15 39:31 
29 TA-08 23/10/15 59:54 
30 TA-09 30/10/15 52:14 
31 TA-10 28/10/15 56:22 
32 TA-11 22/10/15 43:43 
33 TA-12 06/10/15 32:44 
34 TA-13 12/10/15 26:20 
35 TA-14 22/09/15 01:11:03 
36 TM-01 29/10/15 48:49 
37 TM-02 21/10/15 32:17 
38 TM-03 23/09/15 29:57 
39 TM-04 06/11/15 43:13 
40 TM-05 05/11/15 42:15 
41 TM-06 22/10/15 44:38 
42 TM-07 27/10/15 47:45 
43 TM-08 29/10/15 43:37 
44 TM-09 17/10/15 35:19 
45 TM-10 05/11/15 26:45 
46 TM-11 21/10/15 33:39 
47 TM-12 23/10/15 36:46 
48 TM-13 09/10/15 50:14 
 
